Warning: This Could Be the Start of a Global Banking Crisis

By Justin Spittler

Europe’s banking system is collapsing. Over the past year, shares of Deutsche Bank (DB), Germany’s biggest bank, have plunged 56%. Swiss banking giant Credit Suisse (CS) is down 62% over the same period. Yesterday, both stocks hit record lows.

Dozens of other European bank stocks have also crashed. The Euro STOXX Banks, which tracks 48 of Europe’s largest banks, is down 48% over the past year. This is a major issue. That's because banks are the cornerstone of the financial system. They keep money flowing through the economy. If they’re struggling, it often means the economy is having major problems. Right now, European banks are flashing bright warning signs. That’s not just bad news for Europe—it’s also a serious threat to the rest of the world.

In today’s Dispatch, we’ll show you why Europe’s banking crisis could turn into a global banking crisis. You’ll also learn how to transform this threat into a chance to make big gains.

European banks are struggling to make money..…
Spanish banking giant BBVA’s (BBVA) profits fell 54% last quarter. First quarter profits at Deutsche Bank were down 58%. Swiss bank UBS’s (UBS) profits plunged 64%. European banks are hurting for a couple reasons. One, Europe is growing at the slowest pace in decades. Banks are making fewer loans as a result.

Two, negative interest rates are eating European banks alive. If you’ve been reading the Dispatch, you know negative rates are the latest radical government policy. They basically flip your bank account upside down. Instead of earning interest for keeping money in the bank, you pay the bank to hold your money.

Negative rates are clearly bad for savers. They’re also hurting Europe's biggest banks. That’s because these huge institutions have to pay their “bank,” the European Central Bank (ECB). Today, European banks pay £4 for every £1,000 they store at the ECB for a year. That might not sound like a lot. But it adds up quick when you manage trillions of euros like these banks do.

Last week, investors got another reason to avoid European banks..…
On Thursday, Great Britain voted to leave the European Union (EU), which it’s been in since 1973.
The “Brexit,” as the media is calling it, blindsided investors. As we explained yesterday, the market was expecting Great Britain to stay in EU. The unexpected outcome triggered a global stock market crash.

U.S. stocks had their worst day since August. Japanese stocks had their worst day in five years. European stocks had their biggest decline since the 2008 financial crisis. Friday’s global selloff erased $2.1 trillion in value from global stocks. It was the global stock market’s worst day in history. The panic didn’t die down much over the weekend. By the end of Monday, another $930 billion had disappeared from the global stock market.

European bank stocks were hit the hardest..…
Deutsche Bank plunged 22% between Friday and Monday. Credit Suisse fell 23%. UBS fell 20%. Barclays (BCS) and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) each plunged 37%. Both stocks are down more than 57% over the past year. These are gigantic moves in a matter of days. Remember, we’re not talking about small biotech stocks. These are some of the most important financial institutions on the planet.

Government officials are scrambling to contain the crisis..…
Today, the Bank of England (BoE) injected £3.1 billion into Britain’s banking system. It’s pledged to inject as much as £250 billion to stabilize its financial system. The BoE made its cash injection hours after the Bank of Japan (BOJ) pumped $1.5 billion into its banking system. As we'll show you in a second, we don't believe this will end well. That's because this excessive money printing (sometimes called "quantitative easing") doesn't stimulate the economy like governments intend it to.

Credit Suisse says other central banks could soon print more money too. Bloomberg Business reported on Friday:

“Market liquidity and overall liquidity in the U.K. is drying up as we speak in a very rapid way,” said John Woods, chief investment officer for Asia-Pacific at Credit Suisse Private Banking, told Bloomberg TV in Hong Kong. “It’s highly likely that we see monetary easing in a coordinated response” from central banks across the world, he said.

Great Britain is headed for a recession..…
A recession is when an economy shrinks two quarters in a row. Goldman Sachs (GS) says Britain could be in a recession by early 2017. But here’s the thing. We don’t think the BoE will let this happen. That’s because central bankers will do anything, including using reckless, unproven monetary policies, to avoid a recession these days.

Credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s agrees with us. Reuters reported today:

"Brexit is likely to represent a drag of about 1.2 percent of GDP for the UK in 2017," Jean-Michel Six, S&P's chief economist for Europe, the Middle East and Africa told a conference call for investors on Tuesday. "We have a significant slowdown but growth remains positive although obviously in a much more disappointing way. That is because we anticipate a very strong monetary response on the part of the Bank of England, in the form of additional quantitative easing, in the form of a further cut in interest rates," he added.

Bank of America (BAC) and Deutsche Bank also expect the BoE to fire up the printing press again. Bank of America says it could happen as soon as August.

QE won’t help Great Britain’s economy..…
As we told you above, QE doesn’t work. As regular readers know, the Federal Reserve pumped $3.5 trillion into the U.S financial system after the 2008 financial crisis. This massive money printing effort was supposed to juice the economy. But the U.S. is growing at its slowest pace since World War II. QE also failed to jumpstart Japan’s economy, which hasn’t grown in two decades. There’s no reason to think it will work this time.

If you’re nervous about the global financial system, we encourage you to take action today.…
The first thing you should do is own physical gold. Gold is real money. It’s held its value for thousands of years because it has a unique set of attributes: It’s easy to transport, easily divisible, and durable. You can take a gold coin anywhere in the world and folks will immediately recognize its value.

Unlike paper money, central bankers cannot create gold from nothing. It’s the ultimate antidote to crumbling paper currencies. That’s why the price of gold often soars when governments print money. This year, gold is up 24%. It’s trading at the highest price in two years. But it could go much higher as governments continue to run reckless monetary experiments.

If you want big profits from rising gold prices, own gold stocks..…
Dispatch readers know gold miners are leveraged to the price of gold. A small jump in the price of gold can cause gold stocks to surge. Gold’s 24% jump this year has caused GDX, a fund that tracks large gold stocks, to soar 96%. We believe this gold stock rally is just getting started. During the 2000 and 2003 gold bull market, the average gold stock gained 602%. The best ones soared 1,000% or more.

Nick Giambruno, editor of Crisis Investing, has recommended two gold stocks this year..…
He already closed out one of them for a quick double. It surged 103% in 14 months. Nick’s other gold stock is up 30% since March and is still dirt cheap at today's levels. Nick currently rates this stock a "Buy"…and says it could soon start paying a double digit dividend yield if gold keeps rising.

You can learn more about Nick’s gold stock by taking advantage of our special 60%-off sale for Crisis Investing. If you sign up today, you’ll be enrolled in a trial membership, which gives you 90 days risk-free to decide if the service is for you. But we encourage you to act soon. This special offer ends soon, and we likely won’t open this offer again for a long time.

You can learn more about this incredible offer by watching this video presentation. You’ll also learn about an even bigger threat to your wealth than Europe’s banking crisis. As you’ll see, almost no one is talking about this coming crisis. Yet, it could cause millions of Americans to lose their entire life savings. By the end of this video, you’ll know how to protect yourself. And just as importantly, you’ll know how to profit from this coming crisis. Click here to watch this free video.

Chart of the Day

U.S. bank stocks are also headed lower. Today’s chart shows the performance of the Financial Select Sector SPDR ETF (XLF) over the past year. XLF holds 94 major U.S. financial companies including behemoths JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Wells Fargo (WFC), and Bank of America (BAC). You can see XLF is down 11% since last June. While that's not as severe as the near 50% drop in European banks over the same period, it's still a clear sign to stay away.

U.S. banks have many of the same problems as European banks. Like Europe, the U.S. economy is growing at the slowest pace in decades. And while the U.S. economy doesn’t have negative rates yet, Fed Chair Janet Yellen has said they aren’t “off the table” if the U.S. economy runs into trouble. The arrival of negative rates to the U.S. could tip bank stocks into a crisis, just like they have in Europe.

The article Warning: This Could Be the Start of a Global Banking Crisis was originally published at caseyresearch.com.

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How Negative Interest Rates Will Turbocharge the Migrant Crisis

By Nick Giambruno

In the 1989 Batman movie, the Joker (played by Jack Nicholson) showers a crowded Gotham street with free money. In the scene, it looks like it’s raining hundred dollar bills. The people love it. Little do they know, the money is actually a trap. Once the Joker has lured them into the street, he unleashes poisonous gas.

I think the latest gimmick to stimulate the economy is pretty much the same thing. It’s one of the most absurd ideas I’ve heard in a while. And that’s saying something, considering the outrageous schemes our economic luminaries have recently come up with, like..…

• Faking a space alien invasion to help stimulate the economy.
• Minting a trillion dollar coin.
• Negative interest rates.
• Banning physical cash.
• Cash for clunkers.
• Increasing rounds of money printing, euphemistically called “quantitative easing.”

These ideas would be comical if people in power didn’t actually take them seriously. But they do. It’s the same bad medicine the economic witch doctors have been prescribing for years. With a track record like this, it’s hard to imagine they could come up with something even more ridiculous. But they have. This latest gimmick goes well beyond the absurdity of their previous ideas. It’s verifiably insane. And the scariest part is, this dangerous idea is gaining currency. It’s spreading across the world like a smallpox outbreak.

Helicopter Money

Politicians and establishment economists call this scary idea “a basic income.” I call it sheer lunacy. It’s where the government gives you money just because. There’s no requirement to work or even display a willingness to work. You could sit at home all day, watch TV, and still get a check from the government. Simply put, a basic income is “free” money the government hands out to everyone unconditionally. European politicians are heavily pushing this policy.

• Finland wants to pay its citizens around $1,000 a month.
• The Netherlands and the U.K. have also proposed dishing out free money.
• In Switzerland, there’s a proposal to hand out around $2,800 a month to everyone. This one is surprising since the Swiss are generally sensible about money.
• The basic income virus has also infected Canada, which recently announced a pilot program in Ontario.

It’s just a matter of time before the idea gains traction in the U.S. In fact, U.S. central economic planners are already discussing it. You might recall former Fed chair Ben Bernanke’s nickname, “Helicopter Ben.” He got the name after he spoke publicly about using helicopter drops of money to “stimulate” the economy. This is just another flavor of a basic income.

Whether you call it free money, a basic income, or helicopter money, the idea is spreading. It’s the next potion the economic witch doctors will use once their latest scam—negative interest rates—not only fails to cure our economic ailments, but predictably makes them worse. No matter, the idea will be politically popular. Who would protest free money?

And, once a country adopts a basic income, it would be next to impossible to get rid of it until the system collapses under its own weight. Who would vote for a politician that stops (or even slows down) the gravy train? The Joker used free money to lure the people of Gotham to poisonous gas. Now real world politicians are using the same trick. They’re using free money to lure the masses into perpetual dependence on government.

More Problems Ahead for Europe

If Europeans think they have a migrant problem now, just wait until they institute a basic income. It’s obvious what will happen….Once European governments start handing every person thousands of dollars in free money each month (more than many in Africa make in a year), everyone will be scrambling for Europe.

A basic income is a sure recipe for economic disaster and increased cultural tensions. It’s an environment where blowhards and demagogues flourish. Unfortunately, this has happened repeatedly throughout Europe’s history. Once again, it’s going to lead to some very bad things.

I think a basic income will greatly accelerate this recurring trend.

Without a basic income and other welfare benefits, immigrants are usually skilled and the very best of people. But the average European will surely forget that once free money draws in the world’s riffraff. This is why, although the financial effects will be severe, the sociopolitical ones will be much worse.

Here’s the bottom line: All you can do is protect yourself from the consequences of all this stupidity. This is a big reason why I think everyone should own some gold. Gold is the ultimate form of wealth insurance. It’s preserved wealth for thousands of years through every kind of crisis imaginable. It will preserve wealth during the next crisis, too.

Unfortunately, most people have no idea how to prepare for the next economic collapse…..

How will you protect your savings in the event of a crisis? This just released video will show you exactly how. Click here to watch it now.

The article How Negative Interest Rates Will Turbocharge the Migrant Crisis was originally published at caseyresearch.com.

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Muddling Through Shanghai

By John Mauldin

“He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot, will be victorious.”

– Sun Tzu

A couple of weeks ago I was complaining about 47,000 China reports clogging my email. The number now feels like it is well into six figures (perhaps a slight exaggeration). Maybe my memory is going, but there wasn’t nearly as much China talk on the way up. Funny how that works.

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Is China collapsing? I think parts of China are under severe pressure if not outright recession, and clearly the stock market is a disaster. Anyone who bought Shanghai or Shenzhen stocks on margin this year is probably on the brink.

That said, China itself is not collapsing. There are parts of China that are doing just fine, thank you very much. It does have serious problems, though. The Pollyannas and the Cassandras are both wrong. The change in tone in the Financial Times is quite amusing. Their recent hyperbolic, bearish section called “China Tremors” is a case in point. Of the last 30 articles on China on their website, I found less than a handful that were positive on China. My take? China will muddle through, at least for the near term.

China is in transition, a transition that was clearly telegraphed if you have been paying attention. Our recent book on China (A Great Leap Forward?) clearly laid out this new path. Today we are going to talk about this precarious, difficult transition, which may impose profound impacts on much of the rest of the world. This transition is going to change the way global trade has worked in the past. There will be winners and losers.
But first, a brief comment on today’s employment report and how it impacts the need for a rate hike by the Federal Reserve in September. I offer a little different perspective on the coming decision.

To Hike or Not To Hike – That Is the Question

Today’s unemployment report was lackluster, as has been the case for the initial reporting for the last two Augusts. Both were revised significantly upward – August 2012 was eventually revised up 96,000 jobs, while August 2013 saw a final revision upward of 69,000 jobs, and August 2014 saw a final count of +213,000 jobs. Part of the reason for the major revisions is that only some 70% of the potential survey participants actually responded (hat tip Joan McCullough).

Evidently the United States is becoming like Europe, and we are all going on vacation in August. Or at least the department personnel responsible for handling employment figures are. Expect to see significant upward revisions in the coming months, just as July saw another 30,000 added and June saw a plus 14,000.

This report was not so ugly that it would take the breath away from hawks wanting to raise rates or force doves into agreeing to a rate increase. Nothing changed, really. That is illustrated by the two articles below that were side-by-side on the New York Times website within an hour of the release of the report (hat tip Brent Donnelly). Everybody got to see what they wanted to see.

I can’t remember a time when there was such serious disagreement over what the Federal Reserve should do regarding a rate hike. I have been in several groups of analysts and economists in the last few months, and I must confess to being surprised at the split in opinions.

Upon reflection, I think I can actually understand both positions. First, the Fed keeps reiterating that they are “data dependent” – thus the focus on every little bit of data, no matter how trivial. Let me see if I can explain why both sides can feel they are right and then why, to my way of thinking, they are missing the point.

On the side of those who feel that a rate hike should be postponed at the September meeting, it must be remembered that most rate hikes are in anticipation of an economy beginning to pick up speed. The Fed has said they want to see low unemployment, and under the leadership of Bernanke and now Yellen, they have a 2% inflation target. Remember, their congressional mandate is to promote stable prices and full employment.

While unemployment did drop to 5.1%, that is a “soft” unemployment figure. The participation rate is down. The number of part time workers wanting full time jobs is still high. And the new employment trend is not encouraging.

August's gains were well below trend. The average of the previous five months is 211,000; for the previous six before that it was 282,000. The yearly employment gain, 2.1%, is off 0.2 point from the late 2014/early 2015 rate. The private sector gain is 60,000 below the average of the previous six months. (The Liscio Report)

We are not close to 2% inflation; and, frankly, it doesn’t look like we’re going to get there for a while. The economy is, at best, stuck in a low, Muddle Through gear (as I predicted years ago); and getting back to a stable 3% growth rate, let alone the occasional 4–5% that we used to see, seems out of reach. The dollar is strong and getting stronger and is not only holding down inflation but also, anecdotal evidence suggests, slowing down exports in various sectors of the economy.

There were those who argued that a bubble was developing in the stock market, but it appears the stock market is taking care of itself to make sure it doesn’t become overheated. There is no need to pile on to see if we can drive asset prices even lower. Further, we are just in the beginning of a housing recovery. Why raise mortgage rates, etc., at the beginning?

In such an environment, why would you raise rates in order to keep the economy from overheating? The last thing we seem to be doing is overheating, let alone even getting to a slow boil. Instead, we may already be cooling down. If the economy does start to pick up and inflation becomes an issue, we could raise rates then as fast as we would need to. Or so Kocherlakota and his friends on the FOMC say. And thus we should postpone a rate increase until we see a reason for it. Kind of like, don’t shoot till you see the whites of their eyes.

Those who think we should raise rates likewise have an array of data to support their case. GDP grew 3.7% in the second quarter. If you take out the weather related first quarter 2015 GDP figure, GDP growth is running well over 3%. Given the global headwinds currently buffeting economies, that’s about as good as it’s going to get.

This economy has weathered tax increases and the abrupt changes of Obamacare, as well as a significant drop in capital spending related to oil production and has “kept on ticking.” If there is a recession in our near future, as David Rosenberg points out, it would be the first recession ever that did not see consumer spending or employment go down for the count.

We’ve always been able to find negatives in the unemployment rate. Even if unemployment were somehow to ratchet down to less than 200,000 per month, it will be for only two quarters at the most; and it may be that before the end of the year we will be under 5% unemployment. We just set a record for all measures of corporate profits in absolute terms. We finally set a new record for real disposable personal income in July, again in absolute terms. As Jim Smith says,

What all this means is that when the FOMC meets on September 16 and 17, they will be looking at a US economy in which more people are employed than ever before, earning more money than ever before, producing more goods and services than ever before, and with personal consumption expenditures and corporate profits at the highest levels ever seen. If that is not a prescription for finally raising the Fed Funds rate, then I can't imagine what it would take to get them to move. (source)

Despite the significant slowdown in the oil patch, the level of investment in the second quarter was almost 4% higher than last year. Businesses are optimistic. Even given the turmoil in Canada, China, the Eurozone, and the rest of the BRICS, and even though global trade is beginning to fall off a little bit, the US economy seems to be doing quite well in spite of it all.

What else do you need in order to begin to normalize rates? Inflation is under control and according to most Fed economists seems to be ticking higher. Unemployment is moving lower. The economy is doing quite well. If not now, when? How much better do you want things to get before rates are taken back to something close to normal?

I must confess that I personally lean toward the latter argument, but I have a few additional reasons for thinking the Federal Reserve should act in September. As I have presented in previous letters, there are real reasons to think that low interest rates are not only creating malinvestment but also encouraging companies to use financial engineering and to buy their competition rather than purchasing the tools of production and actually competing head on. These behaviors distort an economy over the long term. They frustrate Schumpeter’s forces of creative destruction.

Further, what policy tools does the Federal Reserve still have available if we enter a recession? I admit that doesn’t seem to be a likely possibility today, but there are many potentials for exogenous shocks to the US economy that could cause a recession. Further, in the history of the United States we have never had a period longer than nine years without a recession. This recovery, relatively weak though it is, is getting long in the tooth. Do we want the Fed to confront the next recession with another round of massive quantitative easing as the only policy tool left to deploy? When their own research shows that QE wasn’t very useful and when we can clearly see the distortions caused by QE in emerging markets around the world?

The Federal Reserve is functionally incapable of not feeling the need to “do something” in the midst of a recession. If the only tool they have is further massive quantitative easing, they will use it. Damn the distortions, full speed ahead!

I would not argue for a rapid rate hike. In fact, I would prefer 1/8 of a point at every meeting, rather than the typical quarter point. But there is no reason not to raise a quarter of a point at this meeting, skip a meeting to make sure everybody can take a deep breath, and then raise once more before the end of the year.

I mean, really? Does the Fed think this economy is so fragile that it can’t take a lousy quarter of a point increase in interest rates? The Federal Reserve needs to begin to restock its policy tool chest now. While I personally think we are a long way from ever seeing 5% Fed funds rates again, a 2% rate can probably easily be absorbed if it comes slowly. And that rate would give the Fed some policy tools when, not if, we enter the next recession.

Now, let’s turn back to China.

Repeat After Me: Chinese Stocks Are Not the Chinese Economy

It’s easy to assume that a country’s stock market reflects the condition of its economy, but that is not always the case. Further, what the stock market really does reflect is the consensus estimate of an economy’s future condition. More specifically, stock prices reveal future expectations for corporate profits.

This generally applies to both the United States and China. One key difference, though, is that most American stocks represent companies that seek to make profits. In China, that isn’t necessarily the case. The Chinese stock market includes many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose executives answer to bureaucrats in Beijing. The government views them as public policy tools. Everyone is happy if the SOEs make a profit, but profit is not the first priority.

If US stock prices generally tell us more about the future than the present, except in times of serious over- or undervaluation, then Chinese stock prices tell us even less about either. Just as last year’s incredible run-up in Chinese stocks did not signal an economic boom, the ongoing decline does not signal an economic bust. The correlations aren’t just weak, they are nonexistent. China’s official economic data is also questionable and would be so even if GDP were a precise measurement tool. As we discussed last week, it usually isn’t.

It is no stretch to say we are flying blind about China.

Fortunately, we have diligent researchers like Leland Miller of China Beige Book, whose research firm does the hard work of gathering reliable data each quarter from thousands of companies in China and assembling it in comprehensible form. His data shows that China’s economy has actually been in good shape since China stopped acting Chinese last year. But even then, you have to separate the Chinese economy into several categories.

China Good, China Bad, & China Ugly

Among the many letters and reports on China that I received over the last month, I’d like to single out an excellent research note that the team at Gavekal Dragonomics published last week, called “What to Worry About and What Not to in China.” I appreciated this piece, because it really helped me structure my worrying. I dislike spending energy worrying about the wrong things. Further, worrying about the wrong things can be dangerous. It’s when you are paying attention to the wrong things that what you should have been paying attention to jumps up and bites you on the derrière.

In the spirit of the Gavekal note, here is the good side of China. We’ll get to the bad and the ugly below.
Chinese real estate prices will stabilize. We hear a lot about China’s massive infrastructure boom and the resulting “ghost cities.” These aren’t just rumors. The government mandated the construction of entire cities to house the formerly agrarian population as it shifts to industrial jobs. Provincial governments earned as much as 80% of their revenues from land sales. Essentially, this is a process where they take possession of rural land that has very little value in price terms, declare it to be available for development, and can make profits several orders of magnitude greater than their costs. Nice work if you can get it.

The ghost cities will not stay empty forever. They will fill with people over the next few years (in some cases more than a few). The recent housing bubble is more a function of young people wanting to cram into certain popular areas. The broader internal migration will support housing prices even as the bubble areas pop.

It might be helpful to think of the Chinese ghost cities as analogous to the overbuilt condos in Florida. Prices in Florida did in fact collapse, and places were selling for a fraction of their construction cost. I wrote at the time that I thought they would be very good investments, because the number of people wanting to retire to Florida is actually a fairly steadily growing figure. Low taxes, good weather, positive infrastructure, excellent medical care – what’s not to like, other than it’s not Texas? Just saying…..

To continue reading this article from Thoughts from the Frontline – a free weekly publication by John Mauldin, renowned financial expert, best-selling author, and Chairman of Mauldin Economics – please click here.

The article Thoughts from the Frontline: Muddling Through Shanghai was originally published at mauldineconomics.com.

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The Third and Final Transformation of Monetary Policy

By John Mauldin

The law of unintended consequences is becoming ever more prominent in the economic sphere, as the world becomes exponentially more complex with every passing year. Just as a network grows in complexity and value as the number of connections in that network grows, the global economy becomes more complex, interesting, and hard to manage as the number of individuals, businesses, governmental bodies, and other institutions swells, all of them interconnected by contracts and security instruments, as well as by financial and information flows.

It is hubris to presume, as current economic thinking does, that the entire economic world can be managed by manipulating one (albeit major) subset of that network without incurring unintended consequences for the other parts of the network. To be sure, unintended consequences can be positive or neutral or negative. This letter you are reading, which I’ve been writing for over 15 years and which reaches far more people than I would have ever dreamed possible, is partially the result of a serendipitous unintended consequence.

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But as every programmer knows, messing with a tiny bit of the code in a very complex program can have significant ramifications, perhaps to the point of crashing the program. I have a new Microsoft Surface Pro 3 tablet that I’m trying to get used to, but somehow my heretofore reliable Mozilla Firefox browser isn’t playing nice with this computer. I’m sure it’s a simple bug or incompatibility somewhere, but my team and I have not been able to isolate it.

However, that’s a relatively minor problem compared to the unintended consequences that spill from quantitative easing, ZIRP, and other central bank shenanigans. We have discussed the problem of how the Federal Reserve has pushed dollars on the rest of the world and is playing havoc with dollar inflows and outflows from emerging markets. More than one EM central banker is complaining aggressively.
My good friend Dr. Woody Brock makes the case that an unintended consequence of QE is that the Federal Reserve’s normal transmission of monetary policy through periodic changes in the fed funds rate has been vitiated. He contends that soon we will no longer care about the fed funds rate and will be focused on other sets of rates.

This is an important issue and one that is not well understood. Woody has given me permission to reproduce his quarterly profile. For Woody, this is actually a fairly short piece; but as usual with Woody’s work, you will probably want to read it twice.

Woody is one of the most brilliant economists I know, and I make a point of spending time with him as our schedules permit. We are making plans to get together at his Massachusetts retreat in August. He is restructuring his business in order to spend more time writing and less time traveling, and he intends to lower the price of his subscription. It will still be pricey for the average reader, but for funds and institutions it should be a staple. You can find his website at www.SEDinc.com or email him at SED@SEDinc.com.

Before we go to Woody’s letter, if you’re going to be at my conference this coming week, you’ve already made arrangements. I know a lot of people wanted to go but just couldn’t work it into their schedules. I won’t say it’s the next best thing to being there, but you can follow me on Twitter, where my team and I will be sending out real time tweets about the important ideas and concepts we are hearing, not just from the speeches but from all the conversations that spring up during the day and late into the evening. If you’re curious as to who will be there, here’s a page with the speakers. If you’re at the conference, look me up.

The Fed Funds Rate: R.I.P.
‒ The Third and Final Transformation of Monetary Policy
By Woody Brock, Ph.D.

Strategic Economic Decisions, Inc.
The policy announcements of the US Federal Reserve Board are dissected and analyzed more closely than any other global financial variable. Indeed, during the past thirty years, Fed‐Watching became a veritable industry, with all eyes on the funds rate. Within a few years, this term will rarely appear in print. For the Fed will now be targeting two new variables in place of the funds rate. One result is that forecasting Fed policy will be more demanding.

To make sense of this observation, a bit of history is in order. During the last nine years, US monetary policy has been transformed in three ways. To date, only the first two have been widely discussed and are now well understood. The third development is only now underway, and is not well understood at all. To review:

First, the Fed lowered its overnight Fed funds rate to essentially zero, not only during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009, but throughout nearly six years of economic recovery thereafter. The average level of the funds rate at the current stage of recovery was about 4% during the past dozen business cycles. It was never 0% as it is in this cycle. In past essays, we have argued that this overutilization of “ultra‐easy monetary policy” reflected the failure of the government to utilize fiscal policy correctly (profitable infrastructure spending with a high jobs multiplier), and to introduce long‐overdue incentive structure reforms. It was thus left to monetary policy to pick up the pieces after the global crisis of 2008. This development was true in most other G-7 nations, not just in the US.

Second, the Fed inaugurated its policy of Quantitative Easing whereby it increased the size of its balance sheet five‐fold from $900 billion to $4,500 billion. Such an expansion would have been inconceivable to Fed watchers during the decades prior to the Global Financial Crisis. In the US, QE is now dormant, and the only remaining question (answered below) is how and when the Fed will shrink its bloated balance sheet back to more normal levels.

Third, the way in which the Fed conducts standard monetary policy (periodic changes in the funds rate) is currently undergoing a complete makeover. In particular, the traditional tool of changing the funds rate via Open Market operations carried out by the desk of the New York Fed no longer works. For as will be seen, the vast expansion of the size of its balance sheet (bank reserves in particular) has rendered traditional policy unworkable. From now on, therefore, the Fed will conduct monetary policy via two new tools that were not even on the drawing board of the Fed prior to 2008.

Summary: In this PROFILE, we explain in Part A why traditional (non‐QE) monetary policy has been vitiated by QE. In Parts B and C respectively, we discuss the two new tools that will be used in the future to conduct standard (non‐QE) monetary policy: what exactly are these tools, and how do they work? In Part D, we discuss why these new tools will not be required by the European Central Bank, which has a different institutional structure than the US Fed. Finally, in Part E, we turn to QE and discuss when and how the Fed will shrink its balance sheet back to a more traditional size in the years ahead.

In this write‐up, we largely rely on the remarks set forth in a recent paper by Fed Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer, formerly chief economist of the IMF, Governor of the Central Bank of Israel, and professor of economics at MIT. We also benefitted from clarifications by Professor Benjamin Friedman at Harvard University.

Part A: So Long to Setting the Funds Rate via Open Market Operations

Prior to the financial crisis, bank reserve balances with the Fed averaged about $25 billion. With such a low level of reserves, a level controlled solely by the Fed, minor variations in the amount of reserves via Fed open market sales/purchases of securities sufficed to move the Fed funds rate up or down as desired. Analytically, the market for bank reserves (Fed funds) consisted of a demand curve for bank reserves reflecting the nation’s demand for loans, and a supply curve reflecting the supply of reserves by the Fed.

The so‐called Fed funds rate is the point of intersection of these two curves (the interest rate). If the Fed targeted, say a 2% funds rate, it achieved and maintained this rate by shifting the supply curve left or right by adding to/subtracting from the quantity of reserves. As the Fed was a true monopolist in the creation/extinction of reserves, it could always target and sustain any funds rate it chose.

These operations constituted “monetary policy” for many decades. But this is no longer the case, as was first made clear in a FOMC policy pronouncement of September 2014. To quote Dr. Fischer in his 2015 speech, “With the nearly $3 trillion in free bank reserves (up from pre‐crisis reserves averaging $25 billion), the traditional mechanism of adjustments in the quantity of reserve balances to achieve the desired level of the Federal funds rate may not be feasible or sufficiently predictable.” What new mechanisms will replace it? There are two.

Part B: The Use of Interest Rates Paid by the Fed on Free Bank Reserves

“Instead of the funds rate, we will use the rate of interest paid on excess reserves as our primary tool to move the Fed funds rate.” The ability of the Fed to pay banks an interest rate on their free reserves dates back to legislation of October 2008. This rate has been set at 0.25% during the past few years. (“Excess” or “free” bank reserves are defined as the arithmetic difference between total reserves and required reserves. Currently, as of March 30, required reserves were $142 billion, and total reserves were $2.79 trillion.)

The Logic: Whatever the level of the reserve interest rate that the Fed chooses, banks will have little if any incentives to lend to any private counterparty at a rate lower than the rate they can earn on their free reserve balances maintained at the Fed. The higher the reserve remuneration rate is, the greater will be the upward pressure on a whole range of short‐term rates.

Part C: The Use of the Reverse Repo Rate

“Because not all institutions have access to the excess reserves interest rate set by the Fed, we will also utilize an overnight reverse repurchase purchase agreement facility, as needed. In a reverse repo operation, eligible counterparties may invest funds with the Fed overnight at a given interest rate. The reverse repo counterparties include 106 money market funds, 22 broker‐dealers, 24 depository institutions, and 12 government‐sponsored enterprises, including several Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac.”

The Logic: Fischer continues: “This facility should encourage these institutions to be unwilling to lend to private counterparties in money markets at a rate below that offered on overnight reverse repos by the Fed. Indeed, testing to date suggests that reverse repo operations have generally been successful in establishing a soft floor for money market interest rates.”

Summary

Due to the explosion of the size of its balance sheet (bank reserves in particular), the Fed has been forced to abandon management of the Fed funds rate via traditional open market operations. This activity is now being replaced by two new policy tools, both of which are somewhat “softer” than the older tool. First, bank’s free reserves now earn an interest rate on excess bank reserves which is available to banks with access to the Fed’s reserve facility. Second, financial institutions such as money market funds lacking access to the reserve facility will be able to lodge funds overnight (not necessarily merely one night) at the Fed and receive the reverse repo rate offered by the Fed.

Part D: Irrelevance of these Developments to the European Central Bank

Interestingly, the European Central Bank does not need and will probably not implement the policy innovations now being implemented by the US Fed. The reason is that in Europe, lending is dominated by banks far more than here in the US. Moreover, most all European financial institutions can in effect deposit funds with the central bank. Finally, the ECB has long been able to vary the reserve remuneration (interest) rate that it pays for excess reserves. As a result, the ECB does not need to utilize the reverse repo rate tool that the Fed is introducing.

One final point should be made. Whereas Professor Fischer above asserts that the primary tool of the Fed will be variations in the reserve remuneration rate applicable to banks, other scholars believe it is the reverse repo rate that will be the primary tool of US monetary policy. This is partly because of the ongoing reduction of the role of banks in lending to private sector borrowers, a longstanding development that has accelerated with the new regulations imposed on banks since the Global Financial Crisis.

Part E: Will the Fed Shrink its Balance Sheet Back Down? If So, How?

Professor Fischer answers this point directly. Yes, the Fed will shrink its balance sheet, but not to the size of yesteryear. More specifically:

“With regard to balance sheet normalization, the FOMC has indicated that it does not anticipate outright sales of agency mortgage‐backed securities, and that it plans to normalize the size of the balance sheet primarily by ceasing reinvestment of principal payments on our existing securities holdings when the time comes... Cumulative repayments of principal on our existing securities holdings from now through the end of 2025 are projected to be $3.2 trillion. As a result, when the FOMC chooses to cease reinvestments of principal, the size of the balance sheet will naturally decline, with a corresponding reduction in reserve balances.”

Hopefully these remarks have helped clarify past and future changes in Fed policy—changes that amount to a thoroughgoing transformation of US monetary policy that would have been unimaginable a decade ago.
In the future, we suspect that the press will refer to the Fed’s targeting of the “reverse repo rate” in place of the Federal funds rate when analyzing prospective monetary policy.

San Diego, Raleigh, Atlanta, New York, New Hampshire, and Vermont

I am excited about going to the 2015 Strategic Investment Conference on Tuesday. If for some reason you get there early on Wednesday, I intend to be in the gym at the hotel about 2:30, so come by and let’s work out together. Again, don’t forget to follow me on Twitter while I’m at the conference.

In the middle of May I go to Raleigh to speak for the Investment Institute and then on to Atlanta, where I’m on the board of Galectin Therapeutics. I’m going to New York the first week of June, then up to New Hampshire, where I will be speaking with a number of friends at a private retreat. I will then somehow get to Stowe, Vermont, to meet with my partners at Mauldin Economics. The rest of the summer looks pretty easy, with a few trips here and there.

Next week I intend to share my speech at the conference, or at least the gist of it. I have been thinking about it and working on it for some time. I had dinner this week with Mari Kooi, former fund manager who has become deeply imbedded with the Santa Fe Institute, an intellectual hotspot famous for its maverick scientists and interdisciplinary work on the science of complexity. Some of their people are working on something called complexity economics, which is an attempt to move on from the neoclassical view of general equilibrium.

If you wonder why the theories and models don’t work, it is because traditional economists are still busy trying to describe a vastly complex system by assuming away all the change except for that they believe they can control with the knobs they twist and pull. Their model of the economy resembles some vast Rube Goldberg machine where, if you put X money in here at Y rate, it will produce Z outcome over there.

Except that they don’t really know how the actions of the market will play out, since the market is made up of hundreds of millions of independent agents, all of whom change their behavior on the fly based on what the other agents are doing. Not to mention the effects of herding behavior and incentive structures and a dozen things beyond the ken or control of economists. There is only equilibrium in theory.

And that’s why it is becoming increasingly difficult to predict the future. The agents of change are multiplying and changing faster than we can keep up. But next week I will throw caution to the wind (unless I give up in despair), and we’ll see what my very cloudy crystal ball suggests lies in our future.

I am really looking forward to seeing old friends and making new ones at the conference. Have a great week.

Your trying to find simple in a complex world analyst,

John Mauldin

The article Thoughts from the Frontline: The Third and Final Transformation of Monetary Policy was originally published at mauldineconomics.com

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By John Mauldin

Two years ago, my friend Mohamed El-Erian and I were on the stage at my Strategic Investment Conference. Naturally we were discussing currencies in the global economy, and I asked him about currency wars. He smiled and said to me, “John, we don’t talk about currency wars in polite circles. More like currency disagreements” (or some word to that effect).

This week I note that he actually uses the words currency war in an essay he wrote for Project Syndicate:

Yet the benefits of the dollar’s rally are far from guaranteed, for both economic and financial reasons. While the US economy is more resilient and agile than its developed counterparts, it is not yet robust enough to be able to adjust smoothly to a significant shift in external demand to other countries. There is also the risk that, given the role of the ECB and the Bank of Japan in shaping their currencies’ performance, such a shift could be characterized as a “currency war” in the US Congress, prompting a retaliatory policy response.

This is a short treatise, but as usual with Mohamed’s writing, it’s very thought provoking. Definitely Outside the Box material.

And for a two-part Outside the Box I want to take the unusual step of including an op-ed piece that you might not have seen, from the Wall Street Journal, called “How to Distort Income Inequality,” by Phil Gramm and Michael Solon. They cite research I’ve seen elsewhere which shows that the work by Thomas Piketty cherry-picks data and ignores total income and especially how taxes distort the data. That is not to say that income inequality does not exist and that we should not be cognizant and concerned, but we need to plan policy based on a firm grasp of reality and not overreact because of some fantasy world created by social provocateur academicians.

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The calls for income redistribution from socialists and liberals based on Piketty’s work are clearly misguided and will further distort income inequality in ways that will only reduce total global productivity and growth.
I’m in New York today at an institutional fund manager conference where I had the privilege of hearing my good friend Ian Bremmer take us around the world on a geopolitical tour. Ian was refreshingly optimistic, or at least sanguine, about most of the world over the next few years. Lots of potential problems, of course, but he thinks everything should turn out fine – with the notable exception of Russia, where he is quite pessimistic.

A shirtless Vladimir Putin was the scariest thing on his geopolitical radar. As he spoke, Russia was clearly putting troops and arms into eastern Ukraine. Why would you do that if you didn’t intend to go further? Ian worried openly about Russia’s extending a land bridge all the way to Crimea and potentially even to Odessa, which is the heart of economic Ukraine, along with the Kiev region. It would basically make Ukraine ungovernable.

I thought Putin’s sadly grim and memorable line that “The United States is prepared to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian” pretty much sums up the potential for a US or NATO response. Putin agreed to a cease-fire and assumed that sanctions would start to be lifted. When there was no movement on sanctions, he pretty much went back to square one. He has clearly turned his economic attention towards China.

Both Ian Bremmer and Mohamed El Erian will be at my Strategic Investment Conference next year, which will again be in San Diego in the spring, April 28-30. Save the dates in your calendar as you do not want to miss what is setting up to be a very special conference. We will get more details to you soon.

It is a very pleasant day here in New York, and I was able to avoid taxis and put in about six miles of pleasant walking. (Sadly, it is supposed to turn cold tomorrow.) I’ve gotten used to getting around in cities and slipping into the flow of things, but there was a time when I felt like the country mouse coming to the city. As I walked past St. Bart’s today I was reminded of an occasion when your humble analyst nearly got himself in serious trouble.

There is a very pleasant little outdoor restaurant at St. Bartholomew’s Episcopal Church, across the street from the side entrance of the Waldorf-Astoria. It was a fabulous day in the spring, and I was having lunch with my good friend Barry Ritholtz. The president (George W.) was in town and staying at the Waldorf. His entourage pulled up and Barry pointed and said, “Look, there’s the president.”

We were at the edge of the restaurant, so I stood up to see if I could see George. The next thing I know, Barry’s hand is on my shoulder roughly pulling me back into my seat. “Sit down!” he barked. I was rather confused – what faux pas I had committed? Barry pointed to two rather menacing, dark-suited figures who were glaring at me from inside the restaurant.

“They were getting ready to shoot you, John! They had their hands inside their coats ready to pull guns. They thought you were going to do something to the president!”

This was New York not too long after 9/11. The memory is fresh even today. Now, I think I would know better than to stand up with the president coming out the side door across the street. But back then I was still just a country boy come to the big city.

Tomorrow night I will have dinner with Barry and Art Cashin and a few other friends at some restaurant which is supposedly famous for a mob shooting back in the day. Art will have stories, I am sure.
It is time to go sing for my supper, and I will try not to keep the guests from enjoying what promises to be a fabulous meal from celebrity chef Cyrille Allannic. After Ian’s speech, I think I will be nothing but sweetness and light, just a harmless economic entertainer. After all, what could possibly go really wrong with the global economy, when you’re being wined and dined at the top of New York? Have a great week.

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Boxsubscribers@mauldineconomics.com

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The Return of the Dollar

By Mohamed El-Erian
Project Syndicate, Nov. 13, 2014

The U.S. dollar is on the move. In the last four months alone, it has soared by more than 7% compared with a basket of more than a dozen global currencies, and by even more against the euro and the Japanese yen. This dollar rally, the result of genuine economic progress and divergent policy developments, could contribute to the “rebalancing” that has long eluded the world economy. But that outcome is far from guaranteed, especially given the related risks of financial instability.

Two major factors are currently working in the dollar’s favor, particularly compared to the euro and the yen. First, the United States is consistently outperforming Europe and Japan in terms of economic growth and dynamism – and will likely continue to do so – owing not only to its economic flexibility and entrepreneurial energy, but also to its more decisive policy action since the start of the global financial crisis.

Second, after a period of alignment, the monetary policies of these three large and systemically important economies are diverging, taking the world economy from a multi-speed trajectory to a multi-track one. Indeed, whereas the US Federal Reserve terminated its large-scale securities purchases, known as “quantitative easing” (QE), last month, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank recently announced the expansion of their monetary-stimulus programs. In fact, ECB President Mario Draghi signaled a willingness to expand his institution’s balance sheet by a massive €1 trillion ($1.25 trillion).

With higher US market interest rates attracting additional capital inflows and pushing the dollar even higher, the currency’s revaluation would appear to be just what the doctor ordered when it comes to catalyzing a long-awaited global rebalancing – one that promotes stronger growth and mitigates deflation risk in Europe and Japan. Specifically, an appreciating dollar improves the price competitiveness of European and Japanese companies in the US and other markets, while moderating some of the structural deflationary pressure in the lagging economies by causing import prices to rise.

Yet the benefits of the dollar’s rally are far from guaranteed, for both economic and financial reasons. While the US economy is more resilient and agile than its developed counterparts, it is not yet robust enough to be able to adjust smoothly to a significant shift in external demand to other countries. There is also the risk that, given the role of the ECB and the Bank of Japan in shaping their currencies’ performance, such a shift could be characterized as a “currency war” in the US Congress, prompting a retaliatory policy response.

Furthermore, sudden large currency moves tend to translate into financial-market instability. To be sure, this risk was more acute when a larger number of emerging-economy currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar, which meant that a significant shift in the dollar’s value would weaken other countries’ balance of payments position and erode their international reserves, thereby undermining their creditworthiness. Today, many of these countries have adopted more flexible exchange-rate regimes, and quite a few retain adequate reserve holdings.

But a new issue risks bringing about a similarly problematic outcome: By repeatedly repressing financial-market volatility over the last few years, central-bank policies have inadvertently encouraged excessive risk-taking, which has pushed many financial-asset prices higher than economic fundamentals warrant. To the extent that continued currency-market volatility spills over into other markets – and it will – the imperative for stronger economic fundamentals to validate asset prices will intensify.

This is not to say that the currency re-alignment that is currently underway is necessarily a problematic development; on the contrary, it has the potential to boost the global economy by supporting the recovery of some of its most challenged components. But the only way to take advantage of the re-alignment’s benefits, without experiencing serious economic disruptions and financial-market volatility, is to introduce complementary growth-enhancing policy adjustments, such as accelerating structural reforms, balancing aggregate demand, and reducing or eliminating debt overhangs.

After all, global growth, at its current level, is inadequate for mere redistribution among countries to work. Overall global GDP needs to increase.

The US dollar’s resurgence, while promising, is only a first step. It is up to governments to ensure that the ongoing currency re-alignment supports a balanced, stable, and sustainable economic recovery. Otherwise, they may find themselves again in the unpleasant business of mitigating financial instability.

How to Distort Income Inequality

By Phil Gramm and Michael Solon
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11, 2014

The Piketty-Saez data ignore changes in tax law and fail to count noncash compensation and Social Security benefits.

What the hockey-stick portrayal of global temperatures did in bringing a sense of crisis to the issue of global warming is now being replicated in the controversy over income inequality, thanks to a now-famous study by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, professors of economics at the Paris School of Economics and the University of California, Berkeley, respectively. Whether the issue is climate change or income inequality, however, problems with the underlying data significantly distort the debate.

The chosen starting point for the most-quoted part of the Piketty-Saez study is 1979. In that year the inflation rate was 13.3%, interest rates were 15.5% and the poverty rate was rising, but economic misery was distributed more equally than in any year since. That misery led to the election of Ronald Reagan, whose economic policies helped usher in 25 years of lower interest rates, lower inflation and high economic growth. But Messrs. Piketty and Saez tell us it was also a period where the rich got richer, the poor got poorer and only a relatively small number of Americans benefited from the economic booms of the Reagan and Clinton years.

If that dark picture doesn’t sound like the country you lived in, that’s because it isn’t. The Piketty-Saez study looked only at pretax cash market income. It did not take into account taxes. It left out noncash compensation such as employer-provided health insurance and pension contributions. It left out Social Security payments, Medicare and Medicaid benefits, and more than 100 other means-tested government programs. Realized capital gains were included, but not the first $500,000 from the sale of one’s home, which is tax-exempt. IRAs and 401(k)s were counted only when the money is taken out in retirement. Finally, the Piketty-Saez data are based on individual tax returns, which ignore, for any given household, the presence of multiple earners.

And now, thanks to a new study in the Southern Economic Journal, we know what the picture looks like when the missing data are filled in. Economists Philip Armour and Richard V. Burkhauser of Cornell University and Jeff Larrimore of Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation expanded the Piketty-Saez income measure using census data to account for all public and private in-kind benefits, taxes, Social Security payments and household size.

The result is dramatic. The bottom quintile of Americans experienced a 31% increase in income from 1979 to 2007 instead of a 33% decline that is found using a Piketty-Saez market-income measure alone. The income of the second quintile, often referred to as the working class, rose by 32%, not 0.7%. The income of the middle quintile, America’s middle class, increased by 37%, not 2.2%.

By omitting Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, the Piketty-Saez study renders most older Americans poor when in reality most have above-average incomes. The exclusion of benefits like employer-provided health insurance, retirement benefits (except when actually paid out in retirement) and capital gains on homes misses much of the income and wealth of middle- and upper-middle income families.

Messrs. Piketty and Saez also did not take into consideration the effect that tax policies have on how people report their incomes. This leads to major distortions. The bipartisan tax reform of 1986 lowered the highest personal tax rate to 28% from 50%, but the top corporate-tax rate was reduced only to 34%. There was, therefore, an incentive to restructure businesses from C-Corps to subchapter S corporations, limited liability corporations, partnerships and proprietorships, where the same income would now be taxed only once at a lower, personal rate. As businesses restructured, what had been corporate income poured into personal income-tax receipts.

So Messrs. Piketty and Saez report a 44% increase in the income earned by the top 1% in 1987 and 1988—though this change reflected how income was taxed, not how income had grown. This change in the structure of American businesses alone accounts for roughly one-third of what they portray as the growth in the income share earned by the top 1% of earners over the entire 1979-2012 period.

An equally extraordinary distortion in the data used to measure inequality (the Gini Coefficient) has been discovered by Cornell’s Mr. Burkhauser. In 1992 the Census Bureau changed the Current Population Survey to collect more in-depth data on high-income individuals. This change in survey technique alone, causing a one-time upward shift in the measured income of high-income individuals, is the source of almost 30% of the total growth of inequality in the U.S. since 1979.

Simple statistical errors in the data account for roughly one third of what is now claimed to be a “frightening” increase in income inequality. But the weakness of the case for redistribution does not end there. America is the freest and most dynamic society in history, and freedom and equality of outcome have never coexisted anywhere at any time. Here the innovator, the first mover, the talented and the persistent win out—producing large income inequality. The prizes are unequal because in our system consumers reward people for the value they add. Some can and do add extraordinary value, others can’t or don’t.

How exactly are we poorer because Bill Gates, Warren Buffett and the Walton family are so rich? Mr. Gates became rich by mainstreaming computer power into our lives and in the process made us better off. Mr. Buffett’s genius improves the efficiency of capital allocation and the whole economy benefits. Wal-Mart stretches our buying power and raises the living standards of millions of Americans, especially low-income earners. Rich people don’t “take” a large share of national income, they “bring” it. The beauty of our system is that everybody benefits from the value they bring.

Yes, income is 24% less equally distributed here than in the average of the other 34 member countries of the OECD. But OECD figures show that U.S. per capita GDP is 42% higher, household wealth is 210% higher and median disposable income is 42% higher. How many Americans would give up 42% of their income to see the rich get less?

Vast new fortunes were earned in the 25-year boom that began under Reagan and continued under Clinton. But the income of middle-class Americans rose significantly. These incomes have fallen during the Obama presidency, and not because the rich have gotten richer. They’ve fallen because bad federal policies have yielded the weakest recovery in the postwar history of America.

Yet even as the recovery continues to disappoint, the president increasingly turns to the politics of envy by demanding that the rich pay their “fair share.” The politics of envy may work here as it has worked so often in Latin America and Europe, but the economics of envy is failing in America as it has failed everywhere else.

Mr. Gramm, a former Republican senator from Texas, is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Solon was a budget adviser to Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell and is a partner of US Policy Metrics.

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Important Disclosures

The article Outside the Box: The Return of the Dollar was originally published at mauldineconomics.com.

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Mark Twain: History Doesn't Repeat itself....But it Does Rhyme. Gold, Vanderbilt and more

By John Mauldin

“The significant problems that we have created cannot be solved at the level of thinking we were at when we created them.”– Albert Einstein

“Generals are notorious for their tendency to ‘fight the last war’ – by using the strategies and tactics of the past to achieve victory in the present. Indeed, we all do this to some extent. Life's lessons are hard won, and we like to apply them – even when they don't apply. Sadly enough, fighting the last war is often a losing proposition. Conditions change. Objectives change. Strategies change. And you must change. If you don't, you lose.”– Dr. G. Terry Madonna and Dr. Michael Young

“Markets are perpetuating a serious error by acting on the belief that central bankers actually know what they are doing. They do not. Not because they are ill-intentioned but because they are human and subject to the limitations that apply to all human endeavors. If you want proof of their fallibility, simply look at their economic forecasts. Despite their efforts to do so, central banks can’t repeal the business cycle (though they can distort it). While the 2008 financial crisis should have taught them that lesson, it appears to have led them to precisely the opposite conclusion.

“There are limits to knowledge in every field, including the hard sciences, and economics is not a hard science; it is a social science whose knowledge is imprecise, and practitioners’ ability to predict the future is extremely limited. Fed officials are attempting to guide an extremely complex economy with tools of questionable utility, and markets are ignoring their warnings that their ability to manage a positive outcome is highly uncertain. Markets are confusing what they want to happen with what is likely to happen, a common psychological phenomenon. Investors who prosper in the long run will be those who acknowledge the severe limits of economic knowledge and the compelling evidence that trillions of dollars of QE and years of zero interest rates may have saved the system from immediate collapse five years ago but failed to produce sustained economic growth or long-term price stability.”– Michael Lewitt, The Credit Strategist, Nov. 1, 2014

As I predicted months ago in this letter and last year in Code Red, the Japanese have launched another missile in their ongoing currency war, somewhat fittingly on Halloween. Rather than being spooked, the markets saw it as just another round of feel good quantitative easing and climbed to all-time highs on the Dow and S&P 500. The Nikkei soared even more (for good reason). As we will see later in this letter, this is not your father’s quantitative easing. The Japanese, for reasons of their own, will intervene not only in their own equity markets but in foreign equity markets as well, and do so in a size and manner that will be significant. This gambit is going to have ramifications far beyond merely weakening the yen. In this week’s letter we are going to take an in depth look at what the Japanese have done.

It is something of a cliché to quote Mark Twain’s “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” But it is an appropriate way to kick things off, since we are going to look at the “ancient” history of Mark Twain’s era, and specifically the Panic of 1873. That October saw the beginning of 65 months of recession (certainly longer than our generation’s own Great Recession), which inflicted massive pain on the country. The initial cause was government monetary intervention, but the crisis was deepened by soaring debt and deflation.
As we seek to understand what happened 141 years ago, we’ll revisit the phenomenon of October as a month of negative market surprises. It actually has its roots in the interplay between farming and banking.

The Panic of 1873

Shortly after the Civil War, which saw the enactment of federal fiat money (the “greenback” of that era, issued to finance the war), there was a federal law passed that required rural and agricultural banks to keep 25% of their deposits with certain certified national banks, which were based mainly in New York. The national banks were required to pay interest on those deposits, so they had to put the money out for loans. But because those deposits were “callable” at any time, there was a limit to the types of loans they could do, as long-term loans mismatched assets and liabilities.

The brokers of the New York Stock Exchange were considered an excellent target for such loans. They could use the proceeds of the loans as margin to buy stocks, either for their own trading or on behalf of their clients. As long as the stocks went up – or at the very least as long as the ultimate clients were liquid – there wasn’t a problem for the national banks. Money could be repatriated; or, if necessary, margins could be called in a day. But this was before the era of a central bank, so actual physical dollars (and other physical instruments) were involved as reserves, as was gold. Greenbacks could be used to buy gold, but at a rate that floated. The price of gold could fluctuate significantly from year to year, depending upon the availability of gold and the supply of greenbacks (and of course, market sentiment – which certainly rhymes with our own time).

The driver for October volatility was an annual cycle, an ebb and flow of dollars to and from these rural banks. In the fall when the harvest was ready, the country banks would recall their margin loans in order to pay farmers or loan to merchants to buy crops from farmers and ship them via the railroads. Money would then become tight on Wall Street as the national banks called their loans back in.

This cycle often caused extra volatility, depending on the shortness of loan capital. Margin rates could rise to as much as 1% per day! Of course, this would force speculators to sell their stocks or cover their shorts, but in general it could drive down prices and make margin calls more likely. This monetary tightening often sent stocks into a downward spiral – not unlike the downward pressure that present-day Fed tightening actions have exerted, but in a compressed period of time.

If there was enough leverage in the system, a cascade could result, with stocks dropping 20% very quickly. Since much of Wall Street was involved in railroads, and railroads were nothing if not leveraged loans and capital, falling asset prices would reduce the ability of investors in railroads to find the necessary capital for expansion and maintenance of operations.

This historical pattern no longer explains the present-day vulnerability of markets in October. Perhaps the phenomenon persists simply due to market lore and investor psychology. Like an amputee feeling a twinge in his lost limb, do we still sense the ghosts of crashes past?

(And once more with Mark Twain: “October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to speculate in stocks. The others are July, January, September, April, November, May, March, June, December, August, and February.”)

It was in this fall environment that a young Jay Gould decided to manipulate the gold market in the autumn of 1873, creating a further squeeze on the dollar. Not only would he profit off a play in gold, but he thought the move would help him in his quest to take control of the Erie Railroad. Historian Charles R. Morris explains, in a fascinating book called The Tycoons

Gould’s mind ran in labyrinthine channels, and he turned to the gold markets as part of a strategy to improve Erie’s freights. Grain was America’s largest export in 1869. Merchants purchased grain from farmers on credit, shipped it overseas, and paid off the farmers when they received their remittances from abroad. Their debt to the farmers was in greenbacks, but their receipts from abroad came in gold, for the greenback was not legal tender overseas. It could take weeks, or even months, to complete a transaction, so the merchant was exposed to changes in the gold/greenback exchange rate during that time. If gold fell (or the greenback rose), the merchant’s gold proceeds might not cover his greenback debts.

The New York Gold Exchange was created to help merchants protect against that risk. Using the Exchange, a merchant could borrow gold when he made his contract, convert it to greenbacks, and pay off his suppliers right away. Then he would pay off the gold loan when his gold payment came in some weeks later; since it was gold for gold, exchange rates didn’t matter. To protect against default, the Exchange required full cash collateral to borrow gold. But that was an opening for speculations by clever traders like Gould. If a trader bought gold and then immediately lent it, he could finance his purchase with the cash collateral and thereby acquire large positions while using very little of his own cash.

[Note from JM: In the fall there was plenty of demand for gold and a shortage of greenbacks. It was the perfect time if you wanted to create a “corner” on gold.]

Gould reasoned that if he could force up the price of gold, he might improve the Erie’s freight revenues. If gold bought more greenbacks, greenback-priced wheat would look cheaper to overseas buyers, so exports, and freights, would rise. And because of the fledgling status of the new Gold Exchange, gold prices looked eminently manipulable, since only about $20 million in gold was usually available in New York. [Some of his partners in the conspiracy were skeptical because…] The Grant administration, which had just taken office in March, was sitting on $100 million in gold reserves. If gold started suddenly rising, it would hurt merchant importers, who could be expected to clamor for government gold sales.

So Gould went to President Grant’s brother-in-law, Abel Corbin, who liked to brag about his family influence. He set up a meeting with President Grant, at which Gould learned that Grant was cautious about any significant movements in either the gold or the greenback, noting the “fictitiousness about the prosperity of the country and that the bubble might be tapped in one way as well as another.” That was discouraging: popping a bubble meant tighter money and lower gold.

But Gould plunged ahead with his gold buying, including rather sizable amounts for Corbin’s wife (Grant’s wife’s sister), such that each one-dollar rise in gold would generate $11,000 in profits. Corbin arranged further meetings with Grant and discouraged him from selling gold all throughout September.

Gould and his partners initiated a “corner” in the gold market. This was actually legal at the time, and the NY gold market was relatively small compared to the amount of capital it was possible for a large, well-organized cabal to command. True corners were devastating to bears, as they generally borrowed shares or gold to sell short, betting on the fall in price. Just as today, if the price falls too much, then the short seller can buy the stock back and take his losses. But if there is no stock to buy back, if someone has cornered the market, then losses can be severe. Which of course is what today we call a short squeeze.

The short position grew to some $200 million, most of it owed to Gould and his friends. But there was only $20 million worth of gold available to cover the short sales. That gold stock had been borrowed and borrowed and borrowed again. The price of gold rose as Gould’s cabal kept pressing their bet.

But Grant got wind of the move. His wife wrote her sister, demanding to know if the rumor of their involvement was true. Corbin panicked and told Gould he wanted out, with his $100,000+ of profits, of course. Gould promised him his profits if he would just keep quiet.

Then Gould began to unload all his gold positions, even as some of his partners kept right on buying. You have to keep up pretenses, of course. Gould was telling his partners to push the price up to 160, while he was selling through another set of partners.

It is a small irony that Gould also had a contact in the government in Washington (a Mr. Butterfield) who assured him that there was no move to sell gold from DC, even as that contact was personally selling all his gold as fast as he could. Whatever bad you could say about Gould (and there were lots of bad things you could say), his trading instincts were good. He sensed his contact was lying and doubled down on getting out of the trade. In the end, Gould didn’t make any money to speak of and in fact damaged his intention of getting control of the Erie Railroad that fall.

The attempted gold corner didn’t do much harm to the country in and of itself. But when President Grant decided to step in and sell gold, there was massive buying, which sucked a significant quantity of physical dollars out of the market and into the US Treasury at a time when dollars were short. This move was a clumsy precursor to the open-market operations of the Federal Reserve of today, except that those dollars were needed as margin collateral by brokerage companies. No less than 14 New York Stock Exchange brokerages went bankrupt within a few days, not including brokerages that dealt just in gold.

All this happened in the fall, when there were fewer physical dollars to be had.

The price of gold collapsed. Cornelius Vanderbilt, who was often at odds with Jay Gould, had to step into the market (literally – that is, physically, which was rare for him) in order to quell the panic and provide capital, a precursor to J.P. Morgan’s doing the same during the Panic of 1907.

While many today believe the Fed should never have been created, we have not lived through those periods of panics and crashes. And while I think the Fed now acts in ways that are inappropriate (how can 12 FOMC board members purport to fine-tune an economic cycle, let alone solve employment problems?), the one true and proper role of the Fed is to provide liquidity in time of a crisis.

“People Who Live Too Much on Credit”

At the end of the day, it was too much debt that was the problem in 1873. Cornelius Vanderbilt was quoted in the epic book The First Tycoon as saying (emphasis mine)

I’ll tell you what’s the matter – people undertake to do about four times as much business as they can legitimately undertake.… There are a great many worthless railroads started in this country without any means to carry them through. Respectable banking houses in New York, so called, make themselves agents for sale of the bonds of the railroads in question and give a kind of moral guarantee of their genuineness. The bonds soon reach Europe, and the markets of their commercial centres, from the character of the endorsers, are soon flooded with them.… When I have some money I buy railroad stock or something else, but I don’t buy on credit. I pay for what I get. People who live too much on credit generally get brought up with a round turn in the long run. The Wall Street averages ruin many a man there, and is like faro.”

In the wake of Gould’s shenanigans, President Grant came to New York to assess the damage; and eventually his Secretary of the Treasury decided to buy $30 million of bonds in a less clumsy precursor to Federal Reserve open market operations, trying to inject some liquidity back into the markets. This was done largely as a consequence of a conversation with Vanderbilt, who offered to put up $10 million of his own, a vast sum at the time.

But the damage was done. The problem of liquidity was created by too much debt, as Vanderbilt noted. That debt inflated assets, and when those assets fell in price, so did the net worth of the borrowers. Far too much debt had to be worked off, and the asset price crash precipitated a rather deep depression, leaving in its wake far greater devastation than the recent Great Recession did. It took many years for the deleveraging process to work out. Sound familiar?

To continue reading this article from Thoughts from the Frontline – a free weekly publication by John Mauldin, renowned financial expert, best-selling author, and Chairman of Mauldin Economics – please click here.

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The article Thoughts from the Frontline: Rhyme and Reason was originally published at mauldin economics

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