Showing posts with label ratio. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ratio. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 14, 2017

Why It Feels Like the Dot Com Bubble All Over Again

By Justin Spittler

Today, we’re going to do something different. As you can imagine, we hear from our readers a lot. Some of them have nice things to say. Others…not so much. Most importantly, though, we get a lot of questions. Last week, we received a question that was so important, we’re dedicating this entire issue to it. This question might be something you’re wondering yourself…and it could have a huge impact on your money.

It comes from Joseph J., a subscriber to The Casey Report:
I read today’s newsletter (Trump Should Be Careful What He Wishes For) with great interest. In it you stated that “U.S. stocks are incredibly expensive…” But my question is: Based against what? We are in uncharted territory, and every single newsletter writer that I have asked this question of has failed to provide an answer. Perhaps you will be different.
Thank you for putting us in the hot seat, Joseph. Lucky for us, we didn’t make this claim lightly. We have plenty of facts to back it up. Before we show you the proof, you have to realize something: There are many different ways to value stocks. Everyone has their preference. A lot of folks use the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio. Other investors look at a company’s book value or cash flow.

We prefer to use the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio.…
This ratio is the cousin of the popular P/E ratio. The only difference is that it uses 10 years’ worth of earnings instead of just the previous year’s. This smooths out the up and downs of the business cycle. It gives us a long-term view of the market. Right now, the CAPE ratio for companies in the S&P 500 is 28.4. That’s 70% higher than its historical average. U.S. stocks haven’t been this expensive since the dot com bubble.



This isn’t a good sign. As you may remember, the S&P 500 fell 41% from 2000–2002. The Nasdaq plunged 78% over the same period.

But the CAPE ratio is just one way to value stocks.…
To prove we’re not cherry picking, let’s look at some other metrics. First up, the price-to-sales (P/S) ratio. This ratio is just like the P/E ratio, but it uses the previous year’s sales instead of earnings. According to credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s, the S&P 500 currently trades at 2.02 times sales. That’s 40% higher than its historical average, and the highest level since at least 2000. Clearly, U.S. stocks are more expensive than normal. But that’s not even the main reason investors are nervous about them.

U.S. stocks seem to have lost touch with reality.…
As we all know, the stock market allows investors to own a piece of publicly traded companies. Most of the companies on the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) are U.S. companies. Because of this, you would think the stock market would generally follow the health of the economy. If the economy’s booming, stocks should be soaring. If the economy’s struggling, stocks should be, too. That hasn’t been the case lately.

Since 2009, the S&P 500 has surged 239% to record highs. That makes this one of the strongest bull markets in U.S. history. During that same span, the U.S. economy has grown just 2% per year. That makes the current “recovery” one of the weakest since World War II. In short, Main Street hasn’t kept up with Wall Street.

The U.S. stock market is now clearly in “bubble territory”.…
Just look at the chart below. This chart compares the value of the U.S. stock market with the nation’s gross domestic income (GDI). GDI is like gross domestic product (GDP), but instead of measuring how much money a country spends, it measures how much money a country earns. It counts things like wages, corporate profits, and tax receipts. A high ratio means stocks are expensive relative to how much money an economy makes. You can see in the chart below that this key ratio is well above its housing bubble high. It’s now approaching the record high it hit during the dot-com bubble.



This is another serious red flag.…
But it doesn't mean stocks are going to crash next month, or next year. For this bubble to pop, something will have to prick it. We’re not sure what that will be…where it will come from…or when it will happen…
But we do know stocks don’t go up forever. Sooner or later, this bubble is going to end. When it does, many investors are going to take huge losses. Years’ worth of returns could disappear in a matter of months, even weeks.

The good news is that you can still crisis-proof your portfolio. Here are three ways to get started:
  1. Set aside more cash. Holding extra cash will help you avoid big losses if stocks fall. It will also put you in a position to buy stocks when they get cheaper.
  2. Own physical gold. Gold is the ultimate safe-haven asset. It’s survived every financial crisis in history. It will certainly survive the next one.
  3. Close your weakest positions. Start by selling your most expensive stocks. They tend to fall the hardest during major selloffs. You should also get rid of companies that need cheap debt to make money. If problems in the bond market continue, these companies could be in trouble.
These simple strategies could save you tens of thousands, possibly more, when the inevitable happens.

Chart of the Day

Miners are rallying again. Today’s chart shows the performance of the S&P/TSX Global Mining Index. This index tracks the performance of companies that mine commodities like gold, silver, aluminum, and copper. You can see that this index skyrocketed at the beginning of last year. It nearly doubled between January and July. Then, it went almost nowhere for six months.

Three weeks ago, the S&P/TSX Global Mining Index broke out of this sideways trading pattern. It’s now trading at its highest level since early 2015. This is very bullish. It tells us that mining stocks may have just entered a new phase of a bull market. If you’ve been thinking about buying mining stocks, now might be a good time to get in. But don’t worry if you don’t know what to buy.

We recently put together a presentation that talks about one of the richest gold deposits in the world. Our top gold analyst has never seen anything like this in his career. Early investors in the company that owns this deposit could make 1,000% or more. But this opportunity won’t last long. Just two months from now, this world-class mine will “go live.” When it does, this company’s stock should shoot through the roof. For more details on this incredible opportunity, click here.



Stock & ETF Trading Signals

Friday, October 24, 2014

Blood in the Streets to Create the Opportunity of the Decade

By Laurynas Vegys, Research Analyst

Gold stocks staged spring and summer rallies this year, but haven’t able to sustain the momentum. Many have sold off sharply in recent weeks, along with gold. That makes this a good time to examine the book value of gold equities; are they objectively cheap now, or not?

By way of reminder, a price to book value ratio (P/BV) shows the stock price in relation to the company’s book value, which is the theoretical value of a company’s assets minus liabilities. A stock is considered cheap when it’s trading at a historically low P/BV, and undervalued when it’s trading below book value.

From the perspective of an investor, low price to book multiples imply opportunity and a margin of safety from potential declines in price.

We analyzed the book values of all publicly traded primary gold producers with a market cap of $1 billion or more. The final list comprised 32 companies. We then charted book values from January 2, 2007 through last Thursday, October 15. Here’s what we found.


At the current 1.20 times book value, gold stocks aren’t as cheap as they were when we ran the numbers in June, 2013, successfully pinpointing the all-time low of 0.91 (the turning point before the period in gray). Of course, that P/BV is hard to beat: it was one of the lowest values ever. And while the stocks not quite as cheap now, the valuation multiple still lingers close to its historical bottom. Remember, we’re talking about senior mining companies here—producers with real assets and cash flow selling for close to their book values.

In short, yes, gold stocks are objectively selling cheaply.

The juniors, of course, have been hit harder. It’s hard to put a meaningful book value on many of these “burning matches” with little more than hopes and geologists’ dreams, but valuations on many are scraping the bottom, making them even better bargains, albeit substantially riskier ones.

What does this mean for us investors?

It’s no surprise to see that every contraction in the ratio was followed by a major rally. In other words, the cure for low prices is low prices:
  • The August, 2007 bottom (2.2) and the momentary downtrend that preceded it were quickly erased by a swift price rally leading to a January, 2008 peak (3.8).
  • The bull also made a comeback in 2009-2010, fighting its way up out of what seemed at the time to be the deepest hole (1.04) in October, 2008.
Stocks have been on a long slide since the ratio last peaked at 3.24 in October, 2010, with the downturn in 2013 pushing multiples to previously unseen lows.

No one—us included—has a crystal ball, and so it’s impossible to tell if the bottom is behind us. We can, however, gauge with certainty when an asset is cheap—and cash-generating companies selling for little more than book value are extraordinary values for big-picture investors.

Now let’s see how these valuations look against the S&P 500.


Stocks listed in the S&P500 are currently more than twice as expensive as the gold producers. That’s not surprising given how volatile metals prices can be and how unloved mining is—but is it rational? Note that despite the downtrend in the last month, the multiple for the S&P500 remains close to a multiyear high.

In other words, yes, the S&P 500 is expensive.

This contrast points to an obvious opportunity in our sector.

So is now the time to buy gold stocks? Answer: our stocks are good values now, and, if there is a larger correction ahead, they may well become fantastic values, briefly. Either way, value is value, on sale.

As the most successful resource speculators have repeatedly said: you have to be a contrarian in this sector to be successful, buying low and selling high, and that takes courage based on solid convictions. Yes, it’s possible that valuations could fall further. However:

The difference between prices and clear-cut value argue for going long and staying that way until multiples return to lofty levels again—which they’ve done every time, as the historical record shows.

With a long term time frame in mind, whatever happens in the short term is less of a concern. Building substantial positions at good prices in great companies in advance of what must transpire sooner or later is what successful speculation is all about. This is how Doug Casey, Rick Rule, and others have made their fortunes, and it’s why they’re buying in the market now, seeing market capitulation as one of the prime opportunities of the decade.

That’s worth remembering, especially during a downturn that has even die hard gold bugs giving up.
Bottom line: “Blood in the streets” isn't pretty, but it’s a good thing for those with the liquidity and courage to act.

What to buy? That’s what we cover in BIG GOLD. Thanks to our 3 month full money back guarantee, you have nothing to lose and the potential for gains that only a true contrarian can expect.




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Monday, September 22, 2014

How You Can Tell When a Company’s P/E is All Flash

By Andrey Dashkov

College reunions are toxic. Except for the few precious moments of genuine human connection, these parties are nothing but status pageants. Suits and watches are inconspicuously glanced at, vacation photos (carefully selected the night before) are passed around; compensations guesstimated; Platinum Master Cards flashed (“Oh no, let me take care of this round!”); spouses evaluated based on trophy-worthy qualities… and inconspicuously glanced at.

It’s hard to tell true, praiseworthy success from carefully crafted smoke and mirrors. Your college friend may have rented that car, watch, suit—and even his “spouse.” In fact, there are escort agencies out there that provide “dates” for single men to social occasions. Don’t ask me how I learned about it.

The point is, both people and companies like to project high status and success to the public. Not only do your friends from Beta Phi Delta want to look alpha (pun intended), but companies, too, often want you to think they earn more than they actually do.

There are many incentives to do that: management’s compensation may be tied to earnings-per-share (EPS) goals; the company may be trying to maintain an image of rapid growth; or it could be attempting to raise funds by issuing debt or shares. Higher EPS would benefit the company and the team at the helm in all of these cases.

The Illusory P/E Ratio

Another reason why companies try to massage their earnings is that millions of investors pay attention to the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E). It is one of the most intuitive financial metrics. Potential investors see it all across the Internet, on free finance sites and many trading platforms. However, despite its popularity, I’d argue that it’s one of the most illusory financial metrics that exists, and the blame is on the denominator, earnings. Let’s see how we can make better use of it.

“E” in the P/E ratio stands for earnings per share, which is a ratio itself. EPS is the company’s net income for the reported 12-month period (or forecasted net income for the next 12 months) divided by its shares outstanding. Without going into too much detail, here are some of the potential issues with the usefulness of reported historical, or trailing, earnings per share for investors:
  • Seasonality. Earnings of a lot of companies fluctuate due to seasonal buying activity, weather, and other factors. In these cases, quarter-to-quarter comparisons are meaningless, and it’s necessary to understand the company’s operating cycles (annual, based on contract renewals, etc.) to make use of the reported earnings.

  • Dilution. There are two broad measures of shares outstanding: basic (or common) and diluted. Diluted shares outstanding include common shares, options, warrants, convertible preferred shares, and convertible debt. All of these can potentially be converted to common stock and result in lower earnings per share because of the higher denominator in the EPS ratio. However, when you look at a P/E ratio on the Internet, it’s not always clear whether it was based on basic or diluted shares. The latter is more conservative, and we pay more attention to it than to the basic EPS.

  • Accruals-based accounting, in which revenues are recognized at the moment they’re earned, and expenses are recognized when they’re incurred. In contrast, under cash-based accounting, revenues are recognized when cash is collected, and expenses are recognized when cash is paid.

    Accruals-based accounting has its advantages:

*  It allows the company to match revenues to expenses in time more closely (for example, the cost of a piece of equipment is depreciated over its useful life to match the revenues this equipment generates); and

*  It provides the market with information about the company’s operations as soon as it has enough objective evidence that the transaction will be fulfilled. For example, when a company sends an invoice to a customer, it records a receivable, which sends a signal to the market that a sale took place. We don’t need to wait until the actual funds are deposited in the company’s bank account, which may take a month or more, to become aware of this sale.

However, accrual accounting has two major drawbacks for analysts and investors:

*  Reported income and expenses do not mirror actual cash inflows and outflows; and

*  Management can accelerate or postpone recognition of revenue and expenses, which makes reported net income figures less reliable.

Consider a real-world example. A friend of mine—let’s call him Steven—spent several years as a credit manager. One of his responsibilities was to expense a “reserve” for anticipated credit losses. The first time he was about to charge the expenses, he estimated them realistically and quickly realized that it wouldn’t work. The reserve wasn’t there to cover the related losses calculated fairly and correctly.

After a discussion with the corporate accounting department (his superior), if they needed to find more profit to make their numbers, Steven would lower his reserve estimates. If they were having a good year, he was told to increase the reserve write-off to provide a cushion for the next quarter.

The beauty of it was that such draws and deposits are almost impossible to catch unless the amounts are outrageous, so any auditor would overlook them. Steven and his team were safe legally, but the practice misrepresented his company’s financial performance nevertheless.

When I asked another friend—let’s call him Jack—to share any stories about his company’s creative accounting, he said he too would get calls from the corporate accounting department at the end of each quarter. Another easy target to massage is insurance costs. To get the lowest prices, many of its insurance policies were paid annually, and the premium period did not correspond with the accounting year. If the company was having a good quarter or year, he was encouraged to write off the entire annual premium in that accounting period. Conversely, if it was struggling to make its numbers, the team would show the premiums for future months as “prepaid insurance,” effectively delaying the expense until the next accounting period.

The effect, as with our first example, was to smooth out period-to-period fluctuations to keep stockholders happy by “making their numbers” or beating them by a little bit. The justification was that they weren’t really manipulating profits—“in the long run, it all comes out in the wash.”

Part of Jack’s annual performance review was “being a good team player.” Helping the corporate team was part of that evaluation.

Other common revenue and expense “management” techniques include adjustments to how depreciation expense is calculated, which is doable within limits under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and can affect net income as desired; and adjustments to revenue recognition policies that technically comply with GAAP but distort the underlying economic reality to artificially boost the top line and thereby juice earnings.

Normalization Helps Solve the Numbers Game

The first two issues with earnings—seasonality and dilution—can be addressed simply: instead of looking at price to reported earnings per share, pay attention to P/E calculated from normalized earnings based on diluted shares outstanding. Normalization takes care of seasonality and some of the nonrecurring revenue and cost items. Using diluted share count instead of basic will return a more conservative number, because it assumes that all options, warrants, and convertible debt are converted into common shares. The more common shares there are, the lower the EPS.

As shareholders, we need those conservative estimates. Our returns (share price appreciation and dividend income) aren’t based on management achieving arbitrary earnings targets that can be fiddled with, but on how the company functions as a business. To get a clearer picture, using normalized diluted EPS should help.
Note that I wrote “clearer” but not “clear,” “true,” or “objective.” The reason we stay away from such absolutes is that it’s prohibitively difficult to say what’s going on with any company’s earnings with 100% accuracy.

One simple tip can help you make better use of P/E: use normalized earnings and diluted shares. These numbers are often available on free websites or in SEC filings.

Now I’ll go ahead and clear my browser history. Although reading about escort services for college reunions is a great study of the human condition, I’ll have a hard time explaining to my lovely wife why I need to do it for work.

And speaking of the work I do… you can receive more unique insights on better investing strategies by signing up for our free, retirement-focused e-letter, Miller’s Money Weekly.




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Tuesday, August 19, 2014

Bubbles, Bubbles Everywhere

By John Mauldin



The difference between genius and stupidity is that genius has its limits.
– Albert Einstein
Genius is a rising stock market.
– John Kenneth Galbraith
Any plan conceived in moderation must fail when circumstances are set in extremes.
– Prince Metternich
I'm forever blowing bubbles, Pretty bubbles in the air
They fly so high, nearly reach the sky, Then like my dreams they fade and die
Fortune's always hiding, I've looked everywhere
I'm forever blowing bubbles, Pretty bubbles in the air

You can almost feel it in the air. The froth and foam on markets of all shapes and sizes all over the world. It’s exhilarating, and the pundits who populate the media outlets are bubbling over. There’s nothing like a rising market to lift our moods. Unless of course, as Prof. Kindleberger famously cautioned (see below), we are not participating in that rising market. Then we feel like losers. But what if the rising market is … a bubble? Are we smart enough to ride it high and then bail out before it bursts? Research says we all think that we are, yet we rarely demonstrate the actual ability.

My friend Grant Williams thinks the biggest bubble around is in complacency. I agree that is a large one, but I think even larger bubbles, still building, are those of government debt and government promises. When these latter two burst, and probably simultaneously, that will mark the true bottom for this cycle now pushing 90 years old.

So, this week we'll think about bubbles. Specifically, we'll have a look at part of the chapter on bubbles from Code Red, my latest book, coauthored with Jonathan Tepper, which we launched late last year. I was putting this chapter together about this time last year while in Montana, and so in a lazy August it is good to remind ourselves of the problems that will face us when everyone returns to their desks in a few weeks. And note, this is not the whole chapter, but at the end of the letter is a link to the entire chapter, should you desire more.

As I wrote earlier this week, I am NOT calling a top, but I am pointing out that our risk antennae should be up. You should have a well-designed risk program for your investments. I understand you have to be in the markets to get those gains, and I encourage that, but you have to have a discipline in place for cutting your losses and getting back in after a market drop.

There is enough data out there to suggest that the market is toppy and the upside is not evenly balanced. Take a look at these four charts. I offer these updated charts and note that some charts in the letter below are from last year, but the levels have only increased. The direction is the same. What they show is that by many metrics the market is at levels that are highly risky; but as 2000 proved, high-risk markets can go higher. The graphs speak for themselves. Let’s look at the Q-ratio, corporate equities to GDP (the Buffett Indicator), the Shiller CAPE, and margin debt.






We make the case in Code Red that central banks are inflating bubbles everywhere, and that even though bubbles are unpredictable almost by definition, there are ways to benefit from them. So, without further ado, let’s look at what co-author Jonathan Tepper and I have to say about bubbles in Chapter 9.

Easy Money Will Lead to Bubbles and How to Profit from Them

Every year, the Darwin Awards are given out to honor fools who kill themselves accidentally and remove themselves from the human gene pool. The 2009 Award went to two bank robbers. The robbers figured they would use dynamite to get into a bank. They packed large quantities of dynamite by the ATM machine at a bank in Dinant, Belgium. Unhappy with merely putting dynamite in the ATM, they pumped lots of gas through the letterbox to make the explosion bigger. And then they detonated the explosives. Unfortunately for them, they were standing right next to the bank. The entire bank was blown to pieces. When police arrived, they found one robber with severe injuries. They took him to the hospital, but he died quickly. After they searched through the rubble, they found his accomplice. It reminds you a bit of the immortal line from the film The Italian Job where robbers led by Sir Michael Caine, after totally demolishing a van in a spectacular explosion, shouted at them, “You’re only supposed to blow the bloody doors off!”

Central banks are trying to make stock prices and house prices go up, but much like the winners of the 2009 Darwin Awards, they will likely get a lot more bang for their buck than they bargained for. All Code Red tools are intended to generate spillovers to other financial markets. For example, quantitative easing (QE) and large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) are meant to boost stock prices and weaken the dollar, lower bonds yields, and chase investors into higher-risk assets. Central bankers hope they can find the right amount of dynamite to blow open the bank doors, but it is highly unlikely that they’ll be able to find just the right amount of money printing, interest rate manipulation, and currency debasement to not damage anything but the doors. We’ll likely see more booms and busts in all sorts of markets because of the Code Red policies of central banks, just as we have in the past. They don’t seem to learn the right lessons.

Targeting stock prices is par for the course in a Code Red world. Officially, the Fed receives its marching orders from Congress and has a dual mandate: stable prices and high employment. But in the past few years, by embarking on Code Red policies, Bernanke and his colleagues have unilaterally added a third mandate: higher stock prices. The chairman himself pointed out that stock markets had risen strongly since he signaled the Fed would likely do more QE during a speech in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in 2010. “I do think that our policies have contributed to a stronger stock market, just as they did in March of 2009, when we did the last iteration [of QE]. The S&P 500 is up about 20 percent plus and the Russell 2000 is up 30 percent plus.” It is not hard to see why stock markets rally when investors believe the most powerful central banker in the world wants to print money and see stock markets go up.

To continue reading this article from Thoughts from the Frontline – a free weekly publication by John Mauldin, renowned financial expert, best-selling author, and Chairman of Mauldin Economics – Please Click Here.

Important Disclosures



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Wednesday, April 16, 2014

Every Central Bank for Itself

By John Mauldin



“Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the face.”
– Mike Tyson

For the last 25 days I’ve been traveling in Argentina and South Africa, two countries whose economies can only be described as fragile, though for very different reasons. Emerging market countries face a significantly different set of challenges than the developed world does. These challenges are compounded by the rather indifferent policies of developed world central banks, which are (even if somewhat understandably) entirely self centered. Argentina has brought its problems upon itself, but South Africa can somewhat justifiably express frustration at the developed world, which, as one emerging market central bank leader suggests, is engaged in a covert currency war, one where the casualties are the result of unintended consequences. But the effects are nonetheless real if you’re an emerging market country.

While I will write a little more about my experience in South Africa at the end of this letter, first I want to cover the entire emerging market landscape to give us some context. Full and fair disclosure requires that I give a great deal of credit to my rather brilliant young associate, Worth Wray, who’s helped me pull together a great deal of this letter while I am on the road in a very busy speaking tour here in South Africa for Glacier, a local platform intermediary. They have afforded me the opportunity to meet with a significant number of financial industry participants and local businessman, at all levels of society. It has been a very serious learning experience for me. But more on that later; let’s think now about the problems facing emerging markets in general.

Every Central Bank for Itself

Every general has a plan before going into battle, which immediately begins to change upon contact with the enemy. Everyone has a plan until they get hit… and emerging markets have already taken a couple of punches since May 2013, when Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke first signaled his intent to “taper” his quantitative easing program and thereby incrementally wean the markets off of their steady drip of easy money. It was not too long after that Ben also suggested that he was not responsible for the problems of emerging-market central banks – or any other central bank, for that matter.

As my friend Ben Hunt wrote back in late January, Chairman Bernanke turned a single data point into a line during his last months in office, when he decided to taper by exactly $10 billion per month. He established the trend, and now the markets are reacting as if the Fed's exit strategy has officially begun.

Whether the FOMC can actually turn the taper into a true exit strategy ultimately depends on how much longer households and businesses must deleverage and how sharply our old age dependency ratio rises, but markets seem to believe this is the beginning of the end. For now, that’s what matters most.

Under Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s leadership, the Fed continues to send a clear message to the rest of the world: Now it really is every central bank for itself. 

The QE-Induced Bubble Boom in Emerging Markets

By trying to shore up their rich-world economies with unconventional policies such as ultra low rate targets, outright balance sheet expansion, and aggressive forward guidance, major central banks have distorted international real interest rate differentials and forced savers to seek out higher (and far riskier) returns for more than five years.

This initiative has fueled enormous overinvestment and capital misallocation – and not just in advanced economies like the United States.

As it turns out, the biggest QE-induced imbalances may be in emerging markets, where, even in the face of deteriorating fundamentals, accumulated capital inflows (excluding China) have nearly DOUBLED, from roughly $5 trillion in 2009 to nearly $10 trillion today. After such a dramatic rise in developed world portfolio allocations and direct lending to emerging markets, developed world investors now hold roughly one third of all emerging market stocks by market capitalization and also about one third of all outstanding emerging market bonds.

The Fed might as well have aimed its big bazooka right at the emerging world. That’s where a lot of the easy money ran blindly in search of more attractive real interest rates, bolstered by a broadly accepted growth story.

The conventional wisdom – a particularly powerful narrative that became commonplace in the media – suggested that emerging markets were, for the first time in a long time, less risky than developed markets, despite their having displayed much higher volatility throughout the past several decades.

As a general rule, people believed emerging markets had much lower levels of government debt, much stronger prospects for consumption led growth, and far more favorable demographics. (They overlooked the fact that crises in the 1980s and 1990s still limited EM borrowing limits until 2009 and ignored the fact that EM consumption is a derivative of demand and investment from the developed world.)

Instead of holding traditional safe haven bonds like US treasuries or German bunds, some strategists (who shall not be named) even suggested that emerging market government bonds could be the new safe haven in the event of major sovereign debt crises in the developed world. And better yet, it was suggested that denominating these investments in local currencies would provide extra returns over time as EM currencies appreciated against their developed market peers.

Sadly, the conventional wisdom about emerging markets and their currencies was dead wrong. Herd money (typically momentum based, yield chasing investors) usually chases growth that has already happened and almost always overstays its welcome. This is the same disappointing boom/bust dynamic that happened in Latin America in the early 1980s and Southeast Asia in the mid 1990s. And this time, it seems the spillover from extreme monetary accommodation in advanced countries has allowed public and private borrowers to leverage well past their natural carrying capacity.

Anatomy of a “Balance of Payments” Crisis

The lesson is always the same, and it is hard to avoid. Economic miracles are almost always too good to be true. Whether we’re talking about the Italian miracle of the ’50s, the Latin American miracle of the ’80s, the Asian Tiger miracles of the ’90s, or the housing boom in the developed world (the US, Ireland, Spain, et al.) in the ’00s, they all have two things in common: construction (building booms, etc.) and excessive leverage. As a quick aside, does that remind you of anything happening in China these days?

Just saying…...Broad based, debt fueled overinvestment may appear to kick economic growth into overdrive for a while; but eventually disappointing returns and consequent selling lead to investment losses, defaults, and banking panics. And in cases where foreign capital seeking strong growth in already highly valued assets drives the investment boom, the miracle often ends with capital flight and currency collapse.

Economists call that dynamic of inflow induced booms followed by outflow induced currency crises a “balance of payments cycle,” and it tends to occur in three distinct phases.

In the first phase, an economic boom attracts foreign capital, which generally flows toward productive uses and reaps attractive returns from an appreciating currency and rising asset prices. In turn, those profits fuel a self-reinforcing cycle of foreign capital inflows, rising asset prices, and a strengthening currency.

In the second phase, the allure of promising recent returns morphs into a growth story and attracts ever stronger capital inflows – even as the boom begins to fade and the strong currency starts to drag on competitiveness. Capital piles into unproductive uses and fuels overinvestment, overconsumption, or both; so that ever more inefficient economic growth increasingly depends on foreign capital inflows. Eventually, the system becomes so unstable that anything from signs of weak earnings growth to an unanticipated rate hike somewhere else in the world can trigger a shift in sentiment and precipitous capital flight.

To continue reading this article from Thoughts from the Frontline – a free weekly publication by John Mauldin, renowned financial expert, best-selling author, and Chairman of Mauldin Economics – Please Click Here.

The article Thoughts from the Frontline: "Every Central Bank for Itself" was originally published at Mauldin Economics


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