Showing posts with label exports. Show all posts
Showing posts with label exports. Show all posts

Sunday, March 23, 2014

China’s Minsky Moment?

By John Mauldin


In speeches and presentations since the end of last year, I have been saying that I think the biggest macro problem in the world today is China. China has run up a huge debt, and the payments are coming due. They seem to be proactive, but will it be enough? How much risk do they pose for the global system?

This week as I travel to Cafayate I have asked my young associate Worth Wray to write up his research and our conversations on China. Worth has lived in China; and with his (and my) access to people with their fingers on the pulse of China, he has come up with some valuable insights. The hard part for him was to keep it in a single letter. China is a such a huge topic that writing about it can easily yield a tome.

I am lucky to have enticed Worth to come to work with me. He is extraordinarily talented and insightful as an economist, has the boundless energy of youth (which means he seemingly doesn’t sleep), and spent the last five years deep in one of the best training grounds that a young analyst could have. He brings his own extensive Rolodex to our organization. In the not too distant future, we plan to start writing a joint letter on portfolio design and construction, translating the macro insights we have into real world portfolios that can inform your own investing. Lots of I’s to dot and T’s to cross, but we are making progress.

I am delighted to be able to bring a talent like Worth to your attention. So let’s let him talk China to us and see where it takes us. [Note: as I do the final edits here in Cafayate, I see that Worth did an outstanding job of bringing the data together and making the story understandable. You want to take the time to read this!]

A Front Row Seat
By Worth Wray

Before I teamed up with John last July, I worked as the portfolio strategist for an $18 billion money manager in Houston, TX that, among its other businesses, co-managed (with an elite team of investors from the university endowment world) one of the largest registered funds of funds in the United States.

For a bright-eyed kid from South Louisiana, it was a life changing experience. I had a front-row seat for every investment decision in a multi-billion-dollar portfolio for almost five years; and along with my colleagues and mentors in Texas, North Carolina, New York, Shanghai, and Singapore, I had the chance to meet and interact with a long list of the most sought-after hedge fund, private equity, and venture capital teams. I often found myself in the same room with honest-to-god legends like Kyle Bass, John Paulson, JC Flowers, and Ken Griffin … and I forged lasting some friendships with their portfolio managers and analysts.

As you can imagine, the information flow was addictive. I spent thousands of hours poring over manager letters from six continents, doing my best to connect the global macro dots ahead of the markets and coming up with question after question for everyone who would return my calls. That experience plugged me in to an enduring network of truly independent thinkers, forced me to see the world from an entirely different perspective, and put me in an ideal position to figure out what it takes to navigate the unprecedented (not to say strange) investment challenges posed by a “Code Red” world.

Sometimes, combing through a mountain of manager letters felt like reading the newspaper years in advance. I remember watching with amazement as a free-thinking global macro investor named Mark Hart made a fortune for his investors by shorting US subprime mortgages and then shifted his focus to what he argued would be the next shoe to drop – a series of sovereign defaults across the Eurozone.

Mark explained how the launch of a common currency had allowed historically riskier borrowers like Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and France to issue sovereign debt for the same borrowing cost as Germany did… without any kind of fiscal union to justify the common rates. The resulting debt splurge led to a big increase in fiscal debts, drove an unwarranted rise in unit labor costs across the southern Eurozone, and essentially activated a ticking time bomb at the very foundations of the euro system. It seemed obvious that rates would eventually diverge to reflect the relative credit risks of the borrowers, but the market didn’t seem to care until it got very bad news from Athens. We all know what happened next.

Just as Mark and his team at Corriente Advisors had predicted, spreads blew out in Greece, then in Ireland, then in Portugal, then in Spain… and it now appears that Italy and France are veering toward a similar fate. When the euro crisis finally broke out, my colleagues and I were waiting for it, because Mark had already walked us through his playbook for a multi-act global debt drama.

Instead of blowing up in spectacular fashion, the Eurozone crisis has taken far longer to resolve than a lot of investors and economists expected (Mark, John, and myself included); but the euro’s survival thus far has been largely the result of extensive Realpolitik and an increasingly hollow narrative from Mario Draghi and the ECB laying claim to the wherewithal to “do whatever it takes” to preserve the single-currency system. Meanwhile, as Corriente understood, the likelihood of major defaults across the Eurozone rises every day that the ECB does the bare minimum to resist France’s and Italy’s slide toward deflation. It’s not over until the fat lady sings.

The point I am trying to make is that Mark saw the fundamental imbalances behind the global financial crisis in time to launch a dedicated fund in 2006, and he saw the root causes of the ongoing European debt crisis in time to launch a dedicated fund in 2007… precisely because he thinks of the global economy as one interconnected system peppered with a series of unstable and still unresolved debt bubbles. Mark is one of the most forward-thinking investors I have ever met and one of the best in recent decades at spotting the big imbalances that spell T-R-O-U-B-L-E.

I can’t tell you if he will be right about the next phase of the global debt drama. Predicting the actions and reactions of elected and unelected officials is next to impossible in a Code Red world, but some people have an eye for fundamental imbalances. And since Mark has been largely right in identifying the major debt bubbles that have plagued the world since 2007, John and I can’t comfortably ignore his warning.

As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff argued in their still-authoritative history of financial boom and bust over the past eight hundred years, “When an accident is waiting to happen, it eventually does. When countries become too deeply indebted, they are headed for trouble. When debt-fueled asset price explosions seem too good to be true, they probably are.”

The Bubble That Is China

Following his prescient calls on the subprime debacle and the European debt crisis, Mark identified in 2010 another source of instability that he warned could shake the global economy. And it took me by surprise. He warned that China was in the “late stages of an enormous credit bubble,” and he projected that the economic fallout when that bubble burst could be “as extraordinary as China’s economic outperformance over the last decade.”

To my knowledge, Mark Hart and his team at Corriente were the first of many global macro managers to anticipate a hard landing in the People’s Republic of China. Mark argued that the Middle Kingdom would land very hard indeed, popping speculative bubbles in the property and stock markets, sending foreign capital flying out the door, and triggering a rapid collapse in the renminbi … and even if the Chinese government could manage its economy away from a deflationary bust, they would be forced to devalue the renminbi to do so. In other words, Mark saw a much lower renminbi under almost every outcome.
It was a mind-blowing concept to me that the main driver of global growth (at the time) could not only implode but even drag the rest of the world down with it.

I can’t share the original Corriente China presentation with you for legal reasons, but here are a few public notes published by the Telegraph’s Louise Armistead after she attended one of Mark’s presentations in November 2010. These may look like obvious observations today, the sort you can find plastered all across the internet, but very few people were actually paying attention four years ago. And the data has only gotten worse since 2010 as rampant credit growth and insidious shadow lending have continued to fuel greater and greater capital misallocation.

In the presentation, which amounts to a devastating attack on the prevailing belief that China is an engine for growth, the financier argues that ‘inappropriately low interest rates and an artificially suppressed exchange rate’ have created dangerous bubbles in sectors including:
Raw materials: Corriente says China has consumed just 65pc of the cement it has produced in the past five years, after exports. The country is currently outputting more steel than the next seven largest producers combined – it now has 200m tons of excess capacity, more that the EU and Japan's total production so far this year.
Property construction: Corriente reckons there is currently an excess of 3.3bn square meters of floor space in the country – yet 200m square metres of new space is being constructed each year.
Property prices: The average price-to-rent ratio of China's eight key cities is 39.4 times – this figure was 22.8 times in America just before its housing crisis. Corriente argues: “Lacking alternative investment options, Chinese corporates, households and government entities have invested excess liquidity in the property markets, driving home prices to unsustainable levels.” The result is that the property is out of reach for the majority of ordinary Chinese.
Banking: As with the credit crisis in the West, the banks’ exposure to the infrastructure credit bubbles isn’t obvious because the debt is held in Local Investment Companies – shell entities which borrow from Chinese banks and invest in fixed assets. Mr Hart reckons that ‘bad loans will equal 98pc of total bank equity if LIC-owned, non-cashflow-producing assets are recognised as non-performing.’
The result is that, rather than being the ‘key engine for global growth’, China is an ‘enormous tail-risk’.

The markets may damn well prove Mark right, along with a host of other managers who either jumped on his bandwagon or reached the same conclusions independently; but it seemed downright crazy in 2010 to think that the main driver of global growth could abruptly become its biggest threat within a few short years.

On a personal note, I obsessed over China’s culture, economy, and political system for years in college and then witnessed the country’s transformation firsthand during my time at Shanghai’s Fudan University in the summer of 2007. Then and later, I marveled at China’s strength relative to the developed world and the seemingly invincible central government’s ability to keep the economy chugging along with credit growth and fixed investment while it hoped for the return of its developed world customers then mired in the Great Recession.

It wasn’t what I wanted to hear … but I had to accept that Mark could be right. He had clearly identified a major imbalance which has continued to worsen over the last few years, and now we are just waiting for the next shoe to drop.



Four years later, Chinese production is slowing in the shadow of a massive credit bubble and in the face of aggressive reforms. Disappointing investment returns are revealing broad based capital misallocation; property prices are cooling (relative to other countries); and commodity stockpiles are mounting.

With China’s new policy of allowing defaults (historically, China’s default rate has been 0%), there is a real risk that follow-on events could spin out of control, raising nonperforming loan ratios and sparking a panic as bank capital is significantly eroded.

In the meantime, the renminbi is trading down, most likely due to an intentional effort by the People’s Bank of China to aid in the slow unwinding of leveraged trade finance.

Now the signs of a Chinese slowdown (and thus a global one, as the world is geared to 8% Chinese growth) are clear, and people around the world are meeting uncertainty with emotion. With that in mind, let’s dig into the data that really matters and try to get to the heart of China’s dilemma.
China’s Minsky Moment?

“China is like an elephant riding a bicycle. If it slows down, it could fall off, and then the earth might quake.” – James Kynge, China Shakes the World

After 30 years of sustained economic growth topping 8% and a successful bank cleanup in 2000, the People’s Republic was well on its way to blowing through the “middle income trap” and transitioning to a more advanced consumption-based economy. But then in 2008 the banking crisis in the United States abruptly ushered in a painful era of balance sheet repair across the developed world and delivered a demand shock to emerging markets. Rather than allow the Chinese economy to fall into recession at such an inconvenient time, the Party leadership sprang into action to stimulate demand with its largest fiscal deficit in more than 60 years and to mobilize bank lending with historically low interest rates and enormous liquidity injections.



As you can see in the charts above, China’s total debt-to-GDP (including estimates for shadow banks) grew by roughly 20% per year, from just under 150% in 2008 to nearly than 210% at the end of 2012 … and continued rising in 2013. Even more ominous, corporate debt has soared from 92% in 2008 to 150% today against the expectation that China’s government would always backstop defaults. That makes Chinese corporates the most highly levered in the world and more than twice as levered as US corporates, just as  corporate defaults are happening for the very first time in more than 60 years.



By another measure, China has accounted for more than $15 trillion of the $30 trillion in worldwide credit growth over the last five years, bringing Chinese bank assets to roughly $24 trillion (2.5x Chinese GDP) and prompting London Telegraph columnist Ambrose Evans-Pritchard to tweet John and me a short message: “China riding tail of $24 trillion credit tiger. Tiger will eat Maoists.” And to that, I would respond that I hope the tiger doesn’t find its way to France. (You can follow John and Worth on Twitter at @JohnFMauldin and @WorthWray.)

Looking further into the debt problem, China is steadily incurring more and more credit for less and less growth – suggesting that the newer debt is less productive because it is being put to unproductive uses – as you can see in Chart 2 above. That explains why many analysts believe China’s official reported nonperforming loan ratio of 1% is more like 11% – or more than 20% of GDP.

To continue reading this article from Thoughts from the Frontline – a free weekly publication by John Mauldin, renowned financial expert, best-selling author, and Chairman of Mauldin Economics – please click here.



Get our "Gold and Crude Oil Trade Ideas"


Monday, December 16, 2013

Growing Oil and Natural Gas Production Continues to Reshape the U.S. Energy Economy

The Annual Energy Outlook 2014 reference case was released today by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) presents updated projections for U.S. energy markets through 2040.

"EIA's updated Reference case shows that advanced technologies for crude oil and natural gas production are continuing to increase domestic supply and reshape the U.S. energy economy as well as expand the potential for U.S. natural gas exports," said EIA Administrator Adam Sieminski. "Growing domestic hydrocarbon production is also reducing our net dependence on imported oil and benefiting the U.S. economy as natural-gas-intensive industries boost their output," said Mr. Sieminski.
Some key findings:

Domestic production of oil and natural gas continues to grow. Domestic crude oil production increases sharply in the AEO2014 Reference case, with annual growth averaging 0.8 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) through 2016, when domestic production comes close to the historical high of 9.6 MMbbl/d achieved in 1970 (Figure 1). While domestic crude oil production is projected to level off and then slowly decline after 2020 in the Reference case, natural gas production grows steadily, with a 56% increase between 2012 and 2040, when production reaches 37.6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). The full AEO2014 report, to be released this spring, will also consider alternative resource and technology scenarios, some with significantly higher long-term oil production than the Reference case.

Low natural gas prices boost natural gas-intensive industries. Industrial shipments grow at a 3.0% annual rate over the first 10 years of the projection and then slow to a 1.6% annual growth over the balance of the projection. Bulk chemicals and metals-based durables account for much of the increased growth in industrial shipments. Industrial shipments of bulk chemicals, which benefit from an increased supply of natural gas liquids, grow by 3.4% per year from 2012 to 2025, although the competitive advantage in bulk chemicals diminishes in the long term. Industrial natural gas consumption is projected to grow by 22% between 2012 and 2025.

Higher natural gas production also supports increased exports of both pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG). In addition to increases in domestic consumption in the industrial and electric power sectors, U.S. exports of natural gas also increase in the AEO2014 Reference case (Figure 2). U.S. exports of LNG increase to 3.5 Tcf before 2030 and remain at that level through 2040. Pipeline exports of U.S. natural gas to Mexico grow by 6% per year, from 0.6 Tcf in 2012 to 3.1 Tcf in 2040, and pipeline exports to Canada grow by 1.2% per year, from 1.0 Tcf in 2012 to 1.4 Tcf in 2040. Over the same period, U.S. pipeline imports from Canada fall by 30%, from 3.0 Tcf in 2012 to 2.1 Tcf in 2040, as more U.S. demand is met by domestic production.

Car and light trucks energy use declines sharply, reflecting slow growth in travel and accelerated vehicle efficiency improvements. AEO2014 includes a new, detailed demographic profile of driving behavior by age and gender as well as new lower population growth rates based on updated Census projections. As a result, annual increases in vehicles miles traveled (VMT) in light-duty vehicles (LDV) average 0.9% from 2012 to 2040, compared to 1.2% per year over the same period in AEO2013. The rising fuel economy of LDVs more than offsets the modest growth in VMT, resulting in a 25% decline in LDV energy consumption decline between 2012 and 2040 in the AEO2014 Reference case.

Natural gas overtakes coal to provide the largest share of U.S. electric power generation. Projected low prices for natural gas make it a very attractive fuel for new generating capacity. In some areas, natural-gas-fired generation replaces power formerly supplied by coal and nuclear plants. In 2040, natural gas accounts for 35% of total electricity generation, while coal accounts for 32% (Figure 3). Generation from renewable fuels, unlike coal and nuclear power, is higher in the AEO2014 Reference case than in AEO2013. Electric power generation from renewables is bolstered by legislation enacted at the beginning of 2013 extending tax credits for generation from wind and other renewable technologies.
Other AEO2014 Reference case highlights:
  • The Brent crude oil spot price declines from $112 per barrel (bbl) (in 2012 dollars) in 2012 to $92/bbl in 2017. After 2017, the Brent spot oil price increases, reaching $141/bbl in 2040 due to growing demand that requires the development of more costly resources. World liquids consumption grows from 89 MMbbl/d in 2012 to 117 MMbbl/d in 2040, driven by growing demand in China, India, Brazil, and other developing economies.
  • Total U.S. primary energy consumption grows by just 12% between 2012 and 2040. The fossil fuel share of total primary energy demand falls from 82% of total U.S. energy consumption in 2012 to 80% in 2040 as consumption of petroleum-based liquid fuels falls, largely as a result of slower growth in LDV VMT and increased vehicle efficiency.
  • Energy use per 2005 dollar of gross domestic product (GDP) declines by 43% from 2012 to 2040 in AEO2014 as a result of continued growth in services as a share of the overall economy, rising energy prices, and existing policies that promote energy efficiency. Energy use per capita declines by 8% from 2012 through 2040 as a result of improving energy efficiency and changes in the way energy is used in the U.S. economy.
  • With domestic crude oil production rising to 9.5 MMbbl/d in 2016, the net import share of U.S. petroleum and other liquids supply will fall to about 25%. With a decline in domestic crude oil production after 2019 in the AEO2014 Reference case, the import share of total petroleum and other liquids supply will grow to 32% in 2040, still lower than the 2040 level of 37% in the AEO2013 Reference case.
  • Total U.S. energy-related CO2 emissions remain below their 2005 level (6 billion metric tons) through 2040, when they reach 5.6 billion metric tons. CO2 emissions per 2005 dollar of GDP decline more rapidly than energy use per dollar, to 56% below their 2005 level in 2040, as lower-carbon fuels account for a growing share of total energy use.

Get our "Gold and Crude Oil Trade Ideas"


Wednesday, March 7, 2012

U.S. Petroleum Product Exports Exceeded Imports in 2011 For First Time in Over Six Decades

graph of Annual U.S. net exports of total petroleum products, 1949-2011, as described in the article text

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Monthly.
Notes: Net exports equal gross exports minus gross imports. Negative net export values indicate net imports.

The United States in 2011 exported more petroleum products, on an annual basis, than it imported for the first time since 1949, but American refiners still imported large, although declining, amounts of crude oil, according to full-year trade data from EIA's Petroleum Supply Monthly February report. The increase in foreign purchases of distillate fuel contributed the most to the United States becoming a net exporter of petroleum products.

U.S. petroleum product net exports (exports minus imports) averaged 0.44 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2011, with imports at a nine-year low of close to 2.4 million bbl/d and exports at a record high of nearly 2.9 million bbl/d. The gap between exports and imports widened the most during the second half of the year from August through December (see charts below), with total monthly exports topping 3 million bbl/d for the first time.

graph of Monthly U.S. net exports of total petroleum products, 1949-2011, as described in the article text

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Monthly.

Strong global demand helped propel distillate exports, as distillate fuel, which includes diesel, had a higher profit margin for U.S. refiners than gasoline. Refiners also had access to increased supplies of crude oil imports from Canada, which in 2011 topped 2 million bbl/d for the first time, and from North Dakota's Bakken formation to process into petroleum products.

The United States remained a net importer of crude oil, some of which was refined into petroleum products that were then exported. Petroleum products were ranked second in value of all U.S. exports during 2011 at $111.1 billion, up 60% from 2010, according to U.S. Department of Commerce trade data. Vehicles were the number one U.S. export last year at $132.5 billion. Crude oil was the biggest U.S. import, valued at $331.6 billion, up 32% from 2010. Rising crude oil prices, rather than higher crude oil import volumes, were the key driver of the increased value of crude oil imports.

Check out our latest Video, Market Analysis and Forecast for the Dollar, Crude Oil, Gold, Silver, and the SP500

Sunday, January 8, 2012

EIA: U.S. Refineries and Blenders Produced Record Amounts of Distillate Fuels

graph of Finished motor gasoline and distillate fuel oil production, 2011, as described in the article text
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Petroleum Status Report.
Download CSV Data


U.S. refiners produced historically high volumes of distillate fuels (a category that includes both diesel fuel and heating oil) and motor gasoline in 2011. By fine-tuning their production mix, refineries consistently set record levels of distillate production, most recently topping 5 million barrels per day (bbl/d) for the weeks ending December 2 and December 16, 2011.

In 2011, weekly distillate production was above the five-year historical range 25 times, and ranked second highest an additional 19 times. Finished motor gasoline production was robust over the same period, but was slightly more in line with production volumes at comparable times of year since 2006.

Because of its chemical composition, crude oil run through a refinery typically yields roughly twice as much motor gasoline as distillate fuels. Therefore, regardless of economic or other incentives, refiners cannot completely stop making some finished petroleum products in favor of others. However, by adjusting downstream processes and the types of crude oil used, refineries can optimize production to fine-tune the balance of their finished products output. For much of 2011, refiners saw favorable margins and robust global demand for distillate fuels. In order to benefit from these trends, refineries:

  • Increased crude runs to maximize overall output. This explains why both motor gasoline and distillate fuels production levels are high relative to the five-year historical ranges.
  • Shifted production mix. This explains why the distillate fuels production levels exceeded historical ranges in more weeks than motor gasoline production did.

Since early October, the spot price for ultra-low-sulfur distillate fuel oil rose, while the spot price for motor gasoline (as measured by New York RBOB spot prices in the chart below) declined, widening the spread between these two petroleum product prices. On November 14, 2011, the spot price for ultra-low-sulfur distillate was nearly 65 cents per gallon higher than the spot price for RBOB. The spread between these product prices had not been more than 60 cents per gallon since November 2008.

graph of Gasoline and diesel spot prices, 2011, as described in the article text


Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, based on Bloomberg.

Note: Ultra low sulfur distillate spot prices shown as New York ultra low sulfur distillate spot prices; motor gasoline prices reflect New York RBOB spot prices.

Along with high domestic prices, strong international markets for distillate fuel oils have spurred increased production. In the United States, refineries have typically optimized production for finished motor gasoline to meet high U.S. demand. European refineries, on the other hand, tend to produce higher percentages of distillate fuel oils, as diesel is used more broadly there for transportation.

 Due to crude supply disruptions to European refineries for much of this year, the region has imported more finished products. Weekly U.S. gross distillate export estimates (bound primarily for European and South American markets) were at record levels in the fourth quarter of 2011, topping more than 0.9 million bbl/d in October and November, and exceeding 1 million bbl/d in December.

Robust global distillate demand has led to a significant inventory draw, despite heightened U.S. production. From the end of September to the end of December, U.S. distillate inventories fell by more than 13 million barrels.

Check Out Our Five Best Trade Ideas for the Next Week

Thursday, December 8, 2011

Rigzone: Crude Slides 2.1% On European Debt Worries

Crude oil futures fell 2.1% to near $98 a barrel Thursday, posting the biggest decline in three weeks on continued worries about Europe's sovereign debt.

Prices had posted early gains, approaching $102 a barrel, after a larger than expected drop in new claims for U.S. jobless benefits. The Labor Department said benefits filings in the week ended Dec. 3 fell by 23,000 and were at the lowest level in nine months. Economists had expected a 7,000 decline in the week.

But the weight of concerns, as European leaders begin a two day summit meeting, hit equities price and crude tumbled. Oil, like all global markets, has been gripped by concerns in recent months that the crisis in European could trigger a global economic slowdown.

Those concerns were especially evident in the heating oil futures market Thursday, traders said, as prices fell to their lowest level since Nov. 25 on fears of a potential slowdown in U.S. exports of related diesel fuel. Latest U.S. government data show that 42% of record high exports of distillate fuel (diesel/heating oil) in September were bound for Europe.....Read the entire article.


Gold’s 4th Wave Consolidation Nears Completion and Breakout

Sunday, September 18, 2011

EIA: Over 90% of Syrian Crude Oil Exports go to European Countries


Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Syria Country Analysis Brief.


Syria, the only significant crude oil-producing country in the eastern Mediterranean, produced 387,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of crude oil (including lease condensate) in 2010. Estimated net crude oil exports were 109,000 bbl/d in 2010, the vast majority of which went to OECD European countries. Germany, Italy, France, and the Netherlands comprised over 80% of Syria's crude oil exports.

According to the European Commission, European Union (EU) countries imported 1.35% of their petroleum from Syria in 2010. Although exports from Syria represented a small share of the EU's overall oil needs, these exports accounted for 30% (or $4.1 billion) of Syrian government revenues in 2010.

Declining oil production has been the main driver of lower Syrian oil exports (see chart below). Efforts to reverse the declining trend for production and exports by expanding exploration and production through partnerships with foreign oil companies have been hampered by U.S. sanctions.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Syria Country Analysis Brief.
Download CSV Data


Recent political unrest in Syria and the indiscriminate use of deadly force against dissent by the Syrian government has prompted further U.S. sanctions, including a ban on the import of crude oil or petroleum products of Syrian origins. On September 2, 2011, the EU, whose members purchase over 90% of Syrian oil, announced a ban on imports of Syrian crude oil, which may further hinder Syrian efforts to expand their petroleum industry.

Syria has opened its offshore territory for development; however, this region is expected to contain mostly natural gas. The Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and General Establishment of Geology and Mineral Resources has also opened up bidding for shale oil deposits containing an estimated 285 billion barrels of oil. This new exploration, plus rehabilitation of current oil fields, may help counter the current decline in petroleum production.

Although Syria is not a major producer of oil and gas, it occupies a strategic location in terms of prospective energy transit routes and regional security. EIA's Country Analysis Brief on Syria features additional analysis on these trends, along with a broad discussion of Syria's energy sector.
Stock & ETF Trading Signals