Showing posts with label Outside the Box. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Outside the Box. Show all posts

Monday, November 17, 2014

The Return of the Dollar

By John Mauldin


Two years ago, my friend Mohamed El-Erian and I were on the stage at my Strategic Investment Conference. Naturally we were discussing currencies in the global economy, and I asked him about currency wars. He smiled and said to me, “John, we don’t talk about currency wars in polite circles. More like currency disagreements” (or some word to that effect).

This week I note that he actually uses the words currency war in an essay he wrote for Project Syndicate:

Yet the benefits of the dollar’s rally are far from guaranteed, for both economic and financial reasons. While the US economy is more resilient and agile than its developed counterparts, it is not yet robust enough to be able to adjust smoothly to a significant shift in external demand to other countries. There is also the risk that, given the role of the ECB and the Bank of Japan in shaping their currencies’ performance, such a shift could be characterized as a “currency war” in the US Congress, prompting a retaliatory policy response.

This is a short treatise, but as usual with Mohamed’s writing, it’s very thought provoking. Definitely Outside the Box material.

And for a two-part Outside the Box I want to take the unusual step of including an op-ed piece that you might not have seen, from the Wall Street Journal, called “How to Distort Income Inequality,” by Phil Gramm and Michael Solon. They cite research I’ve seen elsewhere which shows that the work by Thomas Piketty cherry-picks data and ignores total income and especially how taxes distort the data. That is not to say that income inequality does not exist and that we should not be cognizant and concerned, but we need to plan policy based on a firm grasp of reality and not overreact because of some fantasy world created by social provocateur academicians.

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The calls for income redistribution from socialists and liberals based on Piketty’s work are clearly misguided and will further distort income inequality in ways that will only reduce total global productivity and growth.
I’m in New York today at an institutional fund manager conference where I had the privilege of hearing my good friend Ian Bremmer take us around the world on a geopolitical tour. Ian was refreshingly optimistic, or at least sanguine, about most of the world over the next few years. Lots of potential problems, of course, but he thinks everything should turn out fine – with the notable exception of Russia, where he is quite pessimistic.

A shirtless Vladimir Putin was the scariest thing on his geopolitical radar. As he spoke, Russia was clearly putting troops and arms into eastern Ukraine. Why would you do that if you didn’t intend to go further? Ian worried openly about Russia’s extending a land bridge all the way to Crimea and potentially even to Odessa, which is the heart of economic Ukraine, along with the Kiev region. It would basically make Ukraine ungovernable.

I thought Putin’s sadly grim and memorable line that “The United States is prepared to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian” pretty much sums up the potential for a US or NATO response. Putin agreed to a cease-fire and assumed that sanctions would start to be lifted. When there was no movement on sanctions, he pretty much went back to square one. He has clearly turned his economic attention towards China.

Both Ian Bremmer and Mohamed El Erian will be at my Strategic Investment Conference next year, which will again be in San Diego in the spring, April 28-30. Save the dates in your calendar as you do not want to miss what is setting up to be a very special conference. We will get more details to you soon.

It is a very pleasant day here in New York, and I was able to avoid taxis and put in about six miles of pleasant walking. (Sadly, it is supposed to turn cold tomorrow.) I’ve gotten used to getting around in cities and slipping into the flow of things, but there was a time when I felt like the country mouse coming to the city. As I walked past St. Bart’s today I was reminded of an occasion when your humble analyst nearly got himself in serious trouble.

There is a very pleasant little outdoor restaurant at St. Bartholomew’s Episcopal Church, across the street from the side entrance of the Waldorf-Astoria. It was a fabulous day in the spring, and I was having lunch with my good friend Barry Ritholtz. The president (George W.) was in town and staying at the Waldorf. His entourage pulled up and Barry pointed and said, “Look, there’s the president.”

We were at the edge of the restaurant, so I stood up to see if I could see George. The next thing I know, Barry’s hand is on my shoulder roughly pulling me back into my seat. “Sit down!” he barked. I was rather confused – what faux pas I had committed? Barry pointed to two rather menacing, dark-suited figures who were glaring at me from inside the restaurant.

“They were getting ready to shoot you, John! They had their hands inside their coats ready to pull guns. They thought you were going to do something to the president!”

This was New York not too long after 9/11. The memory is fresh even today. Now, I think I would know better than to stand up with the president coming out the side door across the street. But back then I was still just a country boy come to the big city.

Tomorrow night I will have dinner with Barry and Art Cashin and a few other friends at some restaurant which is supposedly famous for a mob shooting back in the day. Art will have stories, I am sure.
It is time to go sing for my supper, and I will try not to keep the guests from enjoying what promises to be a fabulous meal from celebrity chef Cyrille Allannic. After Ian’s speech, I think I will be nothing but sweetness and light, just a harmless economic entertainer. After all, what could possibly go really wrong with the global economy, when you’re being wined and dined at the top of New York? Have a great week.

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
subscribers@mauldineconomics.com

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The Return of the Dollar

By Mohamed El-Erian
Project Syndicate, Nov. 13, 2014

The U.S. dollar is on the move. In the last four months alone, it has soared by more than 7% compared with a basket of more than a dozen global currencies, and by even more against the euro and the Japanese yen. This dollar rally, the result of genuine economic progress and divergent policy developments, could contribute to the “rebalancing” that has long eluded the world economy. But that outcome is far from guaranteed, especially given the related risks of financial instability.

Two major factors are currently working in the dollar’s favor, particularly compared to the euro and the yen. First, the United States is consistently outperforming Europe and Japan in terms of economic growth and dynamism – and will likely continue to do so – owing not only to its economic flexibility and entrepreneurial energy, but also to its more decisive policy action since the start of the global financial crisis.

Second, after a period of alignment, the monetary policies of these three large and systemically important economies are diverging, taking the world economy from a multi-speed trajectory to a multi-track one. Indeed, whereas the US Federal Reserve terminated its large-scale securities purchases, known as “quantitative easing” (QE), last month, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank recently announced the expansion of their monetary-stimulus programs. In fact, ECB President Mario Draghi signaled a willingness to expand his institution’s balance sheet by a massive €1 trillion ($1.25 trillion).

With higher US market interest rates attracting additional capital inflows and pushing the dollar even higher, the currency’s revaluation would appear to be just what the doctor ordered when it comes to catalyzing a long-awaited global rebalancing – one that promotes stronger growth and mitigates deflation risk in Europe and Japan. Specifically, an appreciating dollar improves the price competitiveness of European and Japanese companies in the US and other markets, while moderating some of the structural deflationary pressure in the lagging economies by causing import prices to rise.

Yet the benefits of the dollar’s rally are far from guaranteed, for both economic and financial reasons. While the US economy is more resilient and agile than its developed counterparts, it is not yet robust enough to be able to adjust smoothly to a significant shift in external demand to other countries. There is also the risk that, given the role of the ECB and the Bank of Japan in shaping their currencies’ performance, such a shift could be characterized as a “currency war” in the US Congress, prompting a retaliatory policy response.

Furthermore, sudden large currency moves tend to translate into financial-market instability. To be sure, this risk was more acute when a larger number of emerging-economy currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar, which meant that a significant shift in the dollar’s value would weaken other countries’ balance of payments position and erode their international reserves, thereby undermining their creditworthiness. Today, many of these countries have adopted more flexible exchange-rate regimes, and quite a few retain adequate reserve holdings.

But a new issue risks bringing about a similarly problematic outcome: By repeatedly repressing financial-market volatility over the last few years, central-bank policies have inadvertently encouraged excessive risk-taking, which has pushed many financial-asset prices higher than economic fundamentals warrant. To the extent that continued currency-market volatility spills over into other markets – and it will – the imperative for stronger economic fundamentals to validate asset prices will intensify.

This is not to say that the currency re-alignment that is currently underway is necessarily a problematic development; on the contrary, it has the potential to boost the global economy by supporting the recovery of some of its most challenged components. But the only way to take advantage of the re-alignment’s benefits, without experiencing serious economic disruptions and financial-market volatility, is to introduce complementary growth-enhancing policy adjustments, such as accelerating structural reforms, balancing aggregate demand, and reducing or eliminating debt overhangs.

After all, global growth, at its current level, is inadequate for mere redistribution among countries to work. Overall global GDP needs to increase.

The US dollar’s resurgence, while promising, is only a first step. It is up to governments to ensure that the ongoing currency re-alignment supports a balanced, stable, and sustainable economic recovery. Otherwise, they may find themselves again in the unpleasant business of mitigating financial instability.

How to Distort Income Inequality

By Phil Gramm and Michael Solon
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11, 2014

The Piketty-Saez data ignore changes in tax law and fail to count noncash compensation and Social Security benefits.

What the hockey-stick portrayal of global temperatures did in bringing a sense of crisis to the issue of global warming is now being replicated in the controversy over income inequality, thanks to a now-famous study by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, professors of economics at the Paris School of Economics and the University of California, Berkeley, respectively. Whether the issue is climate change or income inequality, however, problems with the underlying data significantly distort the debate.

The chosen starting point for the most-quoted part of the Piketty-Saez study is 1979. In that year the inflation rate was 13.3%, interest rates were 15.5% and the poverty rate was rising, but economic misery was distributed more equally than in any year since. That misery led to the election of Ronald Reagan, whose economic policies helped usher in 25 years of lower interest rates, lower inflation and high economic growth. But Messrs. Piketty and Saez tell us it was also a period where the rich got richer, the poor got poorer and only a relatively small number of Americans benefited from the economic booms of the Reagan and Clinton years.

If that dark picture doesn’t sound like the country you lived in, that’s because it isn’t. The Piketty-Saez study looked only at pretax cash market income. It did not take into account taxes. It left out noncash compensation such as employer-provided health insurance and pension contributions. It left out Social Security payments, Medicare and Medicaid benefits, and more than 100 other means-tested government programs. Realized capital gains were included, but not the first $500,000 from the sale of one’s home, which is tax-exempt. IRAs and 401(k)s were counted only when the money is taken out in retirement. Finally, the Piketty-Saez data are based on individual tax returns, which ignore, for any given household, the presence of multiple earners.

And now, thanks to a new study in the Southern Economic Journal, we know what the picture looks like when the missing data are filled in. Economists Philip Armour and Richard V. Burkhauser of Cornell University and Jeff Larrimore of Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation expanded the Piketty-Saez income measure using census data to account for all public and private in-kind benefits, taxes, Social Security payments and household size.

The result is dramatic. The bottom quintile of Americans experienced a 31% increase in income from 1979 to 2007 instead of a 33% decline that is found using a Piketty-Saez market-income measure alone. The income of the second quintile, often referred to as the working class, rose by 32%, not 0.7%. The income of the middle quintile, America’s middle class, increased by 37%, not 2.2%.

By omitting Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, the Piketty-Saez study renders most older Americans poor when in reality most have above-average incomes. The exclusion of benefits like employer-provided health insurance, retirement benefits (except when actually paid out in retirement) and capital gains on homes misses much of the income and wealth of middle- and upper-middle income families.

Messrs. Piketty and Saez also did not take into consideration the effect that tax policies have on how people report their incomes. This leads to major distortions. The bipartisan tax reform of 1986 lowered the highest personal tax rate to 28% from 50%, but the top corporate-tax rate was reduced only to 34%. There was, therefore, an incentive to restructure businesses from C-Corps to subchapter S corporations, limited liability corporations, partnerships and proprietorships, where the same income would now be taxed only once at a lower, personal rate. As businesses restructured, what had been corporate income poured into personal income-tax receipts.

So Messrs. Piketty and Saez report a 44% increase in the income earned by the top 1% in 1987 and 1988—though this change reflected how income was taxed, not how income had grown. This change in the structure of American businesses alone accounts for roughly one-third of what they portray as the growth in the income share earned by the top 1% of earners over the entire 1979-2012 period.

An equally extraordinary distortion in the data used to measure inequality (the Gini Coefficient) has been discovered by Cornell’s Mr. Burkhauser. In 1992 the Census Bureau changed the Current Population Survey to collect more in-depth data on high-income individuals. This change in survey technique alone, causing a one-time upward shift in the measured income of high-income individuals, is the source of almost 30% of the total growth of inequality in the U.S. since 1979.

Simple statistical errors in the data account for roughly one third of what is now claimed to be a “frightening” increase in income inequality. But the weakness of the case for redistribution does not end there. America is the freest and most dynamic society in history, and freedom and equality of outcome have never coexisted anywhere at any time. Here the innovator, the first mover, the talented and the persistent win out—producing large income inequality. The prizes are unequal because in our system consumers reward people for the value they add. Some can and do add extraordinary value, others can’t or don’t.

How exactly are we poorer because Bill Gates, Warren Buffett and the Walton family are so rich? Mr. Gates became rich by mainstreaming computer power into our lives and in the process made us better off. Mr. Buffett’s genius improves the efficiency of capital allocation and the whole economy benefits. Wal-Mart stretches our buying power and raises the living standards of millions of Americans, especially low-income earners. Rich people don’t “take” a large share of national income, they “bring” it. The beauty of our system is that everybody benefits from the value they bring.

Yes, income is 24% less equally distributed here than in the average of the other 34 member countries of the OECD. But OECD figures show that U.S. per capita GDP is 42% higher, household wealth is 210% higher and median disposable income is 42% higher. How many Americans would give up 42% of their income to see the rich get less?

Vast new fortunes were earned in the 25-year boom that began under Reagan and continued under Clinton. But the income of middle-class Americans rose significantly. These incomes have fallen during the Obama presidency, and not because the rich have gotten richer. They’ve fallen because bad federal policies have yielded the weakest recovery in the postwar history of America.

Yet even as the recovery continues to disappoint, the president increasingly turns to the politics of envy by demanding that the rich pay their “fair share.” The politics of envy may work here as it has worked so often in Latin America and Europe, but the economics of envy is failing in America as it has failed everywhere else.

Mr. Gramm, a former Republican senator from Texas, is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Solon was a budget adviser to Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell and is a partner of US Policy Metrics.

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The article Outside the Box: The Return of the Dollar was originally published at mauldineconomics.com.


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Thursday, October 16, 2014

Calling into question what we are being told about ISIS, QE and Ebola

By John Mauldin


A note has been circulating among economists, calling into question the wisdom of another group of economists who wrote an open letter to the Federal Reserve a few years ago suggesting that one of the risks of their quantitative easing program was increased inflation. Since we have not seen CPI inflation, this latter group is calling upon the former to admit they were wrong, that quantitative easing does not in fact cause inflation. To no one’s surprise, Paul Krugman has written rather nastily and arrogantly about the lack of CPI inflation.

Cliff Asness has responded with a thoughtful letter, with his usual tinge of humor, pointing out that there has been inflation, it just hasn’t been in the CPI. We’ve seen it in assets instead. That money did go someplace, and it has disrupted markets. So why is Cliff’s letter a candidate for Outside the Box, when the markets seem to be bouncing all over heck and gone?

Because, come the next crisis, there is going to be another move for yet another round of massive quantitative easing. And the justification will be that increases in the money supply clearly don’t have much to do with inflation.

I should note that while I did not agree with the original letter (I thought we were in an overall deflationary environment, and I wrote that the central banks of the world would be able to print more money than any of us could possibly imagine and still not trigger inflation – views came in for considerable pushback), my reasons for believing QE2 and QE3 were problematic dealt with other unintended consequences. And ultimately, as global debt gets restructured (which will take many years) inflation will become a problem. Did you notice how Greek debt spreads blew out yesterday? It’s not just about oil. And trust me, France is going to be the new Greece before we know it. The people who think they can control markets and direct investors like sheep are going to be in for a huge surprise, but the nightmare is going to be visited upon the participants in the market.

We then move to a few thoughts from Peter Boockvar, in a letter he writes to savers, noting that the same people who brought you quantitative easing are also responsible for the demise of any income that might possibly have come from saving.

I wish I had good advice for your savings, but I can’t advise buying stocks that have only been more expensive in 2000 on some key metrics right before you know what, and I can’t recommend buying any long term bond as the yields also stink relative to inflation. With the Fed now saying that the dollars in your pocket are now worth too much relative to money in people’s pockets overseas and thus joining the global FX war, maybe you should buy some gold, but I know that yields nothing either. You are the sacrificial lamb in this grand experiment conducted by the unelected officials working at some building named Eccles who seem to have little faith in the ability of the US economy to thrive on its own as it did for most of its 238 years of existence. Borrowers and debt are their only friends. To you responsible saver that worked hard your whole life, may you again rest in peace.

And then we finish with some thoughts from our friend Ben Hunt, who takes exception to being told how to think and believe and act by “those smart people with degrees” who only want to do what’s best for us. Not just in economics but with regard to ISIS and Ebola and everything else. After reading Ben’s essay I called him and said, “Me too!”

I am tired of being manipulated, placated, spin-lied to (if it’s not a word it should be), mutilated, spindled, and folded.

We have to keep our eyes open and entertain the possibility that central banks will “lose the narrative,” that is, their ability to control markets with simple statements. The BIS recently had this to say:

Guy Debelle, head of the BIS’s market committee, said investors have become far too complacent, wrongly believing that central banks can protect them, many staking bets that are bound to “blow up” [at] the first sign of stress.

Mr. Debelle said the markets may at any time start to question whether the global authorities have matters under control, or whether their pledge to hold down rates through forward guidance can be believed. “I find it somewhat surprising that the market is willing to accept the central banks at their word, and not think so much for themselves,” he said. [Source: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “BIS warns on 'violent' reversal of global markets”]

The 10 year US Treasury slipped below 2% earlier today, but has rebounded somewhat to 2.06% as I write. Oddly, the yen seems to be strengthening slightly as the stock markets once again fall out of bed. Oil continues to weaken. As noted above, Greeks spreads are blowing out. Super Mario needs to get on his bike and start peddling before that concern spreads to other nations almost as insolvent. France will soon be downgraded again. Don’t you just love October?

What an interesting time to hold a midterm election. Have a great week!
Your really thinking through the implications of a stronger dollar analyst,
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box

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The Inflation Imputation

By Cliff Asness, AQR Capital Management LLC

In 2010, I co-signed an open letter warning that the Fed’s experiment with an unprecedented level of loose monetary policy – in amount, and in unorthodox method – created a risk of serious inflation. Sporadically journalists and others have noted that this risk has not come to pass, particularly in consumer prices.

Recently there has been an article surveying each of us as to why; seeming to relish in, when provided, our various rationales, presumably as they sounded like excuses. It seems none of the responses provided what the authors clearly wanted, a blanket admission of error. I did not comment for that article, continuing my life long attempt not to help reporters who’ve already made up their mind to make fun of me – I help them enough through my everyday actions, they don’t need more!

More articles of similar bent keep showing up. The authors seem to find it amusing that four years of CPI data wouldn’t get people to change their economic views, while ignoring that 80 years of overwhelming evidence has not dissuaded Keynesians from the belief that this time, if they could only run everything, not just most things, they’d really get it right.

Focusing my attention, as was predestined, Paul Krugman lived up to his lifelong motto of “stay classy” with a piece on the subject entitled Knaves, Fools, and Quantitative Easing. Some lesser lights of the Keynesian firmament have also jumped in (collectivists, of course, excel at sharing a meme). Responding to Krugman is as productive as smacking a skunk with a tennis racket. But, sometimes, like many unpleasant tasks, it’s necessary. I will, at least partially, make that error here, while mostly trying to deal with the original issue separate from Paul’s screeds (though one wonders if CPI inflation had risen in the last four years if Paul would be admitting his entire economic framework was wrong – ok, one doesn’t really wonder – and those things never happen to Paul anyway, just ask him).

Let me say up front that this essay will satisfy nobody. Those looking for a blanket admission of error will get part of what they want; a small part. Those hoping I hold the line denying any misstep will also be disappointed. I believe truth, as is often the case in similar situations, lies in the middle of these and I prefer truth, as I see it, to any reader walking away sated.

We indeed warned about the risks of inflation in 2010 and the CPI has been, to put it mildly, benign since then. First, to give the baying crowd just a bit of what it wants (I will take some of it back soon), our bad (I say “our” but obviously I speak only for myself). When you warn of a risk and it doesn’t come to pass I do think you owe the world this admission, even if you later explain what it means to warn of a risk not a certainty, and offer good reasons why despite reasonable worry this particular risk didn’t come to pass. I, and many other signatories, live in the world of economic or political prognostication, in my case money management, where if you get a bit more than half your calls right you are doing quite well, more than a bit more than half, you’re doing fabulously. I’ll put our collective record up against Krugman’s (and the Krug-Tone back-up dancers) any day of the week and twice on days he publishes.

Let’s start with the big one. We did not make a prediction, something we certainly know how to do and have collectively done many times. We warned of a risk. That’s a very specific choice people like the open letter writers, and Paul, have to make all the time, and he knows this, but that doesn’t deter him. Rather, Paul engages in the old debating trick of mentioning this argument himself and dismissing it. This technique worked for Eminem at the end of Eight Mile. But let’s not be fooled by chicanery (silly Paul, you are no Rabbit). If I had wanted to make a prediction, I would have made one. I didn’t, nor did my fellow signatories. Frankly, if there are any economists, aside from those never-uncertain-but-usually-wrong like Paul, who did not think such unprecedented Fed action represented at least a heightened risk, I think it was malpractice on their part.

An honest Paul Krugman (we will use this term again below but this is something called a “counter-factual”) would have agreed with our letter but qualified that while heightened, he still didn’t think this risk would come to fruition and that he thought it was a risk worth running. Still, I will give the critics half credit here, accept half blame, and issue a demi mea culpa. By writing the letter we clearly thought this risk was higher than others did, and wished to stress it, and it has not (as most commonly measured) as of now come to bear. Our, and my, (half) bad. I hope that makes the critics (half) happy and they can stop copying each other’s articles over and over again.

Of course being able to call out risks, not just make firm predictions, is quite important. If you believe the risk of an earthquake is 10 times normal, but 10 times normal is still not a high probability, it’s rational to warn of this risk, even if the chance such devastation occurs is still low and you’ll look foolish to some when it, in all likelihood, doesn’t happen. If you can’t point out risks you are left with either silence as an option, or overly and falsely self-confident forecasts. Perhaps the latter may work for former economists turned partisan pundits but the rest of us will have to live with the ex ante and ex post ambiguity of discussing risks.

It’s a real subtlety but I think there is truth somewhere in between the current attack meme of “you predicted inflation risk and were wrong and are now hiding behind the word ‘risk’“ and “we only said it was a risk so we cannot be wrong.” I think when you boldly forecast a risk you are saying more than “this might happen but either way I can’t be blamed” and something less than “this will happen and I stake my reputation on it.” We should all be mature enough to know the difference, but apparently that ship has sailed......

Not surprisingly, the above stress on risk jibes with my personal view of monetary policy, one that might not be shared by all my co-signatories. I tend to think it matters less than most think, and matters less often than most think. I tend to view it, for finance fans, in a “Modigliani Miller” (MM) framework, where most corporate financing transactions are paper-for-paper, mattering little. But, in the MM framework bankruptcy costs do matter. Therefore most corporate capital structure decisions are irrelevant, except to the extent they increase the chance of serious financial distress, in which everyone but the lawyers lose (in many models this risk must be balanced against the tax advantages of debt).

From this perspective, slight adjustments to the target Fed funds rate based on exquisitely sensitive perceptions of the probability of economic overheating or slowdown probably make little difference (and don’t even start me on the dots), but deflation or excessive inflation are important to avoid as their damage can be great. They are the bankruptcy costs of monetary policy. Thus, I think sounding the alarm, not making a prediction, that experimental and aggressive monetary policy raised one of these risks was appropriate. But, still, I think most people engaged on the topic spend a lot of time talking about monetary policy in the same way dogs spend a lot of time talking, yes in their secret dog language, about the cars they chase. The cars aren’t affected and generally don’t care.

Now, if you thought the above was an excuse on par with, continuing my canine fixation, “the dog ate my inflation,” and not the demi mea culpa I intended, you’re really going to hate the full blown non-conciliatory excuses about to come.

Economically, I think what everyone of any political or economic stripe missed, certainly including myself, was how little money would circulate, how little would be lent and then spent. In econo-geek, how low the money multiplier would be. Money kept by banks at low but positive interest rates at the Fed clearly isn’t doing much of anything, creating inflation as we feared, or helping the economy as they hoped. To the extent inflation worriers like us were wrong, so were those predicting great economic benefits. The Fed clearly wanted this money lent by banks and spent by companies on investment and by people on consumption.

They didn’t get that, and we didn’t get the inflation we feared. This is not to say that low interest rates, real and nominal, and high prices for risky assets (and the supposed “wealth effect” that comes with them) were not Fed goals. They clearly were. But it seems these intermediate goals have not had their desired effect on the real economy.

Quantitative easing (QE) and other inventive forms of loose monetary policy have simply been less than hoped or feared. Some may declare Fed policy a great success as we’re not in a depression, but they can’t show any counter-factual, and given that this money has largely sat dormant, albeit presumably lowering risk premia (raising asset prices), it’s likely we’d have a similar record-weak recovery with or without it. How this is a victory for one side of the debate or another is beyond me, but obviously clear to Paul and his back-up singers. Of course, it’s also clear to Paul that the 2009 stimulus package saved us from this same second Great Depression (but more stimulus would of course have been much better). Yep, and if we traded good cash for just one more “clunker” we’d be growing at 5% per annum by now with a normal labor participation rate.

By-the-way, ignored in the critics’ review of the original letter was the line, “In this case, we think improvements in tax, spending and regulatory policies must take precedence in a national growth program...” On this I’m unapologetic. We were right, we’re still right, and thanks to people like Paul we’ve moved in the wrong direction. But that’s a fight for another day.

In a field without a broad set of counter-factuals we all stick too much to our priors and ideologies, and perhaps I’m doing that now. But at least I see it, and that’s always step one. Paul is stuck on step zero (if he ever gets up to “making amends” I will be around but given his history he might never get to me). But, if you’d like to advance past step zero, Paul, we’re still waiting on why Keynesianism failed to fix the Great Depression (no doubt not quite enough stimulus; just one more Hoover Dam would have done it, or, as they called it back then, “Dams for Clunkers”), strongly predicted a deep post-WWII depression, didn’t predict stagflation, and generally was on a the downward spiral to the intellectual dustbin until the great recession resuscitated it, not as a workable intellectual doctrine, but as an excuse for politicians to spend on their constituents and causes.

Also remember, much like when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor, nothing is over yet. The Fed has not undone its extraordinary loose monetary policy and is just now stopping its direct QE purchases. When monetary policy is back to historic norms, and economic growth is once again strong, a normal number of people are seeking and getting jobs, and inflation has not reared its head, I think we can close the books on this one, still recognizing that forecasting a risk and having it fail to come to bear is not a cardinal sin. But which one of those things has happened yet? Paul, and others, should by now know the folly of declaring victory too early.

At the risk of enraging a whole different group (I promise I’m not denying anything I’m just making an analogy, and one I know is very far from dead on) I’m amazed that a Paul Krugman can look at 15+ years of the earth not warming and feel his beliefs need no modification or explanation, but 4 years of the CPI not inflating is reason not simply to declare victory, but to decry those who disagree with him as “Knaves and Fools.” In fact, rather than also anger Mr. Gore and Steyer, I hope they find this paragraph supportive as I’m saying these debates are rarely settled in either direction in short time frames. Now, if I were cheekier (cheek is not denial!) I’d ask if perhaps our letter was right and the inflation we predicted is in fact occurring in the depths of the ocean? Or, maybe we should ex post relabel our letter a warning of the risk of “extreme price action” including of course the extreme stability we have experienced in CPI these last few years.

Now, while not pointing to the actual ocean it is fascinating where inflation has shown up. Don’t limit your view of inflation to the CPI. No, this isn’t a screed where I claim to have invented my own consumption basket showing inflation is rising at 25% per annum – though some of those screeds are interesting. It’s the far simpler observation that we have indeed observed tremendous inflation in asset prices since this experiment began (of course this was part of the Fed’s intent – but it was meant to stoke real activity not an end unto itself!). Stocks, the spreads on high yield bonds, real estate, you name it.

Inflation is hard enough to forecast, but where it lands is even harder. If one counts asset inflation it seems we’ve indeed had tremendous inflation. While admittedly difficult to prove, as is any of this if we’re being honest as economics rarely offers proofs, you’d be hard pressed to find many economists or Wall Street professionals who don’t see current extremely high asset prices, and low forward looking returns to investors, as at least a partial consequence of the cocktail of QE, loose monetary policy, and financial repression. I understand Paul and others wanting to avoid this as not only does it show that they have no right to crow on inflation, but that the policies they advocate, and we decried, have had little effect on the economy but instead have, at least partially intentionally, exacerbated the inequality Paul spends the other half of his columns excoriating (while of course living himself off the global median income in protest and solidarity).

By the way, again the critics somehow manage to skip another prescient forecast in this same short open letter. We explicitly worried that the Fed’s policies “will distort financial markets and greatly complicate future Fed efforts to normalize monetary policy.” That’s econo-geek for “will drive financial market prices up and prospective returns down, and create financial instability when the Fed tries to stop.” Again, while this would perhaps not surprise the Fed, which actively desired low interest rates and a “wealth effect,” it seems that a fair reading shows that this much maligned letter wasn’t as wrong as the critics say, and was very right in ways the critics ignore.

Moving on, please recall that many, not all, supporters of QE and very loose monetary policy in general, did so exactly because they thought it would create some inflation, and they thought (and many still think) that’s what the economy needs. We, we the letter signers, are responsible for our own forecasts, but you might forgive us a bit for taking the other side at their word!

Bottom line, the half mea culpa above was not a throw away. When you go out of your way to warn of a risk and after a suitable period that risk has not come to bear, at least where everyone, including you, expected it, you should admit some error, and I do. But there is a still a big difference between pointing out a risk and making a forecast (hence the half admission!). A big reason this risk hasn’t come to fruition is, while not as dangerous so far as we thought, it appears QE was only mostly useless. To the extent even that is only mostly true, where effects did show up, it actually caused rather a lot of inflation, but inflation that went straight into the pockets of those who needed it least and whom Paul wouldn’t swerve his car to avoid. That is, it inflated financial assets, benefited the rich, and enhanced inequality.

So, to those who’ve been waiting for one of us to say it, you can have half the mea culpa you clearly want, but mostly Paul is wrong, and twisting the facts, and doing so as rudely and crassly as possible, yet again.

The rest of the JV team of Keynesians who have also jumped on board are doing the same thing, just with more class and less entertainment value than the master.

Now for a real prediction: Paul will continue to be mostly wrong, mostly dishonest about it, incredibly rude, and in a crass class by himself (admittedly I attempt these heights sometimes but sadly fall far short). That is a prediction I’m willing to make over any horizon, offering considerable odds, and with no sneaky forecasts of merely “heightened risks.” Any takers?

Cliff Asness is Founding and Managing Principal of AQR Capital Management, LLC

Dear Saver, May You RIP

By Peter Boockvar, The Lindsey Group LLC

Dear Saver,
To the forgotten and misunderstood soul, may you rest in peace. There just seems that nothing can save you now. You were bloody and battered after the stock market bubble crashed in 2001 and 2002. Afterward, you stuck with stocks but also decided to play it safe in real estate. That was ok for a few years but your stock portfolio fell again by 50% and while you have a great new kitchen and wood paneled library, the value of your house is now worth much less than your mortgage. I know, renting can be so much easier! But some guy named Greenspan said something about a wealth effect.

Finally you said enough is enough. You wanted a safe, conservative place for your savings where living off fixed income of mostly CD’s and bonds was possible. Maybe you’d buy an occasional stock again but maybe not. You called your local branch banker and were told that for the privilege of being a Platinum Honors client that you would be able to secure a better rate on a money market savings account. Nice! You were told that you’d be able to get .10%, more than triple the standard rate of .03% that the average person gets! Disgusted, you went online and saw this great add on the Bank of America website, it said “With a Featured CD I can earn a fixed rate on my nest egg.” Sounds enticing until you scrolled down the page and saw it paid .08% for a fixed 12 month term. It had to be a typo but unfortunately it was not.

Questioning now how you can ever retire on your savings after working hard for the past 40 years, you decided to find out who can possibly be responsible for these pathetic yields when you know your cost of living is rising well above the 1.5-2% that these statisticians at the government keep telling you. You ask what an hedonic adjustment is? Don’t worry about it because the purchasing power of your money relative to inflation has been declining day after day for at least 6 years now. This is madness you say. I agree.

You started to read the papers and watched the news and learned that the men and women that work at the Federal Reserve, mostly economists who call themselves central bankers, sit around a large table and decide what the right interest rate should be. Ok you say, they are smart, they have models created by people that likely did really well on their SAT’s, they know what they’re doing and this can’t last. Well, I’m sorry to say to you, we’re 6 years into zero interest rates and these people have no intention of ever saving your savings. You’re screwed and even though they say it’s in your best interest because zero rates and money printing will help the economy, don’t believe them anymore because the strategy has failed. After all, If these policies actually worked, I wouldn’t be writing this letter to you.

I wish I had good advice for your savings but I can’t advise buying stocks that have only been more expensive in 2000 on some key metrics right before you know what and I can’t recommend buying any long term bond as the yields also stink relative to inflation. With the Fed now saying that the dollars in your pocket are now worth too much relative to money in people’s pockets overseas and thus joining the global FX war maybe you should buy some gold but I know that yields nothing either. You are the sacrificial lamb in this grand experiment conducted by the unelected officials working at some building named Eccles who seem to have little faith in the ability of the U.S. economy to thrive on its own as it did for most of its 238 years of existence. Borrowers and debt are their only friends. To you responsible saver that worked hard your whole life, may you again rest in peace.

Sincerely yours,
Peter Boockvar
Managing Director
Chief Market Analyst
The Lindsey Group LLC

Calvin the Super Genius

By Ben Hunt, Ph.D., Salient


People think it must be fun to be a super genius, but they don’t realize how hard it is to put up with all the idiots in the world.  – Bill Watterson, “Calvin and Hobbes”

Here is the most fundamental idea behind game theory, the one concept you MUST understand to be an effective game player. Ready?

You are not a super genius, and we are not idiots.  The people you are playing with and against are just as smart as you are. Not smarter. But just as smart.  If you think that you are seeing more deeply into a repeated-play strategic interaction (a game!) than we are, you are wrong. And ultimately it will cost you dearly.  But if there is a mutually acceptable decision point – one that both you and we can agree upon, full in the knowledge that you know that we know that you know what’s going on – that’s an equilibrium. And that’s a decision or outcome or policy that’s built to last.

Fair warning, this is an “Angry Ben” email, brought on by the US government’s “communication policy” on Ebola, which is a mirror image of the US government’s “communication policy” on markets and monetary policy, which is a mirror image of the US government’s “communication policy” on ISIS and foreign policy. We are being told what to think about Ebola and QE and ISIS. Not by some heavy handed pronouncement as you might find in North Korea or some Soviet-era Ministry, but in the kinder gentler modern way, by a Wise Man or Woman of Science who delivers words carefully chosen for their effect in constructing social expectations and behaviors.

The words are not lies. But they’re only not-lies because if they were found to be lies that would be counterproductive to the social policy goals, not because there’s any fundamental objection to lying. The words are chosen for their  truthiness, to use Stephen Colbert’s wonderful term, not their truthfulness.

The words are chosen in order to influence us as manipulable objects, not to inform us as autonomous subjects.

It’s always for the best of intentions. It’s always to prevent a panic or to maintain confidence or to maintain social stability. All good and noble ends. But it’s never a stable equilibrium. It’s never a lasting legislative or regulatory peace. The policy always crumbles in Emperor’s New Clothes fashion because we-the-people or we-the-market have not been brought along to make a self-interested, committed decision.Instead the Powers That Be – whether that’s the Fed or the CDC or the White House – take the quick and easy path of selling us a strategy as if they were selling us a bar of soap.

This is what very smart people do when they are, as the Brits would say, too clever by half. This is why very smart people are, as often as not, poor game players. It’s why there aren’t many academics on the pro poker tour. It’s why there haven’t been many law professors in the Oval Office. This isn’t a Democrat vs. Republican thing. This isn’t a US vs. Europe thing. It’s a mass society + technology thing. It’s a class thing. And it’s very much the defining characteristic of the Golden Age of the Central Banker.

Am I personally worried about an Ebola outbreak in the US? On balance … no, not at all. But don’t tell me that I’m an idiot if I have questions about the sufficiency of the social policies being implemented to prevent that outbreak. And make no mistake, that’s EXACTLY what I have been told by CDC Directors and Dr. Gupta and the White House and all the rest of the super genius, supercilious, remain-calm crew.

I am calm. I understand that a victim must be symptomatic to be contagious. But I also understand that one man’s symptomatic is another man’s “I’m fine”, and questioning a self-reporting immigration and quarantine regime does not make me a know-nothing isolationist.

I am calm. I understand that the virus is not airborne but is transmitted by “bodily fluids”. But I also understand why Rule #1 for journalists in West Africa is pretty simple: Touch No One, and questioning the wisdom of sitting next to a sick stranger on a flight originating from, say, Brussels does not make me a Howard Hughes-esque nutjob.

I am calm. I understand that the US public health and acute care infrastructure is light years ahead of what’s available in Liberia or Nigeria. I understand that Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas is not just one of the best health care facilities in Texas, but one of the best hospitals in the world. But I also understand that we are all creatures of our standard operating procedures, and what’s second nature in a hot zone will be slow to catch on in the Birmingham, Alabama ER where my father worked for 30 years.

The mistake made by our modern leaders – in every public sphere! – is to believe that they are operating on a deeper, smarter, more far-seeing level of game-playing than we are. I’ve got a long example of the levels of decision-making in the Epsilon Theory note “A Game of Sentiment“, so I won’t repeat all that here. The basic idea, though, is that by announcing a consensus based on the Narrative authority of Science our leaders believe they are stacking the deck for each of us to buy into that consensus as our individual first-level decision. This can be quite effective when you’re promoting a brand of toothpaste, where it is impossible to be proven wrong in your consensus claims, much less so when you’re promoting a social policy, where all it takes is one sick nurse to make the entire linguistic effort seem staged and for effect … which of course it was. The fact that we go along with a game – that we act AS IF we believe in the Common Knowledge of an announced consensus – does NOT mean that we have accepted the party line in our heart of hearts. It does NOT mean that we are myopic game-players, unerringly led this way or that by the oh-so-clever words of the Missionaries. But that’s how it’s been taken, to terrible effect.

I am calm. But I am angry, too. It doesn’t have to be this way … this consensus-by-fiat style of policy leadership where we are always only one counter-factual reveal – the sick nurse or the sick economy – away from a breakdown in market or governmental confidence. I am angry that we have been consistently misjudged and underestimated, treated as children to be “educated” rather than as citizens to be trusted. I am angry that our most important political institutions have sacrificed their most important asset – not their credibility, but their authenticity – on the altar of political expediency, all in a misconceived notion of what it means to lead.

And yet here we are. On the precipice of that breakdown in confidence. A cold wind of change is starting to blow. Can you feel it?

W. Ben Hunt, Ph.D.
Chief Risk Officer, Salient
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Tuesday, March 4, 2014

Ukraine: Three Views

By John Mauldin


All eyes are on Ukraine as the drama continues to unfold. Today, for an early Outside the Box, I’m going to offer three sources on Ukraine. The first is a note that I got from the head of emerging market trading at one of the world’s largest hedge funds. This is what he sent out last week, ahead of any real action:

My view, Putin is stuck now, cannot easily de-escalate. Further escalation is a possibility, with Ukraine cracking along the obvious ethnic fault lines and the West reacting with measures such as sanctions and visa restrictions. Tit-for-tat follows; gas supplies to the EU are disrupted. Russian capital outflows accelerate and the RUB [ruble] quickly gets to 40/$, fuelling inflation and unnerving the Russian banking system, and also infecting the European banking system, in the manner that Chris Watling has envisaged. 

Meanwhile, the Chinese liabilities residing inside the European banking system are also in trouble, of course, and will continue to deteriorate. The CBR [Central Bank of Russia] hikes repeatedly with very little effect on slowing the RUB slide, further hurting GDP growth and economically sensitive segments of the market. The Russian RTX index revisits the GFC lows of 2008, Gazprom ADR's are already within shouting distance of their 2008 lows today. 

In such a scenario, there is an obvious risk of market contagion spreading throughout Eastern and Western Europe, and in fact the rest of the world. It is likely to resemble something on the order of the 1998 LTCM + RUB collapse + Asian financial crisis magnitude. In fact, a number of hedge funds will fail precisely because they have loaded up so heavily with European debt instruments which will unravel.

Meanwhile, politically, the U.S. ends up looking weaker and weaker, and getting less and less respect internationally. The U.S.-Russia confrontation is taking place under the critical gaze of the leaders of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Turkey and Hizballah in Lebanon.

They are seeing the following:
  1. President Obama is now seen backing off a commitment to U.S. allies for the second time in eight months. They remember his U-turn last August on U.S. military intervention for the removal of Syrian President Bashar Assad for using chemical weapons. They also see Washington shying off from Russia's clear and present use of military force and therefore concluding that Washington is not a reliable partner for safeguarding their national security.
  2. The Middle East governments and groups which opted to cooperate recently with Vladimir Putin – Damascus, Tehran, Hizballah and Egypt – are ending up on the strong side of the regional equation. Others such as Turkey and Qatar are squirming.
  3. American weakness on the global front has strengthened the Iranian-Syrian bloc and its ties with Hizballah. Assad is going nowhere.
  4. Putin standing behind Iran is a serious obstacle to a negotiated and acceptable comprehensive agreement with Iran, just as the international EU- and U.S.-led bid for a political resolution of the Syrian conflict foundered last month, and now is unlikely to ever be revisited.
Notice what he said about European banks. Their exposure to emerging-market corporate debt, Chinese debt, and Russian liabilities is going to weaken their balance sheets just as the European central bank stress test will be kicking off.

This is going to be a very interesting period of time and potentially quite dangerous. Very few people saw U.S. market vulnerabilities in early 1998 coming from outside the US. As I said in my 2014 forecast, the United States should be all right until there is a shock to the system. We have to be aware of what can cause shocks. Ukraine in and of itself might not be enough, but notice that the Chinese are preparing to slow their economy down as part of the process of reducing their dependency on bank debt and foreign direct investment in construction and other projects. China has been one of the main engines of global growth, so a slowdown will have effects. It’s all connected, as I wrote in the 2007 letter we reprinted this weekend.

I should note that other very savvy investors and managers think there will be no contagion from current events. That’s what makes a market. It’s why we need to pay attention to Ukraine.

In the second part of today’s Outside the Box we visit a short essay on Ukraine by Anatole Kaletsky, which talks about timing investments during market crises:

Financial markets cannot afford to be so sentimental. While we should always recall at a time like this the famous advice from Nathan Rothschild to “buy at the sound of gunfire,” the drastically risk off response to weekend events in Ukraine makes perfect sense because Russia’s annexation of Crimea is the most dangerous geopolitical event of the post-Cold War era, and perhaps since the Cuban Missile crisis. It can result in only two possible outcomes, either of which will be damaging to European stability in the long-term.

Finally, I got a piece on Ukraine from my friend Ian Bremmer, who says, “[W]e are witnessing the most seismic geopolitical event since 9/11.” His analysis plus background data help us understand what is really going on in Ukraine.

Ian will be at my conference in San Diego, May 13-16, and you should be too. If you don’t have a plan for dealing with what happens when the midterm forecasts begin knocking on the door, you won’t know what to do when the time comes. Our conference offers a wonderful opportunity to bring your plans into focus and perhaps make a few new ones. You can find out more here.

I’m feeling a lot better today than I did this weekend. I am stuck in Miami due to the cancellation of my flight but hope to be able to get to Washington DC tomorrow morning to experience the East Coast version of the polar vortex. But, for the nonce, I guess I will be forced to sit outside at the pool or on the beach and continue my research, which is once again stacking up. You have to love iPads, which are for me great productivity enhancers. I did finish George Gilder’s brilliant must-read book Knowledge and Power this weekend, and I highly recommend it. And I suppose I should research the gym facilities here later this afternoon. I have mastered the trick of reading on my iPad while walking on the treadmill. No excuses. Have a great week.

Your enjoying the Miami weather analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor

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Realpolitik In Ukraine

By Anatole Kaletsky, Gavekal

Oscar Wilde described marriage as the triumph of imagination over intelligence and second marriage as the triumph of hope over experience. In finance and geopolitics, by contrast, experience must always prevail over hope and realism over wishful thinking. A grim case in point is the Russian incursion into Ukraine. What makes this confrontation so dangerous is that US and EU policy seems to be motivated entirely by hope and wishful thinking. Hope that Vladimir Putin will “see sense,” or at least be deterred by the threat of US and EU sanctions to Russia’s economic interests and the personal wealth of his oligarch friends. Wishful thinking about “democracy and freedom” overcoming dictatorship and military bullying.

Financial markets cannot afford to be so sentimental. While we should always recall at a time like this the famous advice from Nathan Rothschild to “buy at the sound of gunfire,” the drastically risk off response to weekend events in Ukraine makes perfect sense because Russia’s annexation of Crimea is the most dangerous geopolitical event of the post- Cold War era, and perhaps since the Cuban Missile crisis. It can result in only two possible outcomes, either of which will be damaging to European stability in the long term. Either Russia will quickly prevail and thereby win the right to redraw borders and exercise veto powers over the governments of its neighbouring countries. Or the Western-backed Ukrainian government will fight back and Europe’s second-largest country by area will descend into a Yugoslav-style civil war that will ultimately draw in Poland, NATO and therefore the US.

No other outcome is possible because it is literally inconceivable that Putin will ever withdraw from Crimea. To give up Crimea now would mean the end of Putin’s presidency, since the Russian public, not to mention the military and security apparatus, believe almost unanimously that Crimea still belongs to Russia, since it was only administratively transferred to Ukraine, almost by accident, in 1954. In fact, many Russians believe, rightly or wrongly, that most of Ukraine “belongs” to them. (The very name of the country in Russian means “at the border” and certainly not “beyond the border”). Under these circumstances, the idea that Putin would respond to Western diplomatic or economic sanctions, no matter how stringent, by giving up his newly gained territory is pure wishful thinking. Putin’s decision to back himself into this corner has been derided by the Western media as a strategic blunder but it is actually a textbook example of realpolitik. Putin has created a situation where the West’s only alternative to acquiescing in the Russian takeover of Crimea is all-out war.

And since a NATO military attack on Russian forces is even more inconceivable than Putin’s withdrawal, it seems that Russia has won this round of the confrontation. The only question now is whether the new Ukrainian government will accept the loss of Crimea quietly or try to retaliate against Russian speakers in Ukraine—offering Putin a pretext for invasion, and thereby precipitating an all-out civil war.

That is the key question investors must consider in deciding whether the Ukraine crisis is a Rothschild style buying opportunity, or a last chance to bail out of risk-assets before it is too late. The balance of probabilities in such situations is usually tilted towards a peaceful solution—in this case, Western acquiescence in the Russian annexation of Crimea and the creation of a new national unity government in Kiev acceptable to Putin. The trouble is that the alternative of a full-scale war, while far less probable, would have much greater impact—on the European and global economies, on energy prices and on the prices of equities and other risk- assets that are already quite highly valued. At present, therefore, it makes sense to stand back and prepare for either outcome by maintaining balanced portfolios of the kind recommended by Charles, with equal weightings of equities and very long-duration U.S. bonds.

Looking back through history at comparable episodes of severe geopolitical confrontation, investors have usually done well to wait for the confrontation to reach some kind of climax before putting on more risk. In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the S&P 500 fell -6.5% between October 16, when the confrontation started, and October 23, the worst day of the crisis, when President Kennedy issued his nuclear ultimatum to Nikita Khrushchev. The market steadied then, but did not rebound in earnest until four days later, when it became clear that Khrushchev would back down; it went on to gain 30% in the next six months.

Similarly in the 1991 Gulf War, it was not until the bombing of Baghdad actually started and a quick US victory looked certain, that equities bounced back, gaining 25% by the summer. Thus investors did well to buy at the sound of gunfire, but lost nothing by waiting six months after Saddam Hussein’s initial invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. Even in the worst-case scenario to which the invasion of Crimea has been compared over the weekend—the German annexation of Sudetenland in June 1938—Wall Street only rebounded in earnest, gaining 24% within one month, on September 29, 1938. That was the day before Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich, brandishing his infamous note from Hitler and declaring “peace in our time”. The ultimate triumph of hope over experience.

Special Eurasia Group Update – Ukraine

By Ian Bremmer, Eurasia Group

Dear John,
Russia is conducting direct military intervention in ukraine, following condemnation and threats of sanction/serious consequence from the united states and europe. we're witnessing the most seismic geopolitical events since 9/11.

A little background from the week. russian president vladimir putin provided safety to now ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. the Ukrainian government came together with broadly pro European sentiment...and with few if any representatives of other viewpoints. the west welcomed the developments and prepared to send an imf mission, which would lift the immediate economic challenge. And then, predictably...the russians changed the conversation.

The west – the us and europe – supported the Ukrainian opposition as soon as President Yanukovych fled the country. that also effectively breached the accord that had been signed by the european foreign ministers, opposition and President Yanukovych (a Russian special envoy attended but did not add his name). The immediate american perspective was to take the changed developments on the ground as a win. but a "win" was never on offer in Ukraine, where russian interests are dramatically, even exponentially, greater than those of the americans or europeans. for its part, the new Ukrainian government lost no time in antagonizing the russians – dissolving the Ukrainian special forces, declaring the former president a criminal, and removing russian as a second official language. the immediate russian response was military exercises and work to keep Crimea. president Vladimir Putin kept mum on any details.

Let's focus on crimea for a moment. it's majority ethnic russian, and ukrainians living there are overwhelmingly russian speaking (there's a significant minority population of muslim Crimean tatars, formerly forcibly resettled under Stalin – relevant from a humanitarian perspective, but they'll have no impact on the practical political outcome). Crimea is a firmly russian oriented territory. Crimea has a Russian military base (with a long term lease agreement) and strong, well organized Russian and cossack groups – which they've supplemented with significant numbers of additional troops, as well as military ships sent to the area. Russia has said they will respect ukrainian territorial integrity...and I'm sure they'll have an interpretation of their action which does precisely that. moscow will argue that the ouster of President Yanukovych was illegal, that he's calling for Russian assistance, that the new government wasn't legally formed, and that citizens of Crimea – governed by an illegal government – are requesting russia's help and protection. all of which is technically true. to be sure, there are plenty of things the russians have already done that involve a breach, including clear and surely provable, given sufficient investigation, direct Russian involvement in taking over the parliament and two airports in crimea. but that's not the issue. it's just that if you want to argue over the finer points, the west doesn't have much of a legal case here and couldn't enforce one if it did.

And the finer points aren't what we're going to be arguing about for some time. president obama's response was to strongly condemn reported russian moves, and to imply it was an invasion of sovereignty...promising unspecified consequences to Russia should they breach Ukrainian sovereignty. if that was meant to warn the russians, who have vastly greater stakes in Ukraine (and particularly crimea) than the americans and the europeans, it was a serious miscalculation, as Putin already controlled crimea, it was only a question of how quickly and clearly he wanted to formalize that fact. there's literally zero chance of american military response, with the pentagon quickly clarifying that it had no contingencies for dealing with moscow on the issue – that's surely not true, they have contingencies for everything. but secretary of defense Chuck Hagel just wanted to ensure nobody thought the president meant that all options were on the table. instead, we're seeing discussions of president Obama not attending the G-8 summit in Sochi and targeted sanctions against Russia.

Putin has since acted swiftly, requesting a vote from the Russian upper house to approve military intervention in Ukraine. it was approved, unanimously, within hours. It's a near certainty that the Russians now persist in direct intervention. the remaining related question is whether russian intervention is limited to Crimea – Putin's request included defense of Russia's military base in sevastopol (on the crimean peninsula) and to defend the rights of ethnic russians in Ukraine...which extends far beyond crimea. putin's words may have been intended to deter the west, or he may intend to go into eastern Ukraine, at least securing military assets there. Given that pro-russian demonstrations were hastily organized earlier in the day in three major southeast ukrainian cities, it seems possible the russians are intending a broader incursion. if that happens, we're in an extremely escalatory environment. if it doesn't, it's still possible (though very difficult) that the west could come in financially and stabilize the Keiv government.

Before we get into implications, it's worth taking a step back, as we've seen this before. in 2008, turmoil developed in Georgia under nationalist president mikheil saakashvili, a charismatic figure, fluent english speaker, and husband to a european (from the Netherlands). he made it very clear he wanted to join NATO and the european union (the latter being a pretty fantastic claim). the Russian government was doing its best to make Georgia's president miserable – cutting off energy and economic ties and directly supporting restive Russian speaking republics within Georgia. for his part, saakashvili delighted in directly antagonizing putin – showing up late for a kremlin meeting (while he was busy swimming), insulting him personally, etc.

Saakashvili was a favorite of the west, the us congress particularly feted him. the messages from the united states were positive, making it sound like America had his back. internally, there was a strong debate – vice president dick cheney led the calls to free himself from russia's grip as fast and as loudly as possible, secretary of state Condoleezza Rice thought Saakashvili unpredictable and dangerous, and wanted to urge him to back off (as did former secretary Colin Powell, who lent his view to the white house as well). The Cheney view prevailed, Georgian president already had a habit of hearing what he wanted to out of mixed messages, and he proceeded. on 8 august, the russian tanks rolled into georgia and then the united states was left with a conundrum –  what to do to defend America's "ally" Georgia.

As it turned out, nothing. national security advisor steve hadley chaired a private meeting with president bush and all relevant advisors, most of whom said the united states had to take action. bush was sympathetic. hadley stopped the meeting and asked if anyone was personally prepared to commit military forces to what would be direct confrontation with russia. he went around the room individually and asked if there was a commitment – which would be publicly required of the group afterwards (and uniformly) if they were to recommend that the president take action. there was not – not a single one. and then the meeting quickly moved to how to position diplomacy, since there wasn't any action to take.

That's precisely where we are on ukraine – but with much higher stakes (and with a united states in a generally weaker diplomatic position), since ukraine is more important economically and geopolitically (and to europe specifically on both).

The good news is that russia doesn't matter as much as it used to on the global stage. indeed, a big part of the problem is that Russia is a declining power, and the west's response on ukraine was to make the west's perception of that reality abundantly clear to Putin. which, in Putin's mind, required a decisive response. but this has the potential to undermine american relationships more broadly. to say the U.S. - Russia relationship is broken presently is an understatement – the upper house also voted to recall the russian ambassador to washington (america's ambassador to Moscow had just this past week ended his term – the decision was unrelated to the crisis).

what will be much more interesting is 1) the significance of the west's direct response; 2) whether the Russians will cause trouble on a broader array of fronts for the west; and 3) whether a strongly intentioned Russia can shift the geopolitical balance against the united states.
taking each of these in order.

1) The west's direct response. we won't see much, although there will certainly be some very significant finger pointing. president obama will cancel his trip to sochi for the upcoming G8 summit and it's possible that enough of the other leaders will join him that the meeting is cancelled. it's conceivable the G7 nations would vote to remove Russia from the club. the us would also suspend talks to improve commercial ties with the united states. it's possible we see an emergency united nations security council session to denounce the intervention – which the russians veto (very interesting to see if the Chinese join them, and who abstains...). hard to see significant european powers actually breaking relations with russia at this point, but an action-reaction cycle could spiral. also, nato will have to fashion some response, possibly by sending ships into the black sea. shots won't be fired, but markets will get fired up.

2) International complications from Russia. this will significantly complicate all areas of us-russian ties.
russia doesn't want an iranian nuclear weapon, but they'll be somewhat less cooperative with the americans and europeans around Iranian negotiations...possibly making them more likely to offer a "third way" down the road that undermines the american deal. on syria, an intransigent russia will become very intransigent, making it more difficult to implement the chemical weapons agreement and providing greater direct financial and military support for bashar assad's regime.

On energy issues, a Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine would put in play the integrity of major pipelines. moscow and kyiv would share strong incentives to keep gas and oil flowing, but in the worst case we could see disruptions. Ukraine has gas reserves for a while, but then the situation could become dire. russia could divert some European bound gas through the nord stream line, but volume to Europe would drop. this is all in extremis, but out there.

3) Geopolitical shift. Russia will see its key opportunity as closing ranks more tightly with China. while we may see symbolic coordination from beijing, particularly if there's a security council vote (where the Chinese are reasonably likely to vote with the russians), the chinese are trying hard to maintain a balanced relationship with the united states...and accordingly won't directly support russian actions that could undermine that relationship. leaving aside China, Russia's ability to get other third party states on board with their Ukrainian engagement is largely limited to the "near abroad" – Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan –  which is not a group the west is particularly concerned with.

But it is, more broadly, a significant hit to american foreign policy credibility. coming only days after secretary of state kerry took strong exception to "asinine", "isolationist" views in congress that acted as if the united states was a "poor country," a direct admonition by the united states and its key allies is willfully and immediately ignored by the russian president. that will send a message of weakness and bring concerns about american commitment to allies around the world. G-zero indeed.


We'll be watching this very closely over coming days. I'm flying to Seoul for a conference on monday, where I'm meeting up with President George W. Bush. should prove interesting on Russia, no question. i'm back on Wednesday, but will be available by phone/email throughout, so feel free to get in touch.
yours truly,

Ian

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The article Outside the Box: Ukraine: Three Views was originally published at Mauldin Economics.






Friday, February 28, 2014

World Money Analyst Update on Europe


For the last two weeks on Thursdays we have brought you special editions of Outside the Box featuring World Money Analyst Managing Editor Kevin Brekke’s interviews with WMA contributing editors. We heard from Ankur Shah on emerging markets and Alexei Medved on Russia, and this week we wrap up the series with a frank, hard-hitting interview with Dirk Steinhoff, who covers the European and Scandinavian markets for WMA.

Kevin and Dirk are both based in Switzerland, and so they lead off with a discussion of the recent Swiss referendum on immigration. Dirk’s interpretation of the vote, which imposes quotas on the number of foreigners allowed to enter the country, is that it has implications for the entire European Union:

[T]he Swiss people basically decided that they want to control immigration themselves and do not want to give up this control to the centralized administration in Brussels. I think that this is a clear signal to the Swiss government that the Swiss people don’t want to give up more sovereignty and that they would like to see more decentralization in the future.

Which leads Kevin and Dirk to take up the broader issues of the unresolved Eurozone debt crisis, unemployment mess, and the fate of the euro. With EU parliamentary elections coming up in May, there is change in the air! OK, let’s turn it over to Kevin and Dirk for the details.

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
subscribers@mauldineconomics.com

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World Money Analyst Update on Europe

World Money Analyst: With me today is Dirk Steinhoff. Dirk is a contributing editor at World Money Analyst and covers the European and Scandinavian markets. Great to have you with us.

Dirk Steinhoff: Thank you very much for having me.

WMA: Seeing that you're in Zurich and I'm in Fribourg, let's start with a look at developments in our own backyard. The Swiss are known for their system of direct democracy via use of the referendum. The recent success of a referendum that will restrict immigration into Switzerland made global headlines. What’s your position on the immigration issue and the consequences of this vote?

Dirk: First of all, I should mention that I was born and raised in Berlin and moved with my family to Switzerland in 2007. One of the main reasons why I decided to leave Germany and come to Switzerland, next to the great Swiss landscape, was the strongly centralized development of the European Union, which reminds me painfully of the political system in the former DDR [communist East Germany].

European politicians live a life that is completely detached from those that don’t belong to this elitist political class. Their decisions are based on distorted experience and lobbyist influence and not on real life experience and independent judgment. The strong, centralized power of Brussels, in combination with the desire to regulate everything in life, increasingly limits personal freedom, limits the development of entrepreneurship (and therefore the creation of non-government-related workplaces), and eliminates local, regional, and national characteristics.

The state is much less dominant in Switzerland, mainly due to its federalist and decentralized political system, which limits the power of the federal government. Due to my own background and my own moral conviction, I personally believe that every human being should be able to live and work wherever he or she wants, as long as they are self-reliant, willing to integrate, and do not become a burden to the community they recently entered.

My interpretation of the referendum is that the Swiss people basically decided that they want to control immigration themselves and do not want to give up this control to the centralized administration in Brussels. I think that this is a clear signal to the Swiss government that the Swiss people don’t want to give up more sovereignty and that they would like to see more decentralization in the future.

It also interesting to note that most of the media in Europe (even Swiss media) were shocked by the outcome of the vote. In sharp contrast, other polls in various European countries actually show that most citizens would have voted similarly to the Swiss, and some by an even higher margin than the outcome of the Swiss vote. I think that in the long run more and more of the European people will ask for the Swiss model of democracy to be implemented in their home countries.

Although the rhetoric used by politicians in Europe might change to the negative in the short term, I do not think that the referendum will have a long-term negative effect on the relations between Switzerland and Brussels. I believe that Brussels has to come to terms with our form of democracy and has to respect our sovereignty, even if they might disagree with some of our decisions.

WMA: The immigration debate is not unique to Switzerland, of course, and is a divisive issue across Europe. This seems to be part of a trend where we've seen a rise in popularity of nationalist and anti-euro parties? What's your view?

Dirk: You are right. The severe criticism of Switzerland because of the outcome of the referendum has eclipsed the fact that many European countries face the same issue. People are not only unhappy with the immigration politics within the EU, they are becoming more EU skeptical in general.

The political parties critical of the European Union – like the UK independence party in Great Britain, the Finns Party (formerly the True Finns) in Finland, the Lega Nord in Italy, the FPÖ in Austria, the AfD in Germany, the French Front Nationale, the Golden Dawn in Greece, and the Party of Freedom in the Netherlands – are gaining popularity. Of course, the reasons for and the scope of their EU criticism vary a lot.

I think this trend can be summed up as follows: the people want to have a voice and be able to decide their own fate! Pretty much everybody in the EU is unhappy about one issue or another. The Southern European countries are unable to cope with the austerity measures, and on the other hand you have a large part of the German population that is simply unwilling to continue financing the complete EU.  I believe this trend will gain momentum, and it will bring some surprises in the elections to the European Parliament in May 2014.
Europe has so many different cultures that centralization just doesn’t work, because there isn’t a one-size-fits-all answer to most issues. The euro is a perfect example of this!

WMA: That's an important point on the euro. With the continued rise of anti-euro sentiment, what is your outlook for the currency? Will the euro survive?

Dirk: I don’t know. There are different scenarios that I can imagine for the euro: strong countries leaving the Eurozone, unwilling to pay for a bottomless pit of EU debt; weak countries leaving the Eurozone in order to be able to devalue their currencies and regain competiveness; or a split into a strong northern euro and a weaker southern euro. Or some combination of these. As you can see, there are many possibilities, and what we will see depends on economic and political developments in European countries over the next several years. In my view, something will happen and we won’t have the same euro in five years time that we have today.

WMA: The adoption of the common currency has limited how individual countries can respond to fiscal stresses. News about the euro debt crisis has been very quiet lately. What is the situation?

Dirk: As you say, there has hardly been any news recently regarding the troubles in the EU, which does not mean that the problems are solved. They are still bubbling under the surface. With the current papering-over and continuation of indebtedness, the need to address the problems, with their inherent negative consequences for most people, has been postponed. Because of that, most of the harsh protest has faded and turned away from the streets and is canalized into the euro-skeptic political parties. And when there have been noteworthy protests, such as last November in French Brittany, media coverage was excluded.
What has changed in the last year? Absolutely nothing fundamentally! So the euro crisis will at some point reappear with all its inevitable consequences.

WMA: You mention France, so let's continue down that path. The small and mid-sized Eurozone countries – Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece – are essentially bankrupt as measured by GDP and in receivership by Brussels. Today, there is growing speculation that France, too, is headed for trouble soon. What do you think?

Dirk: I totally agree! They have too much debt, a radical socialist government, and absurd, business-unfriendly regulation. I have several friends who are business owners in France, and they are all contemplating leaving the country and moving their businesses abroad.  The quantity of regulation they have to comply with simply cannot be handled by a normal business, and the labor laws are so strict that no business owner in their right mind wants to take on the risk of employing someone.

Taking into consideration the unhealthy debt levels they have, the unsustainable social programs they offer, and the complete lack of any growth impulses, I have to believe that the French are indeed headed for trouble soon. And, as the second largest economy in the EU, France matters. If France stumbles, the EU is at risk.

WMA: Drawing on your comments about strict labor laws, the unemployment numbers in many EU countries are mind-boggling. You discussed this situation in your recent article for World Money Analyst. Can you talk about this for a minute?

Dirk: As we have seen since 2008, the trillions in newly created fiat money have mainly fueled asset bubbles. However, the real economy has not profited from it, because this money has not been lent to private industry. We are still facing 30% lower money velocity than before 2008 and that means that more than 30% of credit in circulation has disappeared. This is also why the real economy is still going down the drain.

Most jobs have been created within the government or government related entities; and as we all know, these jobs are paid for by the taxpayers and are not a source of production. Therefore, I personally believe the situation in the labor market will further deteriorate, especially among the young generation, below 25; they are going to suffer the most. The current youth unemployment rates in Spain and Italy are just shocking: 58% and 42%, respectively. We are losing a whole generation, and we cannot predict how drastically the damage we are doing to them will play out in the future.

WMA: High and sustained rates of joblessness can lead to frustration and anger by the unemployed that turns to civil unrest and protests. We've seen riots in several EU countries, including France, Greece, and Bosnia. Is that also a real danger for the stronger European countries?

Dirk: Yes, this is a real danger. As soon as the deterioration of people's personal economic situations reaches a certain level they will be on the streets, and that includes the streets of the stronger countries. At the moment, most people still believe that all the debt and all the rescue programs come for free.

WMA: What does this all mean for the outlook for European stocks and bonds?

Dirk: That you have to watch closely what the European Central Bank and governments do. It’s a tricky situation – you don’t want to miss any upside rallies in equities and bonds induced by loose monetary policies. Yet, on the other hand you know the party could end at any time. Risk management is essential.  The day of reckoning can be postponed by governments and central banks much further – as we know from the US and Japan – than common sense would allow for.

WMA: In your opinion, what European countries have the best economic outlook?

Dirk: The countries that have been strong in the past, with competitive industries and with sound current-account and budget balances. Countries like Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. And Switzerland.

WMA: As you mentioned above, in May 2014 there will be the EU Parliament election. Will that change anything?

Dirk: The potential increase of parliamentarians that are critical of Europe I mentioned before could intensify tensions within the EU and complicate the functioning of the EU system. But I don’t expect a quick change.

WMA: We must talk about the un-loved Swiss franc. Since Switzerland began intervention in the currency markets to halt the rise of the franc against the euro, the mainstream consensus has it that the franc is doomed. But the performance of the franc against other currencies, in particular the US dollar, has been very strong. What's your take on the Swiss franc going forward?

Dirk: It’s hard to say. In a euro crisis I would expect the Swiss National Bank [the central bank] to remove the floor to the euro. In such a situation the power of the SNB to keep the floor would be simply too small, I think. There are also attempts in Switzerland to once again constitutionally back the Swiss franc by gold. We’ll have to see. The Swiss franc, to me, still belongs to the upper class of paper currencies.

WMA: Do you have any last thoughts for our readers?

Dirk: Globally, we have entered a time when substantial corrections of past misadventures are likely to occur. It’s not the end of the world, but it's worth being prepared.

WMA: I really appreciate your insights on the European markets. Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today.

Dirk: The pleasure was mine.

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