Showing posts with label international. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international. Show all posts

Friday, January 17, 2014

A Glimpse into the Coming Collapse

By Jeff Thomas, International Man

Beginning in 1999, we predicted a systemic economic collapse that would take place in the First World and would impact all other economies. We began to list some of the "dominoes" that would fall as the collapse evolved and described that the "Great Unravelling," as we termed it, would take roughly ten years. At that time, we guesstimated that the first two of the dominoes, a real estate crash and subsequent stock market crash in the US, would begin in about 2005.


We were premature in this prediction, as the first of the crashes did not occur until 2007. And, truth be told, we have frequently been incorrect in the timing of the other dominoes. Whilst the actual events have been predicted correctly, our timing has often been incorrect. In every such case, the prediction has been premature.

Sadly, however, the prediction of the events of the collapse have been almost entirely correct.

We also predicted that, just as a ball of string speeds up its rotation as it rolls along unravelling, so, too, the events of the Great Unravelling would occur more quickly as the situation worsened. Additionally, the severity of the events would increase concurrently with the increase in velocity.

However, none of the above was the result of gypsy fortune telling, nor did it require the brightest of minds to work out. It is mostly based on the simple assumption that history repeats itself—that the world's leaders make the same mistakes in every era, because human nature never changes. Anyone who is willing to expend the effort to study history diligently and to be prepared to think in contrarian terms, may develop a meaningful insight into the events of the future.

Back in 1999, of course, the very idea that the world was headed for serious economic calamity was considered ridiculous by most. The unfortunate fact is, most people do truly deal in the present, rarely questioning the future beyond what they consider to be the very next event. The truth of this statement is borne out by the fact that the great majority of people, who have already seen the first half of the Great Unravelling come to pass, still somehow cannot imagine the second half—the more disastrous half—as being in any way possible. Surely, somehow, the governments of the world will fix things.

However, the number of people whose eyes have been opened seems to be growing, and many of them are asking what the collapse will look like as it unfolds. What will the symptoms be?

Well, the primary events are fairly predictable: they would include major collapses in the bond and stock markets and possible sudden deflation (primarily of assets), followed by dramatic inflation, if not hyperinflation (primarily of commodities), followed by a crash of several major currencies, particularly the euro and the US dollar.

The secondary events will be less certain, but likely: increased unemployment, currency controls, protective tariffs, severe depression, etc.

But, along the way, there will be numerous surprises—actions taken by governments that may be as unprecedented as they would be unlawful. Why? Because, again, such actions are the norm when a government finds itself losing its grip over the people it perceives as its minions. Here are a few:
  • Travel Restrictions. This will begin with restrictions on foreign travel, including suspension/removal of passports. (This has begun in a small way in both the EU and US.) Later, travel restrictions will be extended within the boundaries of countries (highway checkpoints, etc.)
  • Confiscation of wealth. The EU has instituted the confiscation of bank accounts, which can be expected to become an international form of governmental theft. This does not automatically mean that other assets, such as precious metals and real estate will also be confiscated, but it does mean that the barrier for confiscation has been eliminated. There is therefore no reason to assume that any asset is safe from any government that approves theft through bail-ins.
  • Food Shortages. The food industry operates on very small profit margins and survives only as a result of quick payment of invoices. With dramatic inflation, marginal businesses (suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers) will fall by the wayside. The percentage of failing businesses will be dependent upon the duration and severity of the inflationary trend.
  • Squatters Rebellions. A dramatic increase in the number of home and business foreclosures will result in homelessness for anyone whose debt exceeds his ability to pay—even those who presently appear to be well-off. As numbers rise significantly, a new homeless class will be created amongst the former middle class. As they become more numerous, large scale ownership of property may give way to large scale "possession" of property.
  • Riots. These will likely happen spontaneously due to the above conditions, but if not, governments will create them to justify their desire for greater control of the masses.
  • Martial Law. The US has already prepared for this, with the passing of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which many interpret as declaring the US to be a "battlefield." The NDAA allows the suspension of habeas corpus, indefinite detention, and the assumption that any resident may be considered an enemy combatant. Similar legislation may be expected in other countries that perceive martial law as a solution to civil unrest.
The above list is purposely brief—a sampling of eventualities that, should they occur, will almost definitely come unannounced. As the decline unfolds, they will surely happen with greater frequency.

But the value in projecting what the collapsing governments may do to their citizens is not merely an exercise in speculation. By anticipating the likelihood of any of the above, the individual may find that it would be prudent to turn off the game on television tonight and spend his time musing on the possibility of what he would do if any of the above events were to take place. (And, again, these projections are not mere fancy; they are actions typically taken by governments as their declines play out.)

Most importantly, if the reader concludes that there is a significant percentage of likelihood that any of the above are coming his way, he would be well-advised to assess whether they are developments that he feels he could live with. If not, he might wish to assess how much time he has before these events become a reality and what he may do to sidestep their impact on him.

Whilst, throughout the First World, the comment, "The whole world is going to Hell," is becoming common, in fact, this is not the case. Although some countries are in decline, others are on the rise. It is left to the reader to decide whether he will fall victim to coming events, or will use them as an opportunity to internationalise himself.

Editor’s Note: You can find Casey Research’s A-Z guide on internationalization here.


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Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Crude Oils Have Different Quality Characteristics

Many types of crude oil are produced around the world. The market value of an individual crude stream reflects its quality characteristics. Two of the most important quality characteristics are density and sulfur content. Density ranges from light to heavy, while sulfur content is characterized as sweet or sour. The crude oils represented in the chart are a selection of some of the crude oils marketed in various parts of the world. There are some crude oils both below and above the API gravity range shown in the chart.

graph of Density and sulfur content of selected crude oils, as described in the article text
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, based on Energy Intelligence Group—International Crude Oil Market Han

Crude oils that are light (higher degrees of API gravity, or lower density) and sweet (low sulfur content) are usually priced higher than heavy, sour crude oils. This is partly because gasoline and diesel fuel, which typically sell at a significant premium to residual fuel oil and other "bottom of the barrel" products, can usually be more easily and cheaply produced using light, sweet crude oil.

The light sweet grades are desirable because they can be processed with far less sophisticated and energy intensive processes/refineries. The figure shows select crude types from around the world with their corresponding sulfur content and density characteristics.

The selected crude oils in the figure are not intended to be comprehensive of global crude production. Rather, they were grades selected for the recurrent and recently updated EIA report, "The Availability and Price of Petroleum and Petroleum Products Produced in Countries Other Than Iran."

graph of Selected crude oil price points, as described in the article text
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 

Notes: Locations on the map are based on the pricing point, not necessarily the area of production. Locations are approximate. Points on the map are labeled by country and benchmark name. United States-Mars is an offshore drilling site in the Gulf of Mexico. WTI = West Texas Intermediate; LLS = Louisiana Light Sweet; FSU = Former Soviet Union; UAE = United Arab Emirates


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Wednesday, June 20, 2012

The United Kingdom’s Natural Gas Supply Mix is Changing

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Natural gas production in the United Kingdom is trending down due to declines in production from that country's North Sea fields. Imports via pipeline connections with Europe as well as seaborne deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG) now account for more than half of the U.K.'s natural gas supply.

graph of U.K. natural gas supply mix, January 2007 - May 2012, as described in the article text

Here are some key findings underpinning supply trends.

U.K. Production

Natural gas production in the U.K. has been falling for years. Average monthly U.K. natural gas production has fallen from around 350 billion cubic feet (Bcf) per month in 2000 to less than 200 Bcf per month in 2011. Natural gas production in the U.K. declined 22% between 2010 and 2011. Natural gas reserves have been steadily declining since 1999 as well; older fields account for a significant volume of current natural gas production in the U.K. The vast majority of U.K. production comes from offshore fields, and in 2010, 85% of gross offshore production came from fields that had been producing for more than 10 years, and 39% of gross offshore natural gas production came from fields that started flowing natural gas prior to 1991.

graph of U.S. coal export destinations by region and by type, 2001-2011, as described in the article text

Pipeline Imports

U.K. annual pipeline imports from Norway rose significantly in recent years, up from just 36 Bcf in 2001 to 878 Bcf in 2010. Most of the growth since October 2006 is attributable to the Langeled Pipeline, which began service that month. Extending 725 miles through the North Sea, the Langeled Pipeline links the Nyhamna terminal in Norway via the Sleipner Riser platform in the North Sea to the Easington Gas Terminal in the U.K. From January 1, 2012 through May 17, 2012, imports from Norway on the Langeled Pipeline averaged about 2.5 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d). Earlier imports from Norway were directly from North Sea fields owned by Norway.

Since 2007, the U.K. has been a net importer of natural gas from Continental Europe via the Interconnector and BBL pipelines, as annual imports on these pipelines have exceeded annual exports. From January 1—May 17, 2012, net imports into the U.K. from Belgium and the Netherlands, together, have averaged about 1 Bcf/d. Natural gas flows between the U.K. and Belgium and the Netherlands vary depending on market conditions. When demand is peaking in the U.K., gas flows into the U.K.; when the U.K. is well-supplied with natural gas relative to demand, natural gas tends to flow into Europe from the U.K. Analysts can observe these changes daily; National Grid, the principal natural gas pipeline operator in the U.K., provides real-time estimates of natural gas flows at key import locations on its website.

LNG Imports

The U.K. has not been dependent on LNG for long. The first modern-era LNG terminal in the U.K.—the Isle of Grain terminal—began commercial service in the summer of 2005. LNG's role, however, has grown significantly since then. At times, LNG deliveries in the U.K. have provided up to 4 Bcf/d of total supply and accounted for 20% of the U.K.'s aggregate natural gas needs (see chart below). In the United States, only the New England region is as reliant on contributions from LNG to meet demand.

In 2011, total U.K. LNG imports exceeded 900 Bcf, with Qatar accounting for over 80% of U.K.'s LNG imports that year. Average daily LNG deliveries from re-gasification terminals have trailed off to 1.4 Bcf/d so far in 2012 (January 1 through May 17) compared with 2.7 Bcf/d for the same period in 2011. Since 2009, the South Hook terminal has received most of the LNG imports into the U.K. (see chart below).

graph of U.S. coal export destinations by region and by type, 2001-2011, as described in the article text

Thursday, May 31, 2012

OPEC Spare Capacity in the First Quarter of 2012 at Lowest Level Since 2008

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The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that global spare crude oil production capacity averaged about 2.4 million barrels per day (bbl/d) during the first quarter of 2012, down about 1.3 million bbl/d from the same period in 2011 (see chart below). The world's spare crude oil production capacity is held by member countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Spare capacity can serve as a buffer against oil market disruptions, and it gives OPEC additional political and economic influence in world markets. There is little or no spare capacity outside of the OPEC member countries.

graph of Quarterly OPEC spare crude oil capacity and WTI spot prices, as described in the article text

Spare crude oil production capacity is now less than 3% of total world crude oil consumption—the lowest proportion since the fourth quarter of 2008—based on EIA estimates.

Spare crude oil production capacity is an important indicator of producers' ability to respond to potential disruptions; consequently, low spare oil production capacity tends to be associated with high oil prices and high oil price volatility. Similarly, rising spare capacity tends to be associated with falling oil prices and reduced volatility. However, spare capacity must also be considered in the context of a number of other market factors that can drive crude oil prices, such as global supply, demand, and inventory levels.

EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. This does not include oil production increases that could not be sustained without degrading the future production capacity of a field.


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