Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Sunday, June 23, 2019

How to Time Market Tops and Bottoms

On this first full weekend of Summer, we thought we would revisit our June 3, 2019 research post regarding a price pattern we love to trade – the Fibonacci Extension Bounce. This pattern sets up fairly often and the key to understanding this pattern and where these trades present real opportunity is in understanding the price dynamics behind these extensions. There are many instances where a Fibonacci price extension level will fail to promote a price bounce or rebound – and the price will just keep trending higher or lower past the extension level.

You can read our original research post here that clearly shows the bottom and our price targets.

Pay very close attention to the price levels and setups of the charts within that June 3, 2019 post. These setups are based on what we term a “100% Fibonacci Extension” from a previous trend reversal (peak or valley). The concept of this trading pattern is that the initial “impulse” price move sets up the first leg of a move. The retracement price move sets up the entry trigger for the second price leg – the next 100% price leg. The bottom, in this case, of the second 100% price leg sets up the “end of the move” and the potential for a price rotation in the opposite direction (likely resulting in a 38% to 61%+ retracement move).

In both instances of our June 3 calls, Crude Oil and the ES followed through exactly as we predicted.

This first chart of Crude Oil shows how price bottomed near $52 and has recently advanced to levels near $58 after reaching the 100% Fibonacci extension levels. As this move higher extends to levels near the ORANGE moving average line on this chart and/or beyond the $58 to $59 target level we originally drew on our June 3rd charts, we would consider the upside price move “completed” based on our expectations. Yes, these types of trend could extend even further beyond our expectations. But our objective, as skilled traders, is to target and profit from the highest probability objectives – which was the move from $52 to near current price levels.

Follow the MAGENTA lines on these charts to see the Fibonacci Extension Pattern Setup. They are not hard to see on the charts when your eyes are trained to identify them.




This ES Daily chart shows the incredible +230 point rally that took place after our June 3 research post and after the Fibonacci extension pattern completed. It is really hard to miss the opportunity with a move like this. Again, follow the MAGENTA lines on this chart to see the Fibonacci Extension pattern setup.

At this point on the ES chart, the upside price rally has resulted in a 161% (roughly) upside price advance of the previous Fibonacci Extension pattern (last leg). This upside price leg range, 161%, suggests the upside price move should be close to ending soon. There is a possibility that price could advance to levels near 200% of the previous price leg range, but traders would be chasing a 25% further upside advance that may only be a low probability outcome.




Our advice for skilled traders is to pare back existing open long trade positions near these new all-time highs. The price advance appears to have reached levels that suggest the upside advance may be nearing an end point for the US stock markets. After such a big upside price leg, we have to be cautious near these new all-time highs that further price rotation may become a concern.

Oil, on the other hand, could continue to rally because it has only advanced 61% of the last Fibonacci 100% price leg. The global concerns regarding Iran and the US, as well as global economic concerns, could push Oil back up to the $60 to $62 level before reaching a peak.

Over the past 21+ months, we’ve highlighted some of the best tools and techniques we use to find great trading signals. This one technique, the Fibonacci 100% Price Expansion Leg, is just one of the tools we use to find trades and targets for our trade alerts for members.

The more one understands how price works and how the markets operate as a Symphony of price actions, one can find opportunities for great trades almost all the time. Skill and experience make the difference when deciding when to trade and what to trade and that’s what we provide.


We’ve now shown you two different price setups using Fibonacci price theory and the only thing we have to do is wait for a technical price confirmation before finding our entry trade. We’ll see how this plays out over the next few days and weeks. Remember, we are not proposing these as “major price bottoms”. They are “upside pullback trades” (bounces) at this point. A bullish price pullback in a downtrend.




Stock & ETF Trading Signals

Friday, February 24, 2017

Donald Trump, Saudi Arabia, and the Petrodollar

By Nick Giambruno

Obama pulled out his veto pen 12 times during his presidency. Congress only overrode him once. In late 2016, Obama vetoed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). The bill would allow 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia in US courts. With only months left in office, Obama wasn’t worried about the political price of opposing the bill. It was worth protecting Saudi Arabia and the petrodollar system, which underpins the US dollar’s role as the world’s premier currency.

Congress didn’t see it that way though. Those up for reelection couldn’t afford to side with Saudi Arabia over US victims. So Congress voted to override Obama’s veto, and JASTA became the law of the land. The Saudis, quite correctly, see this as a huge threat. If they can be sued in US courts, their vast holdings of US assets are at risk of being frozen or seized.

The Saudi foreign minister promptly threatened to sell all of the country’s US assets. Basically, Saudi Arabia was threatening to rip up the petrodollar arrangement, which underpins the US dollar’s role as the world’s premier currency.

Donald Trump and the Saudis

Unlike every president since the petrodollar’s birth, Donald Trump is openly hostile to Saudi Arabia.
Recently he put this out on Twitter:


Dopey Prince @Alwaleed_Talal wants to control our U.S. politicians with daddy’s money. Can’t do it when I get elected.

The dopey prince that Trump is referring to is Al-Waleed bin Talal, a prominent member of the Saudi royal family. He’s also one of the largest foreign investors in the US economy, particularly in media and financial companies. The Saudis openly backed Hillary during the election. In fact, they “donated” an estimated $10 million–$25 million to the Clinton Foundation, making them the most generous foreign donors. Besides Hillary Clinton, the single biggest loser from the US presidential election was Saudi Arabia. The Saudis did not want Donald Trump in the White House. And not because of some bad blood on Twitter. There are real geopolitical issues at stake. At the moment, Trump seems determined to walk back on US support for the so called “moderate” rebels in Syria.

The Saudis are furious with the US for not holding up its part of the petrodollar deal. They think the US should have already attacked Syria as part of its commitment to keep the region safe for the monarchy.
Toppling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a longstanding Saudi goal. But a President Trump makes that unlikely. That’s not good for Saudi Arabia’s position in the Middle East, nor its relationship with the US.
This is just one of the ways President Trump will hasten the death of the petrodollar.


Saudi Arabia, Islam, and Wahhabism

I loathe quoting a neoconservative historian like Bernard Lewis, but even a broken clock is right twice a day:


Imagine if the Ku Klux Klan or Aryan Nation obtained total control of Texas and had at its disposal all the oil revenues, and used this money to establish a network of well endowed schools and colleges all over Christendom peddling their particular brand of Christianity. This is what the Saudis have done with Wahhabism. The oil money has enabled them to spread this fanatical, destructive form of Islam all over the Muslim world and among Muslims in the West. Without oil and the creation of the Saudi kingdom, Wahhabism would have remained a lunatic fringe in a marginal country.

This is actually an apt description of Wahhabism, a particularly virulent and intolerant strain of Sunni Islam most Saudis follow. ISIS, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and a slew of other extremists also follow this puritanical brand of Islam. That’s why Saudi Arabia and ISIS use the same brutal punishments, like beheadings.
Many Wahhabis consider Muslims of any other flavor—like the Shia in Iran, the Alawites in Syria, or non-Wahhabi Sunnis—apostates worthy of death.

In many ways, Saudi Arabia is an institutionalized version of ISIS. There’s even a grim joke that Saudi Arabia is simply “an ISIS that made it.” After living in the Middle East for three years, it’s clear to me that many people in the region despise everything about Wahhabism. Yet it flourishes in certain Sunni communities, among people who feel they have nowhere else to turn.

It’s also widely believed in the Middle East that Western powers deliberately fostered Wahhabism, to a degree, to keep the region weak and divided—and as a weapon against Shia Iran and its allies. That includes Syria and post-Saddam Iraq, which has shifted its allegiance towards Iran. Thanks to WikiLeaks we know the Saudi and Qatari governments, which are also the two largest foreign donors to the Clinton Foundation, willfully financed ISIS to help topple Bashar al-Assad of Syria. Julian Assange says the email revealing this is the most significant among the Clinton related emails his group has released.

Here’s an excerpt of the relevant interview with Assange:


Interviewer: Of course, the consequence of that is that this notorious jihadist group, called ISIL or ISIS, is created largely with money from people who are giving money to the Clinton Foundation?
Julian Assange: Yes.
Interviewer: That’s extraordinary….

With all this in mind, Vladimir Putin opened an unusual conference of Sunni Muslim clerics recently. It took place in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, a Sunni Muslim region within Russia’s southwestern border.
The conference, which included 200 of the top non-Wahhabi Sunni Muslim clerics, issued an extraordinary statement labeling Wahhabism “a dangerous deformation” of Sunni Islam. These clerics carry serious weight in the Sunni world. The imam of Egypt’s al-Azhar mosque, one of the most important Islamic theological centers, was among them. (Egypt is the Arab world’s most populous Sunni country.)

Basically, Putin gathered the world’s most important non Wahhabi clerics to “excommunicate” the Saudis from Sunni Islam. In other words, Putin is going for the jugular of the petrodollar system. Russia and Saudi Arabia have been enemies for decades. The Russians have never forgiven Saudi Arabia (or the US) for supporting the Afghan mujahedeen that drove the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan. And they haven’t forgiven the Saudis for supporting multiple Chechen rebellions. As far as I know, the British writer Robert Fisk was the only Western journalist to cover this extraordinary conference.

Here’s Fisk:
Who are the real representatives of Sunni Muslims if the Saudis are to be shoved aside? And what is the future of Saudi Arabia? Of such questions are revolutions made.

If the Saudis are shoved aside, it could strike a fatal blow to the petrodollar system. The truth is, the petrodollar system is in its death throes. It doesn’t matter if the Saudis willfully abandon it, or if it crumbles because the kingdom implodes. The end result will be the same. Right now, the stars are aligning against the Saudi kingdom. This is its most vulnerable moment since its 1932 founding.

That’s why I think the death of the petrodollar system is the No. 1 black swan event for 2017

I expect the dollar price of gold to soar when the petrodollar system crumbles in the not-so-distant future. You don’t want to find yourself on the wrong side of history when that happens. But that brings up another crucial point.

There’s also likely to be severe inflation
The petrodollar system has allowed the US government and many Americans to live way beyond their means for decades. The US takes this unique position for granted. But it will disappear once the dollar loses its premier status.

This will likely be the tipping point….

Afterward, the US government will be desperate enough to implement capital controls, people controls, nationalization of retirement savings, and other forms of wealth confiscation. I urge you to prepare for the economic and sociopolitical fallout while you still can. Expect bigger government, less freedom, shrinking prosperity and possibly worse. It’s probably not going to happen tomorrow. But it’s clear where the trend is headed. It is very possible that one day soon, Americans will wake up to a new reality.

Once the petrodollar system kicks the bucket and the dollar loses its status as the world’s premier reserve currency, you will have few, if any, options. The sad truth is, most people have no idea how bad things could get, let alone how to prepare. Yet there are straightforward steps you can start taking today to protect your savings and yourself from the financial and sociopolitical effects of the collapse of the petrodollar.

This recently released video will show you where to begin. Click here to watch it now.


The article Donald Trump, Saudi Arabia, and the Petrodollar was originally published at caseyresearch.com




Stock & ETF Trading Signals



Friday, May 15, 2015

Phil Flynn on the Growl of the Crude Oil Bears

While the bearish oil traders have been missed out on a rally for almost $20 a barrel, they are now doubling down on their bearish calls .This comes after today may set a near record 9th week of gains for the most consecutive weekly gains in at least 30 years. Yet despite that prices run bearish, market talk is getting louder and at least for right now some market participants are starting to listen. As oil tried for new highs for the years this week the bearish calls came from high and low and the press has been widely covering them and may have caused some traders to take profits. Many Bears still think that the market has been wrong for the last 9 weeks and an inevitable price collapses is just around the corner.

Bearish traders focused on the fact that U.S. production had held steady last week and talk that refiner demand has fallen. Refiners cut runs by the most in four months but have been refining product at a near record pace for this time of year. They point out that even though that U.S. supply is starting to fall it does not take away from the fact that we put away over 117 million barrels in storage over the last 6 months. Yet oil has rallied 9 weeks in a row in spite of that. Or that refined product increased in March despite the fact that normally refined product falls. Yet it may not be the lack of demand that caused that but strong refining margins that is encouraging refiners to ramp up production ahead of what should be an uptick in demand.

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We also hear some bears complain that the only reason that oil did not go down to $25 a barrel was an increase in the value of the dollar! Well they might also argue that oil would not have gone down into the $40 handle unless the dollar soared. If you look at the chart of the dollar it went straight up after the November OPEC meeting because of the thought that the U.S. was going to start raising interest rates while the rest of the world either lowered rates. While that is going to happen the fear that the U.S. would start rate increases almost immediately obviously is not going to happen. So know these dollars has adjusted by falling as U.S. data is weaker than expected. Still today an uptick in the dollar is weighing on oil.

Oil is also anticipating an uptick in demand as global easing will spark demand. Despite talk of weak demand in China they just imported a record amount of oil. Oil products did show strength as RBOB futures rallied off of refining problems. Glitch in the Mid-west could help provide some back door support for oil.

Uncertainty about the success of President Obama's Camp David Iran Deal initiative. The President tried to assure Mid-East Leaders that the U.S. would rise up and defend them from any attack. It looks like we could have an arms race in the Middle East. Gold is giving back a big part of its recent rally as the dollar tries for a comeback. The talk that India's demand was rising had been a supporting factor. Support also came from The World Gold Council report that said that Germany's demand for gold and coins spiked by 20% in the first quarter from the year before. Do you think the average German is a little worried about the impact of QE and a Greek bail out on their purchasing power? Yet global gold demand fell 1% in the first quarter, as Chinese jewelry demand fell hard. The Report now expects India to overtake China as the world's largest gold consumer.

Phil Flynn
The PRICE Group

See Phil on the Fox Business Network! Market Watch says he is a must follow, follow him on Twitter @energyphilflynn or email Phil at pflynn@pricegroup.com.

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Friday, February 13, 2015

Jim Rogers on Opportunities in Russia and Other Hated Markets

By Nick Giambruno

Nick Giambruno: Welcome, Jim. As you know, Doug Casey and I travel the world surveying crisis markets, and we always like to get your take on things. Today I want to talk to you about Russia, which is a very hated market right now. What are your thoughts on Russia in general and on Russian stocks in particular?

Jim Rogers: Well, I’m optimistic about the future of Russia. I was optimistic before this war started in Ukraine, which was instigated by the US, of course. But in any case, I bought more Russia during the Crimea incident, and I’m looking to buy still more.

Unfortunately, what’s happening is certainly not good for the United States. It’s driving Russia and Asia together, which means we’re going to suffer in the long run—the US and Europe. Another of the big four Chinese banks opened a branch in Moscow recently. The Iranians are getting closer to the Russians. The Russians recently finished a railroad into North Korea down to the Port Rason, which is the northernmost ice-free port in Asia. The Russians have put a lot of money into the Trans-Siberian railroad to update it and upgrade it, all of which goes right by China.

Usually, people who do a lot of business together wind up doing other things together, such as fighting wars, but this isn’t any kind of immediate development. I don’t think the Russians, the Chinese, and the Iranians are about to invade America.

Nick: So because of these economic ties to Asia, the Russians are not as dependent on the West. Is that why you’re optimistic about Russia?

Jim: I first went to the Soviet Union in 1966, and I came away very pessimistic. And I was pessimistic for the next 47 years, because I didn’t see how it could possibly work. But then I started noticing, a year or two ago, that now everybody hates Russia—the market is not at all interesting to anybody anymore.

You may remember in the 1990s, and even the first decade of this century, everybody was enthusiastic about Russia. Lots of people had periodic bouts of huge enthusiasm. I was short the ruble in 1998, but other than that, I had never invested in Russia, certainly not on the long side. But a year or two ago I started noticing that things are changing in Russia… something is going on in the Kremlin. They understand they can’t just shoot people, confiscate people’s assets. They have to play by the rules if they want to develop their economy.

Now Russia has a convertible currency—and most countries don’t have convertible currencies, but the Russians do. They have fairly large foreign currency reserves and are building up more assets. Having driven across Russia a couple of times, I know they have vast natural resources. And now that the Trans-Siberian Railway has been rebuilt, it’s a huge asset as well.

So I see all these things. I knew the market was depressed, knew nobody liked it, so I started looking for and finding a few investments in Russia.

Nick: Yeah, that definitely seems to make sense when you look at the sentiment and long-term fundamentals. So where do you see the conflict with Ukraine and the tensions with the West going?

Jim: Well, the tensions are going to continue to grow, at least as long as you have the same bureaucrats in Washington. You know, they all have a professional stake in making sure that things don’t calm down in the former Soviet Union—so I don’t see things getting better any time soon.

I do notice that some companies and even countries have started pulling back from the sanctions. Many companies and people are starting to say, “Wait a minute, what is all this about?”

People are starting to reexamine the propaganda that comes out of Washington. Even the Germans are starting to reassess the situation. I suspect that things will cool off eventually, because the U.S. doesn’t have much support and they’ve got plenty of other wars they want to fight or are keen to get started.

So Russia will become more and more dominant in Ukraine. The east is more or less Russian. Crimea was always Russian until Khrushchev got drunk one night and gave it away. So I suspect you will see more and more disintegration of Ukraine, which by the way is good for Ukraine and good for the world.

We don’t complain when the Scots have an election as to whether they want to leave the UK or not. People in Spain want to leave. We say we’re in favor of self-determination. We let Czechoslovakia break up, Yugoslavia break up, Ethiopia break up. These things are usually good. Many borders that exist are historic anomalies, and they should break up. Just because something happened after the First World War or Second World War and some bureaucrats drew a border doesn’t mean it’s logical or should survive.

So I suspect you will see more of eastern Ukraine becoming more and more Russian. I don’t see America going to war, I certainly don’t see Europe going to war over Ukraine, and so America will just sort of slowly slide away and have to admit another miscalculation.

Nick: I agree. Would you also say that Europe’s dependence on Russia for energy limits how far the sanctions can go? There’s been speculation that the Europeans are going to cut Russia out of the SWIFT system, like they did with Iran.

Jim: Well, anything can happen. I noticed SWIFT’s reaction when America tried to force them to do that: they were not very happy at all. I’m an American citizen like you, and unfortunately the bigger picture is forcing the Russians, the Chinese, and others to accelerate in finding an alternative. That is not good for the US.

The Americans have a monopoly, because everyone who uses dollars has to get them cleared through New York. People were already starting to worry in the past few years about the American dominance of the system and its ability to just close everything down.

So now the Russians and Chinese and others are accelerating their efforts to find an alternative to SWIFT and to the American dollar and the dominance of the US financial system. As I said earlier, none of this is good for the US. We think we’re hurting the Russians. We are actually hurting ourselves very badly in the long term.

Nick: I think one area where you can really see this is that the US essentially kicked Russia out of Visa and MasterCard. And what did Russia do? They turned to China UnionPay, which is China’s payment processor.

Jim: We could go on and on. There are things that have happened, and everything is underway now because Putin has told everybody, “Okay, we’ve got to reexamine our whole way of life that has evolved since the Berlin Wall fell,” and that’s one of the things. By the way, the Chinese love all of this. It’s certainly good for China. It’s not good for the US in the end, but it’s great for China and some Asian countries, such as Iran.

Nothing we have done has been good for America since this whole thing started—nothing. Everything we’ve done has been good for the Chinese.

Nick: So why are they doing it?

Jim: You know as well as I do: these are bureaucrats who shouldn’t be there in the first place. Power corrupts, and it has. You look at the beginning of the First World War, the Emperor, who was 85 years old at the time, made nine demands on the Serbians. Serbia met eight of his demands. For whatever reason they couldn’t meet the ninth. And so they said, “Okay, that’s it… war.” And then everybody was at war.

The bureaucrats everywhere piled in with great enthusiasm—great headlines about how the war will be over by Christmas. By the way, whenever wars start, the headlines always say the war will be over by Christmas, at least in Christian nations. But six months after that war started, everybody looked around and said, “What the hell are we doing?” This is madness. Millions of people are being killed. Billions of dollars are being lost.

This is not good for anybody. And why did it start? Nobody could even tell you why it started, but unfortunately it went on for four years with massive amounts of destruction, all because a few bureaucrats and an old man couldn’t get their acts together. None of that was necessary. Nearly all wars start like that. If you examine the beginning of any war, years later you ask, “How did it happen? Why did it happen?” And usually there’s not much explanation. The winners write history, so the winners always have a good explanation, but more objective people are usually confused.

Nick: Excellent points that you make, Jim. I want to shift gears a little bit. I know you’re a fan of agriculture, and parts of Russia and Ukraine are among the most fertile regions in the world. Investing there is a nice way to get into agriculture and also Russia at the same time. What do you think about companies and stocks that own and operate farmland in that region?

Jim: Well, historically you’re right. Ukraine was one of the major breadbaskets of the world, and some of those vast Russian lands were great breadbaskets at times in history. Communism can and does ruin everything it touches. It ruined Soviet agriculture, but many of those places have great potential and will revive.

I haven’t actually gone and examined the soil myself to see that it’s still fertile, but I assume it is because you see the production numbers. That part of the world should be and will be great agricultural producers again. It’s just a question of when and who.

By the way, I have recently become a director of a large Russian phosphorous/fertilizer company, partly for the reasons you’re discussing.

(Editor’s Note: We recently discussed how investors can access agricultural investment opportunities in Russia. There's an accessible stock that makes it easy to do just that. For all the details, you may want to check out Crisis Speculator.)

Nick: We were talking about Russia and Iran. I’ve had the chance to travel to Iran. It has a remarkably vibrant stock market, all things considered. It’s not heavily dependent on natural resources. They have consumer goods companies, tech companies, and so forth.

Do you see the potential for Iran to open up anytime soon, maybe a Nixon-goes-to-China moment?

Jim: I bought Iranian shares in 1993, and over the next few years it went up something like 47 times, so it was an astonishing success. I got a lot of my money out, but some of it is still trapped there. I don’t know if I could ever find it, but I took so much out it didn’t really matter.

Yes, I know that there’s an interesting market there. I know there’s a vibrant society there. I know huge numbers of Iranians who are under 30, and they want to live a different life. It is changing slowly, but it’s in the process.

Part of it, of course, is because the West has characterized them as demons and evil, which makes it harder. I was never very keen on things like that. Throughout history and in my own experience, engagement is usually a better way to change things than ignoring people and forcing them to close in and get bitter about the outside world.

So I don’t particularly approve of our approach or anybody’s approach to Iran. I certainly don’t approve of old man Khamenei’s approach to Iran either. There were mistakes made in the early days on both sides. But that’s all changing now. I see great opportunities in Iran. If they don’t open to the West, they’re going to open to Asia and to Russia.

There are fabulous opportunities in Iran, with over 70 million people, vast assets, lots of entrepreneur-type people, smart people, and educated people. Iran is Persia. Persia was one of the great nations of world history for many centuries.

So it’s not as though they were a bunch of backward people sitting over there who can’t read or find other people on the map. Persia has enormous potential, and they will develop it again.

Nick: I completely agree, and we’re looking at Iran closely, too. If the West doesn’t open up to Iran, it’s going to lose out to the Chinese and the Russians, who are going to gobble up that opportunity and really eat the Americans’ lunch.

Of course with the sanctions, it’s pretty much illegal for Americans to invest in Iran right now.

Jim: That wasn’t always the case. Years ago, if the investment was less than a certain amount of money, and some other things, there were no problems. I don’t know the details of the current law.

Nick: It’s difficult to keep up with, because the story is constantly changing.

Jim: Well, that’s the brilliance of bureaucrats; they always have something to do. It gives them ongoing job security.

Nick: Exactly.

Nick: Another place we have on our list is Kurdistan.

Jim: The Kurds have been a pretty powerful group of people for a long time. I hope they can pull it together. An independent Kurdistan would be good for Turkey and good for everybody else. Unfortunately, again, you have all these bureaucrats who don’t like change.

I’ve certainly got it on my radar, and maybe I’ll bump into you in Iran, or Russia, or Kurdistan, or who knows where.

Nick: Sounds good Jim, we’ll be in touch.

Editor’s Note: This was an excerpt from Crisis Speculator, which uncovers the deep value investment opportunities waiting behind the news that frightens others away.
The article was originally published at internationalman.com.


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Tuesday, October 7, 2014

New Video: Obama’s Abandoning the Saudis for Iran and Dooming the Petrodollar

By Alex Daley, Chief Technology Investment Strategist

I sat down with Jim Rickards, author of many best selling economics and investing books, including his latest, titled The Death of Money. In this exclusive interview, Jim shares his view on the changes in U.S. foreign policy—the newly announced partnership with Iran to help fight ISIS and recent moves away from the petrodollar deal with Saudi Arabia—and what they mean for the dollar, gold, and investment markets in general.

This interview just scratches the surface of the topics Jim covered in his speech at the most recent Casey Research Summit in San Antonio. You can grab a complete recording of that speech, and all 25 of the others, in the Summit Audio Collection, which is on sale with a juicy preorder discount for just a few more days.



Alex Daley
Chief Technology Investment Strategist
Casey Research



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Thursday, June 26, 2014

The Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse

By John Mauldin


Ian Bremmer, NYU professor and head of the geopolitical consulting powerhouse Eurasia Group, consults at the highest levels with both governments and companies because he brings to the table robust geopolitical analysis and a compelling thesis: that we are witnessing “the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order.” We live, as his last book told us, in a “G-0” world. In today’s Outside the Box, Ian spells out what that creative destruction means in terms of events on the ground today. As Ian notes, the most prominent feature of the international landscape this year has been the expansion of geopolitical conflict. That expansion is gaining momentum, he says, creating larger-scale crises and sharpening market volatility. Hold on to the reins now as Ian take us for a ride with the “Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse.”

We’ll follow up Ian’s piece with an excellent short analysis of the Iraq situation from a Middle East expert at a large hedge fund I correspond with. Pretty straightforward take on the situation with regard to ISIS. This quagmire has real implications for the world oil supply. (It appears that the Sunni rebel forces are now in complete control of the key Baiji Refinery, which produces a third of Iraq’s output.)

Back in Dallas, it’s a little hard to focus on geopolitical events when seemingly all the news is about ongoing domestic crises. But the outrageous IRS loss of emails doesn’t really affect our portfolios all that much. What happens in Iraq or with China does. There’s just not the emotional impact.

One domestic humanitarian crisis that is brewing just south of me is the massive influx of very young children across the U.S.-Mexican border. When this was first brought to my attention a few weeks ago, I must admit that I questioned the credibility of the source. We have had young children walking across the Texas border for decades but always in rather small numbers. The first source I read said that 40,000 had already come over this year. I just found that to be non credible, but then with a little reasonable research it not only became believable but could be a bit low – it looks as many as 90,000 children will cross the border this year.

What in the name of the Wide Wide World of Sports is going on? First of all, how do you cover up something of this magnitude until it is a true crisis? When the administration and other authorities clearly knew about it last year? (The evidence is irrefutable. They knew.)

I am the father of five adopted children. In an earlier phase of my life, I was somewhat involved with Child Protective Services here in Texas. It was an emotionally difficult and heartrending experience. (One of my children came out of that system and three from outside of the United States). I have no idea how you care for 90,000 children who don’t speak the language and have no connection to their new locale. Forget the dollar cost, which could run into the tens of billions over time. These are children, and they are on our doorstep and our watch. You simply can’t ignore them and say, “They are not supposed to be here, so it’s not our responsibility.” They are children. Someone, and that means here in the U.S., is going to have to figure out how to take care of them, even if it is only to learn why they try to come and figure out where to send them back to. And frankly, trying to to send them back is going to be a logistical and legal nightmare, not to mention psychologically traumatic to the children.

Maybe someone thought that waiting until there was a crisis to let this information slip out (and we found out about it because of photos posted anonymously of children packed together in holding cells) would create momentum for immigration reform. And they may be right. But I’m not certain it’s going to result in the type of immigration reform they were hoping to get.

I have to admit that I’ve been rather tolerant of illegal immigrants over the course of my life. There are a dozen or so key issues that I think this country should focus on, but I’ve just never gotten that worked up about illegal immigration. The simple fact is that everyone here in the US is either an immigrant or descended from immigrants. It may be, too, that I’ve hired a few undocumented workers here and there in my life. As an economist, I know that we should be trying to figure out how to get more capable immigrants here, not less. What you want are educated young people who are motivated to create and work, not children as young as four or five years old who are going to need housing, education, adult supervision, health care, and most of all a loving environment where they can grow up.

It is one thing for undocumented workers to come across the border looking for jobs or for families to come across together. It is a completely different matter when tens of thousands of preteen children come across the border without parents or supervision. They didn’t get across 1500 miles of desert without significant support and a great deal of planning. This couldn’t be happening without the awareness of authorities in Mexico and the Central American countries from which these children come, and if this is truly a surprise to Homeland Security, then there is a significant failure somewhere in the system.

And if it was not a surprise? That begs a whole different series of questions.

This is a major humanitarian crisis, and it is not in the Middle East or Africa. It is on our border, and we need to figure out what to do about it NOW!

I don’t care whether you think we need to build a 20 foot high wall across the southern border of the United States or give amnesty to anyone who wants to come in (or both), something has to be done with these children. It is a staggering problem of enormous logistical proportions, and we have a simple human responsibility to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves.

And on that note I will go ahead and hit the send button, and let’s focus on the critical geopolitical events happening around the globe. Iraq is a disaster. Ukraine is a crisis. What’s happening in the China Sea is troubling. It just seems to come at you from everywhere. Even on a beautiful summer day.

Your stunned by the magnitude of it all at analyst,
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box


(From Ian Bremmer)

Dear John,
We're halfway through 2014, and the single most notable feature of the international landscape has been the expansion of geopolitical conflict. why should we care? what's the impact; what does it mean for the global economy? how should we think about geopolitics? My thoughts on the topic, looking at the four key geopolitical pieces "in play"–in Eurasia, the middle east, Asia, and the transatlantic.

Geopolitics

 

I've written for several years about the root causes of the geopolitical instability the world is presently experiencing. a new, g-zero world where the united states is less interested in providing global leadership and nobody else is willing or able to step into that role. that primary leadership vacuum is set against a context of competing foreign policy priorities from increasingly powerful emerging markets (with very different political and economic systems) and a Germany-led Europe; challenges to the international system from a revisionist Russia in decline; and difficulties in coordination from a proliferation of relevant state and non state actors even when interests are aligned. all of this has stirred tensions in the aftermath of the financial crisis: instability across the middle east after a stillborn Arab spring; a three-year Syrian civil war; a failed Russia "reset"; rising conflict between china and japan; fraying American alliances with countries like Brazil, Germany, and Saudi Arabia.

And yet geopolitical concerns haven't particularly changed our views on global markets. each conflict has been small and self contained (or the spillover wasn't perceived to matter much). Geopolitics has been troubling on the margins but not worth more than a fret.

That's about to change. though perceived as discrete events, the rise of these geopolitical tensions are all directly linked to the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order. it's a process that's gaining momentum, creating in turn larger-scale crises and broader market volatility. we've now reached the point where near to mid-term outcomes of several geopolitical conflicts could become major drivers of the global economy. that's true of Russia/Ukraine, Iraq, the east and south china seas and U.S./Europe. in each, the status quo is unsustainable (though for very different reasons). and so, as it were, the four horsemen of the geopolitical apocalypse.

Russia/Ukraine

 

The prospect of losing Ukraine was the last straw for a Russian government that has been steadily losing geopolitical influence since the collapse of the soviet union over two decades ago. Moscow sees NATO enlargement, expanded European economic integration, energy diversification and the energy revolution as direct security threats that need to be countered. Ukraine is also an opportunity for the Kremlin...for president Putin to invigorate a flagging support base at home.

Putin intends to raise the economic and military pressure on Kiev until, at a minimum, southeast Ukraine is effectively under Russian control. the Ukrainian government's latest effort in response, a unilateral week long cease fire in the southeast, was greeted with lukewarm rhetoric by Putin and rejected by Russian separatists in the region, who escalated their attacks against the Ukrainian military. meanwhile, thousands of Russian troops recently pulled back from the Ukrainian border have now been redeployed there, bolstered by Putin ordering 65,000 Russian troops on combat alert in the region.

The choices for Kiev are thankless. if they press further, violence intensifies and Russian support expands, either routing the Ukrainian military, or taking serious losses and requiring direct "formal" intervention of Russian troops. if they back off, they lose the southeast, which is critical for their internal legitimacy from the Ukrainian population at large. all the while the Ukrainian economy teeters with much of their industrial base off line, compounded by Russian disruptions on customs, trade, and gas supply.

The growing conflict will lead to further deterioration of Russia's relationship with the united states and Europe: gas flow disruptions, expansion of defense spending and NATO coordination with Poland and the Baltic states, turbulence around Moldova and Georgia given their European association agreements this week...and "level 3" sectoral sanctions against Russia. that in turn means a serious economic downturn in Russia itself...and knock-on economic implications for Europe, which has far greater exposure to Russia than the united states does.

For the last several years, the major market concern for Europe was economic: the potential for collapse of the euro zone. that's no longer a worry. the primary risk to Europe is now clearly geopolitical, that expanded Russia/Ukraine conflict hurts Europe, in worst case pushing the continent back into recession.

Iraq

 

Like so much of the world's colonial legacy, many of the middle east's borders only "worked" because of the combination of secular authoritarian rule and international military and economic support. that was certainly true of Iraq–most recently under decades of control by the Baath party, beginning in 1963. Saddam Hussein's ouster forty years later by the united states and Great Britain, combined with the dismantling of nearly all of the military and political architecture that supported him (in dramatic contrast to, say, the ouster of Egypt's hosni Mubarak) undermined Iraq's territorial integrity. since then, Iraqi governance could still nominally function given significant American military presence and military and economic aid. once that was removed, there was little left to keep iraq functioning as a country.

Sectarianism is the primary form of allegiance in iraq today, both limiting the reach of prime minister nouri al maliki's majority shia government and creating closer ties between iraq's sunni, shia and kurdish populations and their brethren outside Iraq's borders. extremism within iraq has also grown dramatically as a consequence, particularly among the now disenfranchised sunni population--made worse by their heavy losses in the war against bashar assad across the largely undefended border with syria. the tipping point came with the broad attacks by the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) over the past fortnight, speeding up a decade-long expansion of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing between iraq's Sunni and shia. the comparatively wealthy and politically stable Kurds have done their best to steer clear of the troubles, seizing a long sought opportunity for de facto independence.

The American response has been cautious. domestic support for military engagement in Iraq diminished greatly as the war in Iraq continued and the economic and human costs mounted. obama repeatedly promised an end to the occupation and considered full withdrawal a major achievement of his administration. there's little domestic upside for taking responsibility in the crisis. obama's position has accordingly been that any direct military involvement requires a change in governance from the Iraqis--initially sounding like a unity government and increasingly evolving into the replacement of prime minister maliki. the pressure on maliki has gained momentum with shia grand ayatollah ali al-sistani calling on the iraqi prime minister to broaden the government to include more kurds and sunnis.

But Maliki, having successfully fought constitutional crises and assassination attempts, to say nothing of decisively winning a democratic election, is unlikely to go. isis poses a threat to the unity of the iraqi state, but not to maliki's rule of iraq's majority shia population, which if anything now stands stronger than it did before the fighting. and maliki's key international sponsor, iran, has little interest in forcing maliki into compromise as long as there's no threat to baghdad: they see themselves in far better strategic standing with a maliki-led iraqi government where they exert overwhelming influence, than over a broader government where they're one of many competing international forces. further, even if maliki were prepared to truly share power with iraq's kurds and sunni (something made more likely by the informal "influence" of 300 us military advisors now arriving in baghdad), he's unlikely to see much enthusiasm responding to that offer. the kurds are better off sticking to nominal (and a clearer road to eventual formal) independence; and sunni leaders that publicly find common cause with maliki would better hope all their family members aren't anywhere isis can find them.
absent american (or anyone else's) significant military engagement, the iraqi government is unlikely to be able to remove isis from leadership and, accordingly, reassert control over the sunni and kurdish areas of the country. that will lead to a significant increase in extremist violence emanating from the islamic world, a trend that's already deteriorated significantly in recent years (and since obama administration officials announced that cyberattacks were the biggest national security threat to the united states--a claim president obama overturned during his west point speech last month). since 2010, the number of known jihadist fighters has more than doubled; attacks by Al Qaeda affiliates have tripled.

The combination of challenging economic conditions, sectarian leadership, and the communications revolution empowering individuals through narrowing political and ideological demographic lenses all make this much more likely to expand. that's a greater threat to stability in the poorer middle eastern markets, but also will morph back into a growing terrorist threat against western assets in the region and more broadly. that creates, in turn, demand for increased security spending and bigger concerns about fat tail terrorism in the developed world, particularly in southern and western europe (where large numbers of unintegrated and unemployed islamic populations will pose more of a direct threat).

The broader risk is that sunni/shia conflict metastasizes into a single broader war. isis declares an islamic state across sunni iraq and syria, becoming ground zero for terrorist funding and recruitment from across the region. the saudi government condemns the absence of international engagement in either conflict and directly opposes an increasingly heavy and public iranian hand in iraqi and syrian rule. the united states completes a comprehensive nuclear deal with iran and declares victory (but doesn't work meaningfully with teheran on iraq), steering clear of the growing divide between the middle east's two major powers. the gulf cooperation council starts to fragment as members see opportunity in economic engagements with Iran. Iranian "advisers" in Iraq morph into armed forces; Saudi Arabia publicly opposes isis, but Saudi money and weapons get into their hands and an abundance of informal links pop up. militarization grows between an emboldened Iran and a more isolated, defensive Saudi Arabia. that's when the geopolitical premium around energy prices becomes serious.

East/South China Sea

 

Ukraine and Iraq are the two major active geopolitical conflicts. but there are two more geopolitical points of tension involving major economies that are becoming significant.

In Asia, it's the consequences of (and reactions to) an increasingly powerful and assertive china. the growth of china's influence remains the world's most important geopolitical story by a long margin. but, at least to date, china's growth is mostly an opportunity for the rest of the world. for the middle east, it's the principal new source of energy demand as the united states becomes more energy independent. for Africa, it's the best opportunity to build out long-needed infrastructure across the continent. for Europe and even the united states, it's a critical source of credit propping up currency, and a core producer of inexpensive goods. that's not to argue that there aren't significant caveats in each of these stories (or that those caveats aren't growing--they are), but rather that overall, china has been primarily perceived as an opportunity rather than a threat for all of these actors, and so it remains today.

for asia, a rising china has been seen more clearly as a double-edged sword. the greater comparative importance of the chinese economy has translated into more political influence (formal and informal) for beijing, at the expense of other governments in the region. meanwhile, china's dramatic military buildup has fundamentally changed the balance of power in asia; it's had negligible interest elsewhere.
china's military assertiveness has also grown in its backyard. in other regions, china continues to promote itself as a poor country that needs to focus on its own development and stability. in east and southeast asia china has core interests that it defends, and it is increasingly willing to challenge the status quo as its influence becomes asymmetrically greater.

that's been most clear with vietnam, where china first sent one oil rig to drill in contested waters directly off vietnam's shore--accompanied by several hundred chinese fishing vessels. they announced last week that they are repositioning four more. unsurprisingly, the vietnamese response has been sharp--anti-chinese demonstrations, violence, increased naval presence in the region, and coordination with the philippines.
none of that creates significant political risk on its own: vietnam isn't an ally of the united states and so engenders less support and response from washington than the philippines or japan...which is precisely why beijing has decided that's the best place to start changing the regional security balance.

but tokyo feels differently. the japanese government understands that a rising china is longer term a much more existential threat to its own security position in asia, and it isn't prepared to wait to raise concern until its position weakens further. so prime minister shinzo abe has declared his security support for vietnam. for america's part, obama has jettisoned the official "pivot" to asia. but the administration continues to believe that america's core national security interests, now and in the future, are in asia; and if china significantly escalates tensions in the east and south china seas, the united states is not likely to sit as idly by as they have on syria or ukraine.

the good news here is that--unlike with the countries driving the tensions in eurasia and the middle east--china has solid political stability and isn't looking for international trouble. but the realities of chinese growth, coupled with strong leadership from japan and (over time) india, along with the persistence of a strong american footprint are contributing to a much more troublesome geopolitical environment in the region.
the principle danger to the markets is what happens if the chinese government no longer holds that perspective. president xi jinping's commitment to transformational economic reform has been strong over the first year of his rule, and he has gotten surprisingly little pushback from the country's entrenched elites. but the uncertainty around china's near- to medium-term trajectory is radically greater than that of any of the world's other major economies. should significant instability emerge in china, very plausible indeed, china's willingness to take on a far more assertive (and risk-acceptant) security strategy in the region, promoting nationalism in the way putin has built his support base of late, would become far more likely. and then, the east and south china seas move to the top of our list.

U.S.-Europe

 

finally, the transatlantic relationship. advanced industrial economies with consolidated institutions and political stability, there's none of the geopolitical conflict presently visible in the middle east, eurasia, or asia.

geopolitical tensions have long been absent from the transatlantic relationship, the great success of the nato alliance. for all the occasional disagreement in europe on us military and security policy both during the cold war and since (the war in iraq, israel/palestine, counterterrorism and the like), european states never considered the need for broader security ties as a counterbalance for nato membership.

but the changing nature of geopolitics is creating a rift between the united states and europe.
american global hegemony had security and economic components, and it was collective security that had been the core element holding together the transatlantic alliance. that's no longer the case--a consequence of changing priorities for the americans and europeans, and an evolving world order (russia/ukraine a major blip, but notwithstanding). the transatlantic relationship is much less closely aligned on economics.

it's not the conventional wisdom. most observers say that, after bush, american policy looks more european these days--less militarist, more multilateralist. but actually, us foreign policy isn't becoming more like europe, it's becoming more like china. it's less focused on the military, except on issues of core security concern (in which case the united states acts with little need to consult allies), while american economic policy tends to be unilateralist in supporting preferred american geopolitical outcomes--which is seen most directly in us sanctions behavior (over $15bn in fines now levied against more than 20 international banks--mostly european) and nsa surveillance policy (with no willingness of the us to cooperate in a germany requested "no spying" mutual agreement)

transatlantic economic dissonance is also in evidence in a number of more fundamental ways: america's "growth uber alles" approach to a downturn in the economy, compared to germany's fixation on fiscal accountability. europe's greater alignment between governments and corporations on industrial policy, as opposed to a more decentralized, private-sector led (and occasionally captured) american policy environment. a more economy-driven opportunistic european approach to china, russia and other developing markets; the us government looking focused more on us-led/"universalist" principles on industrial espionage, intellectual property, etc.

as the g-zero persists, we will see the united states looking to enforce more unilateral economic standards that the europeans resent and resist; while the europeans look to other countries more strategically as counterbalances to american economic hegemony (the german-china relationship is critical in this regard, but that's also true of europe's willingness to support american economic policies in russia and the middle east). all of this means a much less cooperative trans-atlantic relationship--less "universalism" (from the american perspective) and less "multilateralism" (from the european perspective). more zero-sumness in the transatlantic relationship is a big change in the geopolitical environment; a precursor to true multipolarity, but in the interim a more fragmented and much less efficient global marketplace.

* * *

so that's where i see geopolitics emerging as a key factor for the global markets--much more than at any time since the end of the cold war. there's some good news and bad news here.

the good news is none of these geopolitical risks are likely to have the sort of market implications that the macro economic risks did after the financial crisis. there are lots of reasons for that. a low interest rate environment and solid growth from the us and china--plus the eurozone out of recession--along with pent up demand for investment is leading to significant optimism that won't be easily cowed by geopolitics. the supply/demand energy story is largely bearish, so near-term geopolitical risks from the middle east won't create sustained high prices. and markets don't know how to price geopolitical risk well; they're not covered as clearly analytically, so investors don't pay as much attention (until/unless they have to).

the bad news...that very lack of pressure from the markets means political leaders won't feel as much need to address these crises even as they expand, particularly in the united states. this is another reason the world's geopolitical crises will persist beyond a level that a similar economic crisis would hit before serious measures start to be taken to mitigate them. these geopolitical factors are going to grow. now's the time to start paying attention to them.

* * *
every once in a while, it's good to take a step back and look at the big picture. hope you found that worthwhile. i'll surely get back in the weeds next monday.

meanwhile, it's looking like a decidedly lovely week in new york.
very best,
Ian

From intel sources:

Dislodging ISIS Will Be a Difficult Task

 

The ISIS advance toward Baghdad may be temporarily held off as the government rallies its remaining security forces and Shia militias organize for the upcoming Battle for Baghdad. There is a rather clear reason why the ISIS leader has renamed himself Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, meaning the Caliph of Baghdad . ISIS will at a minimum be able to take control of some Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad shortly and wreak havoc on the city with IEDs, ambushes, single suicide attacks, and suicide assaults that target civilians, the government, security forces, senior members of government, and foreign installations and embassies. Additionally, the brutal sectarian slaughter of Sunni and Shia alike that punctuated the violence in Baghdad from 2005 to 2007 is likely to return as Shia militias and ISIS fighters begin to assert control of neighborhoods and roam the streets.

Even if Iraqi forces are able to keep ISIS from fully taking Baghdad and areas south, it is unlikely the beleaguered military and police forces will be able to retake the areas under ISIS control in the north and west without significant external support, as well as the support of the Kurds.

ISIS and its allies are in a position today that closely resembles the position prior to the US surge back in early 2007. More than 130,000 US troops, partnered with the Sunni Awakening formations and Iraqi security forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were required to clear Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, Ninewa, Baghdad, and the "triangle of death." The concurrent operations took more than a year, and were supported by the US Air Force, US Army aviation brigades, and US special operations raids that targeted the jihadists’ command and control, training camps, and bases, as well as its IED and suicide bomb factories.

Today, the Iraqis have no US forces on the ground to support them, US air power is absent, the Awakening is scattered and disjointed, and the Iraqi military has been humiliated badly while surrendering or retreating in disarray during the lightning fast jihadists' campaign from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad. This campaign, by the way, has been remarkably and significantly faster than the U.S. armored campaign advance to Baghdad in 2003 . The US government has indicated that it will not deploy US soldiers in Iraq, either on the ground or at airbases to conduct air operations.  Meanwhile, significant amounts of US made advanced armaments, vehicles, ammunition, and diverse military equipment have fallen into ISIS jihadists’ hands .

ISIS is advancing boldly in the looming security vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi security forces and the West's refusal to recommit forces to stabilize Iraq. This has rendered the country vulnerable to further incursions by al Qaeda-linked jihadists as well as intervention by interested neighbors such as Iran. Overt Iranian intervention in Iraq would likely lead any Sunnis still loyal to the government to side with ISIS and its allies, and would ensure that Iraq would slide even closer to a full-blown civil war and de facto partition, and risk a wider war throughout the Middle East.

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Thursday, May 29, 2014

The Colder War and the End of the Petrodollar

By Marin Katusa, Chief Energy Investment Strategist

The mainstream media are falling over themselves talking about Russia’s just-signed “Holy Grail” gas deal with China, which is expected to be worth more than $400 billion. But here’s what I think the real news is… and nobody’s talking about it—until now, that is. China’s President Xi Jinping has publicly stated that it’s time for a new model of security, not just for China, but for all of Asia. This new model of security, otherwise known as “the new UN,” will include Russia and Iran, but not the United States or the EU-28.

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This monumental gas deal with China does so much more for Russia than the Western media are reporting. First off, it opens up Russian oil and gas supplies to all of Asia. It’s no coincidence that Russian President Putin announced the gas deal with China at a time when the tensions with the West over Ukraine were growing. Putin has U.S. President Obama exactly where he wants him, and it’s only going to get worse for Europe and America. But before I explain why that is, let’s put this deal in terms we can understand. The specific details have not been announced, but my sources tell me that the contract will bring in over U.S. $10 billion a year of revenue to start with.

The 30 year deal states that every year, the Russians will deliver 1.3 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of gas to China. The total capital expenditure to build the pipeline and all other infrastructure for the project will be more than $22 billion—this will be one of the largest projects in the world. You can bet the Russians won’t take payment in US dollars for their gas. This is the beginning of the end for the petrodollar.

The Chinese and Russians are working together against the Americans, and there are many countries that would be happy to join them in dethroning the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. This historic gas deal between Russia and China is very bad news for the petrodollar. Through this one deal, the Russians will provide about 25% of China’s current natural gas demand. In a word, this is huge. It’s also not a coincidence that Putin sealed the deal with China before the Australian, US, and Canadian liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals are completed. If you read our recent Casey Energy Report issue on LNG, you know to be wary of the hype about LNG’s “bright future.” Take note: this deal is a serious negative for the global LNG projects.

I also stated in our April 2012 newsletter:

Putin has positioned Russia to play an increasingly dominant role in the global gas scene with two general strategies: first, by building new pipelines to avoid transiting troublesome countries and to develop Russia’s ability to sell gas to Asia, and second, by jumping into the liquefied natural gas (LNG) scene with new facilities in the Far East.

Pretty bang on for a comment that was made over two years ago in print, don’t you think?

So, what’s next? Lots. Putin will continue to outsmart Obama. (Note to all Americans: the Russians make fun of you—not just for your poor choice of presidents, but also for your failed foreign policy that has led to most of the world hating America. But I digress.) You will see Russia announce a major nuclear deal with Iran, where the Russians will build, finance, and supply the uranium for many nuclear reactors. The Russians will do the same for China, and then Syria. With China signing the natural gas deal with Russia and the president of China publicly stating that it’s time to create a new security model for the Asian nations that includes Russia and Iran, it’s clear China has chosen Russia over the U.S.

We are now in the early stages of the Colder War.

The European Union will be the first victim. The EU is completely dependent on Russia for its oil and natural gas imports—over one-third of the EU-28’s supply of oil and natural gas comes from Russia. I’ve been writing for years about this, and I’m watching it come true right now: the only way out for the EU countries is to use modern North American technology to revitalize their old proven oil and gas deposits.

I call it the European Energy Renaissance, and there’s a fortune to be made from it. Our Casey Energy Report portfolio has already been doing quite well from investing in the European Energy Renaissance, but this is only the beginning. If Europe is to survive the Colder War, it has no choice but to develop its own natural resources. There are naysayers who claim that Europe cannot and will not do that, for many reasons. I say rubbish.

Of course, to make money from this European dilemma, it’s imperative to only invest in the best management teams, operating in those countries with the political will to do what it takes to survive… but if you do, you could make a fortune. Doug Casey and I plan on doing so, and so should you.

For example, two weeks ago in this missive, I discussed “The Most Anticipated Oil Well of 2014,” where if you invested, in just two weeks you could be up over 40%. Not only did I write in great detail about the company, I even interviewed the CEO because of the serious potential this high-risk junior holds. I said in that Dispatch that the quality of the recorded interview wasn’t first class, but the quality of information was. The company just put together a very high-quality, professional video showing its potential, and I include it here for all to watch.

Since my write-up, the company has announced incredible news. It’s only months away now from knowing whether or not it has made a world-class discovery. Subscribers to the Casey Energy Report are already sitting on some good, short-term profits with this story, but it keeps getting better.

The more the tension is building in Ukraine (and it’s going to get worse), the more money we’re going to make from the Colder War. There’s nothing you can do about the current geopolitical situation, but you can position yourself and your family to benefit financially from the European Energy Renaissance.

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We expect great things from this company and other companies that are exposed to the European Energy Renaissance. You can read our ongoing guidance on this and our other top energy stocks every month in the Casey Energy Report. In the current issue, for example, you’ll find an in-depth report on the coal sector, uranium, and updates on all of our portfolio companies that are poised to benefit most from the European Energy Renaissance.

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The article The Colder War and the End of the Petrodollar was originally published at Casey Research



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Tuesday, March 4, 2014

Ukraine: Three Views

By John Mauldin


All eyes are on Ukraine as the drama continues to unfold. Today, for an early Outside the Box, I’m going to offer three sources on Ukraine. The first is a note that I got from the head of emerging market trading at one of the world’s largest hedge funds. This is what he sent out last week, ahead of any real action:

My view, Putin is stuck now, cannot easily de-escalate. Further escalation is a possibility, with Ukraine cracking along the obvious ethnic fault lines and the West reacting with measures such as sanctions and visa restrictions. Tit-for-tat follows; gas supplies to the EU are disrupted. Russian capital outflows accelerate and the RUB [ruble] quickly gets to 40/$, fuelling inflation and unnerving the Russian banking system, and also infecting the European banking system, in the manner that Chris Watling has envisaged. 

Meanwhile, the Chinese liabilities residing inside the European banking system are also in trouble, of course, and will continue to deteriorate. The CBR [Central Bank of Russia] hikes repeatedly with very little effect on slowing the RUB slide, further hurting GDP growth and economically sensitive segments of the market. The Russian RTX index revisits the GFC lows of 2008, Gazprom ADR's are already within shouting distance of their 2008 lows today. 

In such a scenario, there is an obvious risk of market contagion spreading throughout Eastern and Western Europe, and in fact the rest of the world. It is likely to resemble something on the order of the 1998 LTCM + RUB collapse + Asian financial crisis magnitude. In fact, a number of hedge funds will fail precisely because they have loaded up so heavily with European debt instruments which will unravel.

Meanwhile, politically, the U.S. ends up looking weaker and weaker, and getting less and less respect internationally. The U.S.-Russia confrontation is taking place under the critical gaze of the leaders of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Turkey and Hizballah in Lebanon.

They are seeing the following:
  1. President Obama is now seen backing off a commitment to U.S. allies for the second time in eight months. They remember his U-turn last August on U.S. military intervention for the removal of Syrian President Bashar Assad for using chemical weapons. They also see Washington shying off from Russia's clear and present use of military force and therefore concluding that Washington is not a reliable partner for safeguarding their national security.
  2. The Middle East governments and groups which opted to cooperate recently with Vladimir Putin – Damascus, Tehran, Hizballah and Egypt – are ending up on the strong side of the regional equation. Others such as Turkey and Qatar are squirming.
  3. American weakness on the global front has strengthened the Iranian-Syrian bloc and its ties with Hizballah. Assad is going nowhere.
  4. Putin standing behind Iran is a serious obstacle to a negotiated and acceptable comprehensive agreement with Iran, just as the international EU- and U.S.-led bid for a political resolution of the Syrian conflict foundered last month, and now is unlikely to ever be revisited.
Notice what he said about European banks. Their exposure to emerging-market corporate debt, Chinese debt, and Russian liabilities is going to weaken their balance sheets just as the European central bank stress test will be kicking off.

This is going to be a very interesting period of time and potentially quite dangerous. Very few people saw U.S. market vulnerabilities in early 1998 coming from outside the US. As I said in my 2014 forecast, the United States should be all right until there is a shock to the system. We have to be aware of what can cause shocks. Ukraine in and of itself might not be enough, but notice that the Chinese are preparing to slow their economy down as part of the process of reducing their dependency on bank debt and foreign direct investment in construction and other projects. China has been one of the main engines of global growth, so a slowdown will have effects. It’s all connected, as I wrote in the 2007 letter we reprinted this weekend.

I should note that other very savvy investors and managers think there will be no contagion from current events. That’s what makes a market. It’s why we need to pay attention to Ukraine.

In the second part of today’s Outside the Box we visit a short essay on Ukraine by Anatole Kaletsky, which talks about timing investments during market crises:

Financial markets cannot afford to be so sentimental. While we should always recall at a time like this the famous advice from Nathan Rothschild to “buy at the sound of gunfire,” the drastically risk off response to weekend events in Ukraine makes perfect sense because Russia’s annexation of Crimea is the most dangerous geopolitical event of the post-Cold War era, and perhaps since the Cuban Missile crisis. It can result in only two possible outcomes, either of which will be damaging to European stability in the long-term.

Finally, I got a piece on Ukraine from my friend Ian Bremmer, who says, “[W]e are witnessing the most seismic geopolitical event since 9/11.” His analysis plus background data help us understand what is really going on in Ukraine.

Ian will be at my conference in San Diego, May 13-16, and you should be too. If you don’t have a plan for dealing with what happens when the midterm forecasts begin knocking on the door, you won’t know what to do when the time comes. Our conference offers a wonderful opportunity to bring your plans into focus and perhaps make a few new ones. You can find out more here.

I’m feeling a lot better today than I did this weekend. I am stuck in Miami due to the cancellation of my flight but hope to be able to get to Washington DC tomorrow morning to experience the East Coast version of the polar vortex. But, for the nonce, I guess I will be forced to sit outside at the pool or on the beach and continue my research, which is once again stacking up. You have to love iPads, which are for me great productivity enhancers. I did finish George Gilder’s brilliant must-read book Knowledge and Power this weekend, and I highly recommend it. And I suppose I should research the gym facilities here later this afternoon. I have mastered the trick of reading on my iPad while walking on the treadmill. No excuses. Have a great week.

Your enjoying the Miami weather analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor

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Realpolitik In Ukraine

By Anatole Kaletsky, Gavekal

Oscar Wilde described marriage as the triumph of imagination over intelligence and second marriage as the triumph of hope over experience. In finance and geopolitics, by contrast, experience must always prevail over hope and realism over wishful thinking. A grim case in point is the Russian incursion into Ukraine. What makes this confrontation so dangerous is that US and EU policy seems to be motivated entirely by hope and wishful thinking. Hope that Vladimir Putin will “see sense,” or at least be deterred by the threat of US and EU sanctions to Russia’s economic interests and the personal wealth of his oligarch friends. Wishful thinking about “democracy and freedom” overcoming dictatorship and military bullying.

Financial markets cannot afford to be so sentimental. While we should always recall at a time like this the famous advice from Nathan Rothschild to “buy at the sound of gunfire,” the drastically risk off response to weekend events in Ukraine makes perfect sense because Russia’s annexation of Crimea is the most dangerous geopolitical event of the post- Cold War era, and perhaps since the Cuban Missile crisis. It can result in only two possible outcomes, either of which will be damaging to European stability in the long term. Either Russia will quickly prevail and thereby win the right to redraw borders and exercise veto powers over the governments of its neighbouring countries. Or the Western-backed Ukrainian government will fight back and Europe’s second-largest country by area will descend into a Yugoslav-style civil war that will ultimately draw in Poland, NATO and therefore the US.

No other outcome is possible because it is literally inconceivable that Putin will ever withdraw from Crimea. To give up Crimea now would mean the end of Putin’s presidency, since the Russian public, not to mention the military and security apparatus, believe almost unanimously that Crimea still belongs to Russia, since it was only administratively transferred to Ukraine, almost by accident, in 1954. In fact, many Russians believe, rightly or wrongly, that most of Ukraine “belongs” to them. (The very name of the country in Russian means “at the border” and certainly not “beyond the border”). Under these circumstances, the idea that Putin would respond to Western diplomatic or economic sanctions, no matter how stringent, by giving up his newly gained territory is pure wishful thinking. Putin’s decision to back himself into this corner has been derided by the Western media as a strategic blunder but it is actually a textbook example of realpolitik. Putin has created a situation where the West’s only alternative to acquiescing in the Russian takeover of Crimea is all-out war.

And since a NATO military attack on Russian forces is even more inconceivable than Putin’s withdrawal, it seems that Russia has won this round of the confrontation. The only question now is whether the new Ukrainian government will accept the loss of Crimea quietly or try to retaliate against Russian speakers in Ukraine—offering Putin a pretext for invasion, and thereby precipitating an all-out civil war.

That is the key question investors must consider in deciding whether the Ukraine crisis is a Rothschild style buying opportunity, or a last chance to bail out of risk-assets before it is too late. The balance of probabilities in such situations is usually tilted towards a peaceful solution—in this case, Western acquiescence in the Russian annexation of Crimea and the creation of a new national unity government in Kiev acceptable to Putin. The trouble is that the alternative of a full-scale war, while far less probable, would have much greater impact—on the European and global economies, on energy prices and on the prices of equities and other risk- assets that are already quite highly valued. At present, therefore, it makes sense to stand back and prepare for either outcome by maintaining balanced portfolios of the kind recommended by Charles, with equal weightings of equities and very long-duration U.S. bonds.

Looking back through history at comparable episodes of severe geopolitical confrontation, investors have usually done well to wait for the confrontation to reach some kind of climax before putting on more risk. In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the S&P 500 fell -6.5% between October 16, when the confrontation started, and October 23, the worst day of the crisis, when President Kennedy issued his nuclear ultimatum to Nikita Khrushchev. The market steadied then, but did not rebound in earnest until four days later, when it became clear that Khrushchev would back down; it went on to gain 30% in the next six months.

Similarly in the 1991 Gulf War, it was not until the bombing of Baghdad actually started and a quick US victory looked certain, that equities bounced back, gaining 25% by the summer. Thus investors did well to buy at the sound of gunfire, but lost nothing by waiting six months after Saddam Hussein’s initial invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. Even in the worst-case scenario to which the invasion of Crimea has been compared over the weekend—the German annexation of Sudetenland in June 1938—Wall Street only rebounded in earnest, gaining 24% within one month, on September 29, 1938. That was the day before Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich, brandishing his infamous note from Hitler and declaring “peace in our time”. The ultimate triumph of hope over experience.

Special Eurasia Group Update – Ukraine

By Ian Bremmer, Eurasia Group

Dear John,
Russia is conducting direct military intervention in ukraine, following condemnation and threats of sanction/serious consequence from the united states and europe. we're witnessing the most seismic geopolitical events since 9/11.

A little background from the week. russian president vladimir putin provided safety to now ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. the Ukrainian government came together with broadly pro European sentiment...and with few if any representatives of other viewpoints. the west welcomed the developments and prepared to send an imf mission, which would lift the immediate economic challenge. And then, predictably...the russians changed the conversation.

The west – the us and europe – supported the Ukrainian opposition as soon as President Yanukovych fled the country. that also effectively breached the accord that had been signed by the european foreign ministers, opposition and President Yanukovych (a Russian special envoy attended but did not add his name). The immediate american perspective was to take the changed developments on the ground as a win. but a "win" was never on offer in Ukraine, where russian interests are dramatically, even exponentially, greater than those of the americans or europeans. for its part, the new Ukrainian government lost no time in antagonizing the russians – dissolving the Ukrainian special forces, declaring the former president a criminal, and removing russian as a second official language. the immediate russian response was military exercises and work to keep Crimea. president Vladimir Putin kept mum on any details.

Let's focus on crimea for a moment. it's majority ethnic russian, and ukrainians living there are overwhelmingly russian speaking (there's a significant minority population of muslim Crimean tatars, formerly forcibly resettled under Stalin – relevant from a humanitarian perspective, but they'll have no impact on the practical political outcome). Crimea is a firmly russian oriented territory. Crimea has a Russian military base (with a long term lease agreement) and strong, well organized Russian and cossack groups – which they've supplemented with significant numbers of additional troops, as well as military ships sent to the area. Russia has said they will respect ukrainian territorial integrity...and I'm sure they'll have an interpretation of their action which does precisely that. moscow will argue that the ouster of President Yanukovych was illegal, that he's calling for Russian assistance, that the new government wasn't legally formed, and that citizens of Crimea – governed by an illegal government – are requesting russia's help and protection. all of which is technically true. to be sure, there are plenty of things the russians have already done that involve a breach, including clear and surely provable, given sufficient investigation, direct Russian involvement in taking over the parliament and two airports in crimea. but that's not the issue. it's just that if you want to argue over the finer points, the west doesn't have much of a legal case here and couldn't enforce one if it did.

And the finer points aren't what we're going to be arguing about for some time. president obama's response was to strongly condemn reported russian moves, and to imply it was an invasion of sovereignty...promising unspecified consequences to Russia should they breach Ukrainian sovereignty. if that was meant to warn the russians, who have vastly greater stakes in Ukraine (and particularly crimea) than the americans and the europeans, it was a serious miscalculation, as Putin already controlled crimea, it was only a question of how quickly and clearly he wanted to formalize that fact. there's literally zero chance of american military response, with the pentagon quickly clarifying that it had no contingencies for dealing with moscow on the issue – that's surely not true, they have contingencies for everything. but secretary of defense Chuck Hagel just wanted to ensure nobody thought the president meant that all options were on the table. instead, we're seeing discussions of president Obama not attending the G-8 summit in Sochi and targeted sanctions against Russia.

Putin has since acted swiftly, requesting a vote from the Russian upper house to approve military intervention in Ukraine. it was approved, unanimously, within hours. It's a near certainty that the Russians now persist in direct intervention. the remaining related question is whether russian intervention is limited to Crimea – Putin's request included defense of Russia's military base in sevastopol (on the crimean peninsula) and to defend the rights of ethnic russians in Ukraine...which extends far beyond crimea. putin's words may have been intended to deter the west, or he may intend to go into eastern Ukraine, at least securing military assets there. Given that pro-russian demonstrations were hastily organized earlier in the day in three major southeast ukrainian cities, it seems possible the russians are intending a broader incursion. if that happens, we're in an extremely escalatory environment. if it doesn't, it's still possible (though very difficult) that the west could come in financially and stabilize the Keiv government.

Before we get into implications, it's worth taking a step back, as we've seen this before. in 2008, turmoil developed in Georgia under nationalist president mikheil saakashvili, a charismatic figure, fluent english speaker, and husband to a european (from the Netherlands). he made it very clear he wanted to join NATO and the european union (the latter being a pretty fantastic claim). the Russian government was doing its best to make Georgia's president miserable – cutting off energy and economic ties and directly supporting restive Russian speaking republics within Georgia. for his part, saakashvili delighted in directly antagonizing putin – showing up late for a kremlin meeting (while he was busy swimming), insulting him personally, etc.

Saakashvili was a favorite of the west, the us congress particularly feted him. the messages from the united states were positive, making it sound like America had his back. internally, there was a strong debate – vice president dick cheney led the calls to free himself from russia's grip as fast and as loudly as possible, secretary of state Condoleezza Rice thought Saakashvili unpredictable and dangerous, and wanted to urge him to back off (as did former secretary Colin Powell, who lent his view to the white house as well). The Cheney view prevailed, Georgian president already had a habit of hearing what he wanted to out of mixed messages, and he proceeded. on 8 august, the russian tanks rolled into georgia and then the united states was left with a conundrum –  what to do to defend America's "ally" Georgia.

As it turned out, nothing. national security advisor steve hadley chaired a private meeting with president bush and all relevant advisors, most of whom said the united states had to take action. bush was sympathetic. hadley stopped the meeting and asked if anyone was personally prepared to commit military forces to what would be direct confrontation with russia. he went around the room individually and asked if there was a commitment – which would be publicly required of the group afterwards (and uniformly) if they were to recommend that the president take action. there was not – not a single one. and then the meeting quickly moved to how to position diplomacy, since there wasn't any action to take.

That's precisely where we are on ukraine – but with much higher stakes (and with a united states in a generally weaker diplomatic position), since ukraine is more important economically and geopolitically (and to europe specifically on both).

The good news is that russia doesn't matter as much as it used to on the global stage. indeed, a big part of the problem is that Russia is a declining power, and the west's response on ukraine was to make the west's perception of that reality abundantly clear to Putin. which, in Putin's mind, required a decisive response. but this has the potential to undermine american relationships more broadly. to say the U.S. - Russia relationship is broken presently is an understatement – the upper house also voted to recall the russian ambassador to washington (america's ambassador to Moscow had just this past week ended his term – the decision was unrelated to the crisis).

what will be much more interesting is 1) the significance of the west's direct response; 2) whether the Russians will cause trouble on a broader array of fronts for the west; and 3) whether a strongly intentioned Russia can shift the geopolitical balance against the united states.
taking each of these in order.

1) The west's direct response. we won't see much, although there will certainly be some very significant finger pointing. president obama will cancel his trip to sochi for the upcoming G8 summit and it's possible that enough of the other leaders will join him that the meeting is cancelled. it's conceivable the G7 nations would vote to remove Russia from the club. the us would also suspend talks to improve commercial ties with the united states. it's possible we see an emergency united nations security council session to denounce the intervention – which the russians veto (very interesting to see if the Chinese join them, and who abstains...). hard to see significant european powers actually breaking relations with russia at this point, but an action-reaction cycle could spiral. also, nato will have to fashion some response, possibly by sending ships into the black sea. shots won't be fired, but markets will get fired up.

2) International complications from Russia. this will significantly complicate all areas of us-russian ties.
russia doesn't want an iranian nuclear weapon, but they'll be somewhat less cooperative with the americans and europeans around Iranian negotiations...possibly making them more likely to offer a "third way" down the road that undermines the american deal. on syria, an intransigent russia will become very intransigent, making it more difficult to implement the chemical weapons agreement and providing greater direct financial and military support for bashar assad's regime.

On energy issues, a Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine would put in play the integrity of major pipelines. moscow and kyiv would share strong incentives to keep gas and oil flowing, but in the worst case we could see disruptions. Ukraine has gas reserves for a while, but then the situation could become dire. russia could divert some European bound gas through the nord stream line, but volume to Europe would drop. this is all in extremis, but out there.

3) Geopolitical shift. Russia will see its key opportunity as closing ranks more tightly with China. while we may see symbolic coordination from beijing, particularly if there's a security council vote (where the Chinese are reasonably likely to vote with the russians), the chinese are trying hard to maintain a balanced relationship with the united states...and accordingly won't directly support russian actions that could undermine that relationship. leaving aside China, Russia's ability to get other third party states on board with their Ukrainian engagement is largely limited to the "near abroad" – Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan –  which is not a group the west is particularly concerned with.

But it is, more broadly, a significant hit to american foreign policy credibility. coming only days after secretary of state kerry took strong exception to "asinine", "isolationist" views in congress that acted as if the united states was a "poor country," a direct admonition by the united states and its key allies is willfully and immediately ignored by the russian president. that will send a message of weakness and bring concerns about american commitment to allies around the world. G-zero indeed.


We'll be watching this very closely over coming days. I'm flying to Seoul for a conference on monday, where I'm meeting up with President George W. Bush. should prove interesting on Russia, no question. i'm back on Wednesday, but will be available by phone/email throughout, so feel free to get in touch.
yours truly,

Ian

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The article Outside the Box: Ukraine: Three Views was originally published at Mauldin Economics.






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