By John Mauldin

Today’s Outside the Box is from my good friend George Friedman of Geopolitical Futures. George, who founded the well known Stratfor, is one of the world’s top geopolitical forecasters. I’m very excited to welcome him as a Contributing Editor for Mauldin Economics.

Starting today and every Monday, we’ll publish a regular feature from George called This Week in Geopolitics. In this weekly letter written for Mauldin Economics, George will highlight the top international events that investors and those with an interest in geopolitics should monitor. I am amazed by how quickly George slices through the media’s superficial stories to reveal what is really important.

What you read in This Week in Geopolitics will be a small sample of the research George and his team publish. His Geopolitical Futures premium service is off to a great start and I highly recommend you try it. We have a special offer for Mauldin Economics readers. Click here for details.

As a reminder, I interviewed George in last week’s Thoughts from the Frontline. He had some fascinating thoughts on the connection between politics and economics, the European refugee crisis, China’s economic future and more. Click here to read it.

Today he examines the origins of ISIS and looks at why they see their behavior as rational. It is a disturbing viewpoint, and not one that will make us comfortable, but we do need to understand this. And it highlights the almost no-win position that the United States and the rest of the world (specifically the Middle East) is in.
In order to make sure this gets out Monday evening, I need to go ahead and hit the send button without further comment so…. with that, let’s go straight to George’s first weekly contribution.

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Origins and Strategy of the Islamic State

By George Friedman for Mauldin Economics
Al-Qaida struck the United States on September 11, 2001 in order to pave the way for the caliphate, a multinational Islamic state governed by a caliph. From Osama Bin Laden’s point of view, the Christian world—as he thought of Euro-American civilization—had made a shambles of the Muslim world. Most Muslim lands had been occupied or controlled by Christians. After World War I the British and French, in particular, had reshaped these lands to suit them. They invented new countries that had never existed before like Jordan, Lebanon, and (in their minds) Israel and installed rulers on others, such as the Saudis in the Arabian Peninsula.

After World War II, the United States inherited a world the British had largely created. Where the British were the architects of this world, the Americans became its maintenance men. Since the Americans were caught up in a Cold War with the Soviets, the Soviets sought to create pro-Soviets as well. A new wave of rulers arose under Soviet tutelage. These were secularists, socialists, and militarists imposing military regimes.

Men like Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Hafez al-Assad in Syria were all Soviet allies. They were despised by Islamists, as were the monarchies allied with the Americans. The secular Arab rulers were simply apostates. The monarchies, like Saudi Arabia, were corrupt hypocrites—formally Muslim but clinging to the Christians (now the Americans) for power and safety.

Al-Qaida did not yet exist, but there were those who dreamed of reclaiming the lands, expelling the apostates and hypocrites, and creating the caliphate. These men had learned the art of war under American tutelage in Pakistani camps after being recruited by the Saudis. They believed they had destroyed the Soviets and, as a result, destroyed the Soviet Union. True or not, this is what they believed.

When the Soviet Union fell, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Saudis asked the American Christians to save them. Men who had fought in Afghanistan held the Saudis in contempt and were enraged by the Americans. To a great extent, the Americans were unaware of the response. The men they had trained for war in Afghanistan now saw the Americans as an obstacle to the caliphate.

This is the soil that gave rise to al-Qaida. Al-Qaida’s primary goal was to overthrow one of the secular or hypocritical regimes, create a Sharia-based caliphate, and use it as a base for creating a broader, transnational entity. Al-Qaida actually means “the base” in Arabic. It had excellent relations in Afghanistan, given the role it played there, but Afghanistan was too backward and geographically isolated to be the caliphate’s capital. It instead became the base where al-Qaida would begin the war.

In al-Qaida’s analysis, the weak and corrupt Islamic regimes could be overthrown, but the Muslim masses were inert, beaten into submission by Europeans and Americans, and convinced of American invincibility. They had no love for the Americans outside of some of the regimes, but saw their cause to be hopeless.

Al-Qaida needed to convince the masses that America was both vulnerable and hostile to Islam. It sought to strike the United States in a way that the Muslim world would take startled note, and that would compel America to go to war in the Muslim world. Al-Qaida’s experience in Afghanistan convinced it that the United States, caught in a war of attrition regardless of casualties, would eventually withdraw. The September 2001 attacks were meant to draw the Americans into combat but, even more, to convince the Muslim world that Muslims could strike at the heart of America, and then, when the Americans invaded, encourage Muslims to rise up in a long war America couldn’t win.

Part of the strategy worked, part of it didn’t. The attacks did galvanize the Muslim world. The United States showed itself to be Islam’s enemy by invading Afghanistan and later Iraq. The Muslim world saw that Muslims could fight Americans and not suffer defeat like the Jews had defeated the apostate Nasser’s army in 1967.

What did not happen was the essential step. While war raged in Afghanistan and Iraq, there was no uprising elsewhere in the Islamic world. When there were uprisings, as during the Arab Spring, they were put down (Egypt) or left in unending civil war (Syria and Libya). There was no foundation created for the caliphate, and over time American intelligence whittled down al-Qaida.

Others stepped into the vacuum as al-Qaida declined. Their opening occurred in Iraq and Syria. The Arab Spring in 2011 created an uprising against Bashar al-Assad, son of Hafez. Like much of the Arab Spring, the public faces of the protests were secular liberals, but they were unable to overthrow Assad. The resulting chaos and stalemate opened one door to al-Qaida’s heir.

At the same time, the U.S. decision to withdraw from Iraq, first made by George W. Bush and accelerated by Barack Obama, allowed a Shiite government to take power there. This forced their enemies, the Sunnis, back against the wall. Al-Qaida was Sunni and regarded Shiite Iran as an enemy. The rise of a Shiite government in Baghdad left the Iraqi Sunnis nowhere to go. It was out of this that the Islamic State arose. Syria and especially Iraq were its recruiting office and its battle ground.

Al-Qaida wanted an uprising in an existing country, but IS had a different strategy. Rather than overthrowing an existing government, it decided to create the state in a region that paid no attention to existing borders. Its goal, unlike al-Qaida’s, was to hold territory in which the caliph could rule and from which it could expand and guide the caliphate’s extension into noncontiguous Muslim lands.

The IS goal, therefore, was not to strike at the Americans as al-Qaida did. The 9/11 strikes had done their work. Their job was to create an area ruled under Sharia law with a governmental structure, financial system, welfare system, and the other things a state needs. In addition, and before this, IS had to create a military force that could take and seize land against the weak opposition it would face in Iraq and Syria.

The first step in the Islamic State’s strategy, therefore, was to put the caliphate before everything by taking control of substantial and contiguous territory. IS did this by carrying out a series of extremely competent military operations, seizing Mosul and Ramadi in Iraq as well as Palmyra in Syria. The result was a new state, no less artificial than those countries the British and French created after World War I, and governed from the capital in Raqqa.

In carrying out this operation, IS deliberately created a series of highly publicized atrocities. There were two reasons for this. The first was to intimidate the new Islamic State’s population. This region consisted of a wide variety of groups, many potentially hostile to the new state. The ruthless acts served to make clear to the population that IS was not merely claiming control of the region, but was in sufficient control that it was indifferent to what the outside world thought.

Having fought the Americans, IS knew that apart from special operations teams (the principle threat to IS in both Afghanistan and Iraq) which could not by themselves threaten the existence of IS, the United States took months to deploy forces. IS needed to show not only how ruthless it was, but that it would not be challenged as a result.

The second reason for creating this core was to lure the Americans into attacking it. The United States had grown wary of occupation warfare that required deploying a military force against scattered and persistent guerilla operations.

The Islamic State presented, and was, precisely the type of force the United States should be comfortable attacking. First, it occupied a clearly defined territory. Second, it contained a conventional military force. IS was not a guerilla organization or terrorist group, although it had elements capable of both kinds of operations.

The size of IS’ main military force (a force large enough to seize, occupy, and defend an area as large as some countries in the region) meant it could not be a guerrilla force. It appeared to be a mobile infantry force, moving by foot and truck, armed with infantry weapons as well as some small artillery and anti-tank weapons.

The exact size of IS forces remains a mystery, and that is a testament to its skills at camouflaging its activities from the ground to the electromagnetic sphere. Estimates of the size of its armed and trained force range from 20,000 to 200,000. Based on the extent of its frontiers and the casualties it seems to have taken, I estimate the force at about 100,000.

This, of course, leaves another mystery: where this force was trained—since training even 20,000 is a conspicuous activity. Units must train together to be effective. There are many mysteries about IS for which there is no consensus save educated guesses. We know the extent of its power. We know when this frontier is attacked, the attacker tends to encounter resistance. Beyond that, IS has protected its capabilities professionally.

Given all this, it would appear to be ripe for attack by American forces, which excel at this kind of warfare. That is precisely what IS wants. There has been much talk about IS believing that an apocalyptic battle must take place in order to establish the caliphate. This is a metaphysical concept on which I have no opinion.

However, from a political and military point of view, the caliphate must be founded on a decisive battle that forces capitulation from its main enemy. This would convince the US to respect the caliphate and the caliphate’s citizens to respect the power of the state. By this I don’t mean the guerrilla wars in which the conventional force simply withdraws; I mean a battle in which the enemy is defeated in detail.

The Americans prefer conventional attacks with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. IS engaged and destroyed a Syrian armored brigade with anti-tank weapons. The United States uses air strikes and helicopters. IS may have man-portable surface-to-air missiles (and should have them from whatever source it secured the anti-tank missiles).

IS has a major advantage in one thing: the US is casualty averse. The US has a force operating at a distance for reasons that impact national security but don’t pose a direct threat to the homeland. Therefore, the American appetite for more serious military intervention is extremely limited. IS needs a decisive battle at any cost. Weapons aside, the outcome of this battle matters far more to IS than to the United States, and therefore IS’ threshold for pain is far higher.

The caliphate, having been established, must now be defended. It must be a territory and not a hideout, it must be coherent and not scattered tracts, and it must be defensible regardless of the cost. Having established its frontiers, the Islamic State intends to use minimal force to defend against minor attacks, as the Syrian Kurds carried out recently.

Most impressive about IS is its ability to retreat, regroup, and strike elsewhere. That is the measure of a military force. For example, the Americans proved themselves at the Battle of the Bulge when having been sent reeling, they regrouped, reinforced and struck back. It is in defeat that I judge a military force, and IS has handled defeat well. But we should also remember that IS will not waste force on marginal threats.

For IS, the main threat will come from the Americans and therefore it must preserve the ability to fight U.S. forces. Some point out that IS has been under pressure from all sides. This is because its leaders understand the maxim that he who defends everything defends nothing.

But the Americans have not come. Nor have other enemies like the Iranians or Israelis. Nor for that matter have the Turks. No one wishes to engage IS while it is on the defensive and at its best. There are many reasons, but the heart of the matter is that the battle, if lost, would be devastating for Americans, and if won by them opens the door to occupation warfare, as did the defeat of the Iraqi army in 2003.

IS must hold to save the caliphate now or, if it loses this battle, wait and fight another. And if the Americans don’t come and IS holds its territory, then IS can choose the time and place for its next strategic offensive.

Assuming that IS has 100,000 troops, the US must bring a force of 300,000 to bear under the old (and perhaps obsolete) rule of 3 to 1 on the offensive. It took six months to prepare for Desert Storm and longer for Iraqi Freedom with far fewer troops than 300,000. The terrain is desert, and supply lines will run from ports that have to be secured, along with roads that could be filled with IEDs. For the Americans, the logistics would be as tough as the battle.

Logically, the best course for the United States is not to engage. IS is beginning to realize this and seemingly prefers to force a battle. That is why we are beginning to see terrorist actions flaring in Western countries. The lesson al-Qaida taught IS is that the Americans have a threshold and that if you cross it, they will react dramatically.

Therefore, it appears to me that IS is searching for that threshold and probing to see responses. Attacks like the ones in Paris last month were not in response to French involvement in the region. These attacks are unconnected to that, but are designed to be as terrifying as possible—both in their suddenness and brutality—and compel a response.

It is odd to argue that someone wants to be attacked by the US. But IS needs the attack and also believes it can at least survive and likely defeat the Americans. It is clear that other countries in the region are steering clear of IS, and it is clear that President Obama is doing everything he can not to engage IS on the ground.

And it is clear that IS is doing what it can to drag the Americans deeper into the conflict. If the Americans don’t come, and no one else comes, the psychological demonstration might not take place - but the caliphate will exist. On the whole, IS has the strategic advantage in multiple ways. It behaves in its territory as if it intends to stay a long time.

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The article Outside the Box: Origins and Strategy of the Islamic State was originally published at mauldineconomics.com.

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When China Stopped Acting Chinese

By John Mauldin

“The one thing I know for sure about China is, I will never know China. It's too big, too old, too diverse, too deep. There's simply not enough time.”

– Anthony Bourdain, Parts Unknown

Much of the world is focused on what is happening in Greece and Europe. A lot of people are paying attention to the Middle East and geopolitics. These are significant concerns, for sure; but what has been happening in China the past few months has more far reaching global investment implications than Europe or the Middle East do. Most people are aware of the amazing run up in the Shanghai stock index and the recent “crash.” The government intervened and for a time has halted the rapid drop in the markets.

There have been a number of concerns about what this means for the Chinese economy. Is China getting ready to implode? Certainly there are those who have been predicting that outcome for some time. In this week’s letter I am going to try to explain both what caused the Chinese stock market to rise so precipitously and then fall just as fast and why we have to view China’s stock market differently from its economy.

As I have been saying for several years, in order for the Chinese economy to continue to grow, the Chinese must shift their emphasis from industrial production and infrastructure investment to a services oriented economy. That is indeed what they are trying to do, and we are beginning to see signs of the services sector taking on a role as important to the Chinese economy as services are to the US economy. They have a long way to go, but they have begun the trip.

A Transformation Like No Other

When the US stock market crashed in October 1987, commentators on that era’s primitive financial media (I recall seeing them on the large wooden box in my living room) rushed to distinguish between the country’s economy and its stock market.

The American economy, they said, is just fine. Life will go on, and businesses will make money. As it turned out, that was good analysis – and it still is today – and not just for the United States. Stock markets do reflect the economy over time, but they can lead it or lag it for years.

Anyone who owns China stocks has probably sought solace in such thinking the last few weeks. The Chinese stock bubble is deflating in spectacular fashion. The sharp decline and Beijing’s flailing efforts to stabilize the market have many economists seeing deeper trouble.

We’ll compare and contrast the Chinese stock market and economy by looking at an unusual but very reliable data source. With apologies to Anthony Bourdain, whom I quoted at the beginning of the letter, we can know China. We just have to ask the right people the right questions.

Back in 1987, as American investors were licking their wounds, the Shanghai skyline looked like this:

Here is a 2013 view from the same spot:

Photo credit: Carlos Barria, Reuters

A lot can change in 26 years. Transformations like this are commonplace in China. Gleaming cities now tower over what was undeveloped land a decade or two ago. Most of those cities even have people living in them, although the ghost cities are legendary.

You can crunch any numbers you like in any way you like, and it will be clear that China’s rapid growth is unprecedented. It is changing the course of human history. China has moved more than 250 million people from living a medieval lifestyle in the country to living and working in these fabulous new cities. And they have built the infrastructure to connect and supply them.

Worth Wray and I explored China from many different perspectives in our e-book, A Great Leap Forward? Our all-star cast of China experts variously see both opportunity and risk. The book is getting rave reviews. If you’re interested in an in-depth analysis of China, it’s the place to start (Click here for more information and to order the book.)

In thinking about China last week, I skimmed through the book and noticed something that, with the benefit of hindsight, is simply stunning. The paragraphs I read brought all the pieces together to explain the Chinese stock market’s epic drawdown.

China GDP Versus China Beige Book

The part that made me sit up straight was in the contribution by Leland Miller of China Beige Book. His chapter “How Private Data Can Demystify the Chinese Economy” comes at the Chinese economy from a unique angle.

We all know government economic data isn’t always reliable. That is especially true in China. It is the only country in the world that can report its GDP quarter after quarter and never have to revise its calculations. That is just the most obvious of its economic data manipulations.

Even knowing that, most China analysts still rely on that GDP number, because it is all they have. That is beginning to change because of the work of Leland Miller. Leland, along with his colleague Craig Charney, decided to build an alternative analysis to government GDP numbers. Using the same methodology that the Federal Reserve uses in its quarterly Beige Book, they gather data from a network of observers all over China. Their clients – who include the world’s largest central banks – provide granular data that gives a much deeper view of the Chinese economy.

In A Great Leap Forward? [get it here on Amazon] Leland describes how China Beige Book picked up on a major change in Chinese businesses. He says the country’s 2014 slowdown was different.

The slowdown of 2013 was the result of subtle credit tightening, few signs of which were evident in official data right up until the June interbank credit crunch caused a market panic. Small and medium-sized companies during that period still wanted to access credit but found – TSF data notwithstanding – that it was difficult if not impossible to do so. 2014, intriguingly, has proven to be a very different story.

One of the most interesting dynamics we’ve tracked across corporate China has been the historical disconnect between company performance and the willingness of those companies to continue to borrow and spend. In many sectors, particularly troubled ones such as mining and property, firms typically reacted to poor results in a peculiarly Chinese way: they doubled down.

Too often, the thinking appeared to be: good results were good, but bad results were not necessarily bad, because the government was expected to step in and bail them out. Perhaps with subsidies, perhaps by ordering loans to be rolled over to another day. Firms often chose to act in demonstrably non-commercial ways.

Since early 2014, however, our data suggest a startling transformation. During the second quarter, CBB data showed a particularly broad deceleration in revenue growth nationwide: for the first time in our survey, not one sector showed on quarter improvement. Yet firms reacted to this slowdown in a surprisingly rational way: capital expenditure growth fell broadly, as did capex expectations, as did loan demand – all to the lowest levels in the history of our survey. The third quarter then showed yet another quarter of weak loan demand, with even lower levels of current and expected capex.

Firms watching the economic slowdown didn’t want to spend – and they didn’t want to borrow either. For the time being, they preferred to watch events unfold from the sidelines.

Leland says, and I agree, that this was a positive development. Both businesses and investors need the discipline of free markets. Experiencing failure forces everyone to learn what works and what doesn’t work.

In a phone call this week, Leland told me their data actually pinpointed this change in the second quarter of 2014. He thinks it was the most important single quarter in Chinese economic history. I’m sure that Leland, as an Oxford educated China historian, doesn’t say that lightly. It was in that quarter, Leland thinks, that Chinese business leaders “stopped acting Chinese.” Faced with falling demand, they did the rational thing and stopped adding new capacity. As he says in the excerpt above, they didn’t want to spend or borrow.

They just sat on the sidelines. That was a good business decision. Unfortunately, it wasn’t consistent with Beijing’s master plan.

To continue reading this article from Thoughts from the Frontline – a free weekly publication by John Mauldin, renowned financial expert, best selling author, and Chairman of Mauldin Economics – please click here.

The article Thoughts from the Frontline: When China Stopped Acting Chinese was originally published at mauldineconomics.com.

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Commodity Market Summary for Week Ending Friday October 17th - Crude Oil, Gold, U.S. Dollar, Coffee and More

Our trading partner Mike Seery brings us his take on this volatile commodities market, read in detail as Mike includes his stops and so much more......

Crude oil futures in the November contract had a wild trading week in New York currently trading at $83 a barrel after settling last Friday at 85.82 as prices actually breached the $80 mark before reversing in yesterday’s trade to settle down nearly $3 for the trading week. Crude oil futures are trading below their 20 day and $13 below their 100 day moving average telling you the trend is clearly bearish and if you are short this market place your stop above the 10 day high which currently stands at 90.75 and that stop will be lowered on a daily basis as I missed this market and am currently sitting on the sidelines as the chart structure was awful when the breakout occurred so I’m kicking myself at the current time.

I definitely am not recommending any type of long position in crude oil as I think prices will continue to head lower especially with Saudi Arabia coming out stating that they will not cut production as they are looking for lower prices to squeeze U.S output as this market still has further to go in my opinion and 79.78 in yesterday’s trade will be retested once again so continue to take advantage of any rally making sure you place the proper stop loss also maintaining a proper risk management of 2% of your account balance on any given trade. Crude oil prices have dropped from $104 a barrel in late June to today’s price levels dropping over $20 or 20% as consumers will definitely benefit when they hit their local gas stations and that should also help improve the U.S economy.

The fundamentals in crude oil are extremely bearish as worldwide supplies are extremely high while supplies here in the United States are at record highs so it’s very difficult to rally as we don’t have the spike up in price like we used to when Middle East conflicts erupted which is a good thing for the United States. TREND: LOWER
CHART STRUCTURE: POOR

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Gold futures in the December contract had a volatile trading week in New York still trading above its 20 day but below its 100 day moving average telling you that the trend currently is mixed as prices hit a 4 week high in Wednesday’s trade at 1,250 however we are down about $3 this Friday afternoon currently trading at 1,239 as the trend still remains neutral as I’m sitting on the sidelines. A possible spike bottom was created around the 1,185 level as I was short this market from around 1,278 getting stopped out at the 2 week high around 1,235 so right now I’m waiting for a better chart pattern to develop as the chart structure is somewhat poor at the current time as the U.S dollar has been pressuring gold in recent weeks but the dollar looks like its created a short term top as well.

The problem I have with gold at the current time is with all worldwide problems and the stock market experiencing huge volatility this week gold prices should be sharply higher from today’s prices levels so this tells me that this market remains weak and if you think a top has been created at 1,250 sell at today’s price of 1,239 risking $11 or $1,100 per contract, however like I’ve stated before I am sitting on the sidelines waiting for a trend to develop. At the current time many of the commodity markets are experiencing very few trends and as a commodity trader you do not want to trade just too trade so you must have patience as at the current time there have not been any new breakouts in several weeks except for a select few.
TREND: MIXED
CHART STRUCTURE: POOR

The U.S Dollar experienced an extremely volatile trading week settling last Friday at 86.00 currently trading at 85.28 up about 20 points this Friday afternoon as volatility has exploded in bonds, stocks and many of the commodities as prices hit a 2 week low this week stopping out my recommendation around 85.30 as currently I’m sitting on the sidelines. If you took my original recommendation when prices broke out above the contract high of 81.20 back on the 25th of July this trade worked out very well but now look for other markets that are trending as this market will probably consolidate as it rallied about 600 points in the last 4 months, however I do believe we are in the midst of a long term bull market as Europe and Japan continue their quantitative easing as the United States has basically ended there quantitative easing so fundamentally speaking that should keep the foreign currencies weak against the U.S dollar. The chart structure currently is poor as this market generally is one of the least volatile of all the commodities, however with the stock market swings this week that sent volatility back into the dollar while sending shock waves through the currency markets as well so sit on the sidelines and look for another market with better chart structure. TREND: MIXED
CHART STRUCTURE: POOR

Coffee futures in the December contract are trading above their 20 & 100 day moving average however prices hit a 2 week low today as prices have become extremely volatile to the fact of hot & dry weather once again in Brazil causing concerns of another poor crop as prices settled last Friday at 220.40 currently trading at 210.70 down this Friday afternoon on a forecast of rain hitting key coffee growing regions next week. At the current time I’m sitting on the sidelines in this market as prices have become extremely volatile as I will wait for better chart structure to develop however I do think prices are limited to the downside due to the fact that Brazil probably will produce another poor crop this year as coffee is grown on trees and when a drought occurs those trees can be stressed for several years unlike the grain market where you can grow a brand new crop the next year. I’ve talked to a large coffee producer down in Brazil and he still is extremely bullish stating that he thinks the crop production numbers will be lower than what is currently estimated but only time will tell but the trend is neutral to higher at the current time but look for a better market with better chart structure.
TREND: NEUTRAL
CHART STRUCTURE: POOR

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How Low Can Crude Oil Go?

Our trading partner Mike Seery is laying out his bearish view on crude oil. How low can it go?

Crude oil futures in the November contract are down $1.50 a barrel currently trading at 89.53 right near two year lows with extreme choppiness over the last several weeks with many rallies and sell offs as I’ve been sitting on the sidelines but now the trend clearly is to the downside, however the chart structure is terrible at the current time so I am not taking a short at this time, however if you are interested in selling this market I would sell a futures contract at today’s price of 89.53 while placing my stop above $95 risking around $5,500 per contract.

The chart structure is very poor as volatility is extremely high but I am certainly not recommending anybody to buy this market as I do think prices are headed lower and if the chart structure improves in the next couple of days I will take a shot at the downside as we are awash in supplies worldwide plus the fact that the U.S dollar hit 2 year highs today as I see oil prices possibly heading down to the $80 level here in the next couple of months due to the fact of low demand and the fact that many of the commodity markets continue bearish trends as deflation is a problem not inflation.

The fact that prices are not rallying with havoc over in the mid East as oil used to rally sharply on problems in the Middle East but now the U.S is an exporter of oil so these ISIS events are not as important as they used to be so continue to sell any type of rally while placing your stop loss properly risking 2% of your account balance on any given trade.

TREND: LOWER
CHART STRUCTURE: TERRIBLE

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The Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse

By John Mauldin

Ian Bremmer, NYU professor and head of the geopolitical consulting powerhouse Eurasia Group, consults at the highest levels with both governments and companies because he brings to the table robust geopolitical analysis and a compelling thesis: that we are witnessing “the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order.” We live, as his last book told us, in a “G-0” world. In today’s Outside the Box, Ian spells out what that creative destruction means in terms of events on the ground today. As Ian notes, the most prominent feature of the international landscape this year has been the expansion of geopolitical conflict. That expansion is gaining momentum, he says, creating larger-scale crises and sharpening market volatility. Hold on to the reins now as Ian take us for a ride with the “Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse.”

We’ll follow up Ian’s piece with an excellent short analysis of the Iraq situation from a Middle East expert at a large hedge fund I correspond with. Pretty straightforward take on the situation with regard to ISIS. This quagmire has real implications for the world oil supply. (It appears that the Sunni rebel forces are now in complete control of the key Baiji Refinery, which produces a third of Iraq’s output.)

Back in Dallas, it’s a little hard to focus on geopolitical events when seemingly all the news is about ongoing domestic crises. But the outrageous IRS loss of emails doesn’t really affect our portfolios all that much. What happens in Iraq or with China does. There’s just not the emotional impact.

One domestic humanitarian crisis that is brewing just south of me is the massive influx of very young children across the U.S.-Mexican border. When this was first brought to my attention a few weeks ago, I must admit that I questioned the credibility of the source. We have had young children walking across the Texas border for decades but always in rather small numbers. The first source I read said that 40,000 had already come over this year. I just found that to be non credible, but then with a little reasonable research it not only became believable but could be a bit low – it looks as many as 90,000 children will cross the border this year.

What in the name of the Wide Wide World of Sports is going on? First of all, how do you cover up something of this magnitude until it is a true crisis? When the administration and other authorities clearly knew about it last year? (The evidence is irrefutable. They knew.)

I am the father of five adopted children. In an earlier phase of my life, I was somewhat involved with Child Protective Services here in Texas. It was an emotionally difficult and heartrending experience. (One of my children came out of that system and three from outside of the United States). I have no idea how you care for 90,000 children who don’t speak the language and have no connection to their new locale. Forget the dollar cost, which could run into the tens of billions over time. These are children, and they are on our doorstep and our watch. You simply can’t ignore them and say, “They are not supposed to be here, so it’s not our responsibility.” They are children. Someone, and that means here in the U.S., is going to have to figure out how to take care of them, even if it is only to learn why they try to come and figure out where to send them back to. And frankly, trying to to send them back is going to be a logistical and legal nightmare, not to mention psychologically traumatic to the children.

Maybe someone thought that waiting until there was a crisis to let this information slip out (and we found out about it because of photos posted anonymously of children packed together in holding cells) would create momentum for immigration reform. And they may be right. But I’m not certain it’s going to result in the type of immigration reform they were hoping to get.

I have to admit that I’ve been rather tolerant of illegal immigrants over the course of my life. There are a dozen or so key issues that I think this country should focus on, but I’ve just never gotten that worked up about illegal immigration. The simple fact is that everyone here in the US is either an immigrant or descended from immigrants. It may be, too, that I’ve hired a few undocumented workers here and there in my life. As an economist, I know that we should be trying to figure out how to get more capable immigrants here, not less. What you want are educated young people who are motivated to create and work, not children as young as four or five years old who are going to need housing, education, adult supervision, health care, and most of all a loving environment where they can grow up.

It is one thing for undocumented workers to come across the border looking for jobs or for families to come across together. It is a completely different matter when tens of thousands of preteen children come across the border without parents or supervision. They didn’t get across 1500 miles of desert without significant support and a great deal of planning. This couldn’t be happening without the awareness of authorities in Mexico and the Central American countries from which these children come, and if this is truly a surprise to Homeland Security, then there is a significant failure somewhere in the system.

And if it was not a surprise? That begs a whole different series of questions.

This is a major humanitarian crisis, and it is not in the Middle East or Africa. It is on our border, and we need to figure out what to do about it NOW!

I don’t care whether you think we need to build a 20 foot high wall across the southern border of the United States or give amnesty to anyone who wants to come in (or both), something has to be done with these children. It is a staggering problem of enormous logistical proportions, and we have a simple human responsibility to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves.

And on that note I will go ahead and hit the send button, and let’s focus on the critical geopolitical events happening around the globe. Iraq is a disaster. Ukraine is a crisis. What’s happening in the China Sea is troubling. It just seems to come at you from everywhere. Even on a beautiful summer day.

Your stunned by the magnitude of it all at analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box

---

(From Ian Bremmer)

Dear John,
We're halfway through 2014, and the single most notable feature of the international landscape has been the expansion of geopolitical conflict. why should we care? what's the impact; what does it mean for the global economy? how should we think about geopolitics? My thoughts on the topic, looking at the four key geopolitical pieces "in play"–in Eurasia, the middle east, Asia, and the transatlantic.

Geopolitics

 

I've written for several years about the root causes of the geopolitical instability the world is presently experiencing. a new, g-zero world where the united states is less interested in providing global leadership and nobody else is willing or able to step into that role. that primary leadership vacuum is set against a context of competing foreign policy priorities from increasingly powerful emerging markets (with very different political and economic systems) and a Germany-led Europe; challenges to the international system from a revisionist Russia in decline; and difficulties in coordination from a proliferation of relevant state and non state actors even when interests are aligned. all of this has stirred tensions in the aftermath of the financial crisis: instability across the middle east after a stillborn Arab spring; a three-year Syrian civil war; a failed Russia "reset"; rising conflict between china and japan; fraying American alliances with countries like Brazil, Germany, and Saudi Arabia.

And yet geopolitical concerns haven't particularly changed our views on global markets. each conflict has been small and self contained (or the spillover wasn't perceived to matter much). Geopolitics has been troubling on the margins but not worth more than a fret.

That's about to change. though perceived as discrete events, the rise of these geopolitical tensions are all directly linked to the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order. it's a process that's gaining momentum, creating in turn larger-scale crises and broader market volatility. we've now reached the point where near to mid-term outcomes of several geopolitical conflicts could become major drivers of the global economy. that's true of Russia/Ukraine, Iraq, the east and south china seas and U.S./Europe. in each, the status quo is unsustainable (though for very different reasons). and so, as it were, the four horsemen of the geopolitical apocalypse.

Russia/Ukraine

 

The prospect of losing Ukraine was the last straw for a Russian government that has been steadily losing geopolitical influence since the collapse of the soviet union over two decades ago. Moscow sees NATO enlargement, expanded European economic integration, energy diversification and the energy revolution as direct security threats that need to be countered. Ukraine is also an opportunity for the Kremlin...for president Putin to invigorate a flagging support base at home.

Putin intends to raise the economic and military pressure on Kiev until, at a minimum, southeast Ukraine is effectively under Russian control. the Ukrainian government's latest effort in response, a unilateral week long cease fire in the southeast, was greeted with lukewarm rhetoric by Putin and rejected by Russian separatists in the region, who escalated their attacks against the Ukrainian military. meanwhile, thousands of Russian troops recently pulled back from the Ukrainian border have now been redeployed there, bolstered by Putin ordering 65,000 Russian troops on combat alert in the region.

The choices for Kiev are thankless. if they press further, violence intensifies and Russian support expands, either routing the Ukrainian military, or taking serious losses and requiring direct "formal" intervention of Russian troops. if they back off, they lose the southeast, which is critical for their internal legitimacy from the Ukrainian population at large. all the while the Ukrainian economy teeters with much of their industrial base off line, compounded by Russian disruptions on customs, trade, and gas supply.

The growing conflict will lead to further deterioration of Russia's relationship with the united states and Europe: gas flow disruptions, expansion of defense spending and NATO coordination with Poland and the Baltic states, turbulence around Moldova and Georgia given their European association agreements this week...and "level 3" sectoral sanctions against Russia. that in turn means a serious economic downturn in Russia itself...and knock-on economic implications for Europe, which has far greater exposure to Russia than the united states does.

For the last several years, the major market concern for Europe was economic: the potential for collapse of the euro zone. that's no longer a worry. the primary risk to Europe is now clearly geopolitical, that expanded Russia/Ukraine conflict hurts Europe, in worst case pushing the continent back into recession.

Iraq

 

Like so much of the world's colonial legacy, many of the middle east's borders only "worked" because of the combination of secular authoritarian rule and international military and economic support. that was certainly true of Iraq–most recently under decades of control by the Baath party, beginning in 1963. Saddam Hussein's ouster forty years later by the united states and Great Britain, combined with the dismantling of nearly all of the military and political architecture that supported him (in dramatic contrast to, say, the ouster of Egypt's hosni Mubarak) undermined Iraq's territorial integrity. since then, Iraqi governance could still nominally function given significant American military presence and military and economic aid. once that was removed, there was little left to keep iraq functioning as a country.

Sectarianism is the primary form of allegiance in iraq today, both limiting the reach of prime minister nouri al maliki's majority shia government and creating closer ties between iraq's sunni, shia and kurdish populations and their brethren outside Iraq's borders. extremism within iraq has also grown dramatically as a consequence, particularly among the now disenfranchised sunni population--made worse by their heavy losses in the war against bashar assad across the largely undefended border with syria. the tipping point came with the broad attacks by the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) over the past fortnight, speeding up a decade-long expansion of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing between iraq's Sunni and shia. the comparatively wealthy and politically stable Kurds have done their best to steer clear of the troubles, seizing a long sought opportunity for de facto independence.

The American response has been cautious. domestic support for military engagement in Iraq diminished greatly as the war in Iraq continued and the economic and human costs mounted. obama repeatedly promised an end to the occupation and considered full withdrawal a major achievement of his administration. there's little domestic upside for taking responsibility in the crisis. obama's position has accordingly been that any direct military involvement requires a change in governance from the Iraqis--initially sounding like a unity government and increasingly evolving into the replacement of prime minister maliki. the pressure on maliki has gained momentum with shia grand ayatollah ali al-sistani calling on the iraqi prime minister to broaden the government to include more kurds and sunnis.

But Maliki, having successfully fought constitutional crises and assassination attempts, to say nothing of decisively winning a democratic election, is unlikely to go. isis poses a threat to the unity of the iraqi state, but not to maliki's rule of iraq's majority shia population, which if anything now stands stronger than it did before the fighting. and maliki's key international sponsor, iran, has little interest in forcing maliki into compromise as long as there's no threat to baghdad: they see themselves in far better strategic standing with a maliki-led iraqi government where they exert overwhelming influence, than over a broader government where they're one of many competing international forces. further, even if maliki were prepared to truly share power with iraq's kurds and sunni (something made more likely by the informal "influence" of 300 us military advisors now arriving in baghdad), he's unlikely to see much enthusiasm responding to that offer. the kurds are better off sticking to nominal (and a clearer road to eventual formal) independence; and sunni leaders that publicly find common cause with maliki would better hope all their family members aren't anywhere isis can find them.
absent american (or anyone else's) significant military engagement, the iraqi government is unlikely to be able to remove isis from leadership and, accordingly, reassert control over the sunni and kurdish areas of the country. that will lead to a significant increase in extremist violence emanating from the islamic world, a trend that's already deteriorated significantly in recent years (and since obama administration officials announced that cyberattacks were the biggest national security threat to the united states--a claim president obama overturned during his west point speech last month). since 2010, the number of known jihadist fighters has more than doubled; attacks by Al Qaeda affiliates have tripled.

The combination of challenging economic conditions, sectarian leadership, and the communications revolution empowering individuals through narrowing political and ideological demographic lenses all make this much more likely to expand. that's a greater threat to stability in the poorer middle eastern markets, but also will morph back into a growing terrorist threat against western assets in the region and more broadly. that creates, in turn, demand for increased security spending and bigger concerns about fat tail terrorism in the developed world, particularly in southern and western europe (where large numbers of unintegrated and unemployed islamic populations will pose more of a direct threat).

The broader risk is that sunni/shia conflict metastasizes into a single broader war. isis declares an islamic state across sunni iraq and syria, becoming ground zero for terrorist funding and recruitment from across the region. the saudi government condemns the absence of international engagement in either conflict and directly opposes an increasingly heavy and public iranian hand in iraqi and syrian rule. the united states completes a comprehensive nuclear deal with iran and declares victory (but doesn't work meaningfully with teheran on iraq), steering clear of the growing divide between the middle east's two major powers. the gulf cooperation council starts to fragment as members see opportunity in economic engagements with Iran. Iranian "advisers" in Iraq morph into armed forces; Saudi Arabia publicly opposes isis, but Saudi money and weapons get into their hands and an abundance of informal links pop up. militarization grows between an emboldened Iran and a more isolated, defensive Saudi Arabia. that's when the geopolitical premium around energy prices becomes serious.

East/South China Sea

 

Ukraine and Iraq are the two major active geopolitical conflicts. but there are two more geopolitical points of tension involving major economies that are becoming significant.

In Asia, it's the consequences of (and reactions to) an increasingly powerful and assertive china. the growth of china's influence remains the world's most important geopolitical story by a long margin. but, at least to date, china's growth is mostly an opportunity for the rest of the world. for the middle east, it's the principal new source of energy demand as the united states becomes more energy independent. for Africa, it's the best opportunity to build out long-needed infrastructure across the continent. for Europe and even the united states, it's a critical source of credit propping up currency, and a core producer of inexpensive goods. that's not to argue that there aren't significant caveats in each of these stories (or that those caveats aren't growing--they are), but rather that overall, china has been primarily perceived as an opportunity rather than a threat for all of these actors, and so it remains today.

for asia, a rising china has been seen more clearly as a double-edged sword. the greater comparative importance of the chinese economy has translated into more political influence (formal and informal) for beijing, at the expense of other governments in the region. meanwhile, china's dramatic military buildup has fundamentally changed the balance of power in asia; it's had negligible interest elsewhere.
china's military assertiveness has also grown in its backyard. in other regions, china continues to promote itself as a poor country that needs to focus on its own development and stability. in east and southeast asia china has core interests that it defends, and it is increasingly willing to challenge the status quo as its influence becomes asymmetrically greater.

that's been most clear with vietnam, where china first sent one oil rig to drill in contested waters directly off vietnam's shore--accompanied by several hundred chinese fishing vessels. they announced last week that they are repositioning four more. unsurprisingly, the vietnamese response has been sharp--anti-chinese demonstrations, violence, increased naval presence in the region, and coordination with the philippines.
none of that creates significant political risk on its own: vietnam isn't an ally of the united states and so engenders less support and response from washington than the philippines or japan...which is precisely why beijing has decided that's the best place to start changing the regional security balance.

but tokyo feels differently. the japanese government understands that a rising china is longer term a much more existential threat to its own security position in asia, and it isn't prepared to wait to raise concern until its position weakens further. so prime minister shinzo abe has declared his security support for vietnam. for america's part, obama has jettisoned the official "pivot" to asia. but the administration continues to believe that america's core national security interests, now and in the future, are in asia; and if china significantly escalates tensions in the east and south china seas, the united states is not likely to sit as idly by as they have on syria or ukraine.

the good news here is that--unlike with the countries driving the tensions in eurasia and the middle east--china has solid political stability and isn't looking for international trouble. but the realities of chinese growth, coupled with strong leadership from japan and (over time) india, along with the persistence of a strong american footprint are contributing to a much more troublesome geopolitical environment in the region.
the principle danger to the markets is what happens if the chinese government no longer holds that perspective. president xi jinping's commitment to transformational economic reform has been strong over the first year of his rule, and he has gotten surprisingly little pushback from the country's entrenched elites. but the uncertainty around china's near- to medium-term trajectory is radically greater than that of any of the world's other major economies. should significant instability emerge in china, very plausible indeed, china's willingness to take on a far more assertive (and risk-acceptant) security strategy in the region, promoting nationalism in the way putin has built his support base of late, would become far more likely. and then, the east and south china seas move to the top of our list.

U.S.-Europe

 

finally, the transatlantic relationship. advanced industrial economies with consolidated institutions and political stability, there's none of the geopolitical conflict presently visible in the middle east, eurasia, or asia.

geopolitical tensions have long been absent from the transatlantic relationship, the great success of the nato alliance. for all the occasional disagreement in europe on us military and security policy both during the cold war and since (the war in iraq, israel/palestine, counterterrorism and the like), european states never considered the need for broader security ties as a counterbalance for nato membership.

but the changing nature of geopolitics is creating a rift between the united states and europe.
american global hegemony had security and economic components, and it was collective security that had been the core element holding together the transatlantic alliance. that's no longer the case--a consequence of changing priorities for the americans and europeans, and an evolving world order (russia/ukraine a major blip, but notwithstanding). the transatlantic relationship is much less closely aligned on economics.

it's not the conventional wisdom. most observers say that, after bush, american policy looks more european these days--less militarist, more multilateralist. but actually, us foreign policy isn't becoming more like europe, it's becoming more like china. it's less focused on the military, except on issues of core security concern (in which case the united states acts with little need to consult allies), while american economic policy tends to be unilateralist in supporting preferred american geopolitical outcomes--which is seen most directly in us sanctions behavior (over $15bn in fines now levied against more than 20 international banks--mostly european) and nsa surveillance policy (with no willingness of the us to cooperate in a germany requested "no spying" mutual agreement)

transatlantic economic dissonance is also in evidence in a number of more fundamental ways: america's "growth uber alles" approach to a downturn in the economy, compared to germany's fixation on fiscal accountability. europe's greater alignment between governments and corporations on industrial policy, as opposed to a more decentralized, private-sector led (and occasionally captured) american policy environment. a more economy-driven opportunistic european approach to china, russia and other developing markets; the us government looking focused more on us-led/"universalist" principles on industrial espionage, intellectual property, etc.

as the g-zero persists, we will see the united states looking to enforce more unilateral economic standards that the europeans resent and resist; while the europeans look to other countries more strategically as counterbalances to american economic hegemony (the german-china relationship is critical in this regard, but that's also true of europe's willingness to support american economic policies in russia and the middle east). all of this means a much less cooperative trans-atlantic relationship--less "universalism" (from the american perspective) and less "multilateralism" (from the european perspective). more zero-sumness in the transatlantic relationship is a big change in the geopolitical environment; a precursor to true multipolarity, but in the interim a more fragmented and much less efficient global marketplace.

* * *

so that's where i see geopolitics emerging as a key factor for the global markets--much more than at any time since the end of the cold war. there's some good news and bad news here.

the good news is none of these geopolitical risks are likely to have the sort of market implications that the macro economic risks did after the financial crisis. there are lots of reasons for that. a low interest rate environment and solid growth from the us and china--plus the eurozone out of recession--along with pent up demand for investment is leading to significant optimism that won't be easily cowed by geopolitics. the supply/demand energy story is largely bearish, so near-term geopolitical risks from the middle east won't create sustained high prices. and markets don't know how to price geopolitical risk well; they're not covered as clearly analytically, so investors don't pay as much attention (until/unless they have to).

the bad news...that very lack of pressure from the markets means political leaders won't feel as much need to address these crises even as they expand, particularly in the united states. this is another reason the world's geopolitical crises will persist beyond a level that a similar economic crisis would hit before serious measures start to be taken to mitigate them. these geopolitical factors are going to grow. now's the time to start paying attention to them.

* * *
every once in a while, it's good to take a step back and look at the big picture. hope you found that worthwhile. i'll surely get back in the weeds next monday.

meanwhile, it's looking like a decidedly lovely week in new york.
very best,
Ian

From intel sources:

Dislodging ISIS Will Be a Difficult Task

 

The ISIS advance toward Baghdad may be temporarily held off as the government rallies its remaining security forces and Shia militias organize for the upcoming Battle for Baghdad. There is a rather clear reason why the ISIS leader has renamed himself Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, meaning the Caliph of Baghdad . ISIS will at a minimum be able to take control of some Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad shortly and wreak havoc on the city with IEDs, ambushes, single suicide attacks, and suicide assaults that target civilians, the government, security forces, senior members of government, and foreign installations and embassies. Additionally, the brutal sectarian slaughter of Sunni and Shia alike that punctuated the violence in Baghdad from 2005 to 2007 is likely to return as Shia militias and ISIS fighters begin to assert control of neighborhoods and roam the streets.

Even if Iraqi forces are able to keep ISIS from fully taking Baghdad and areas south, it is unlikely the beleaguered military and police forces will be able to retake the areas under ISIS control in the north and west without significant external support, as well as the support of the Kurds.

ISIS and its allies are in a position today that closely resembles the position prior to the US surge back in early 2007. More than 130,000 US troops, partnered with the Sunni Awakening formations and Iraqi security forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were required to clear Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, Ninewa, Baghdad, and the "triangle of death." The concurrent operations took more than a year, and were supported by the US Air Force, US Army aviation brigades, and US special operations raids that targeted the jihadists’ command and control, training camps, and bases, as well as its IED and suicide bomb factories.

Today, the Iraqis have no US forces on the ground to support them, US air power is absent, the Awakening is scattered and disjointed, and the Iraqi military has been humiliated badly while surrendering or retreating in disarray during the lightning fast jihadists' campaign from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad. This campaign, by the way, has been remarkably and significantly faster than the U.S. armored campaign advance to Baghdad in 2003 . The US government has indicated that it will not deploy US soldiers in Iraq, either on the ground or at airbases to conduct air operations.  Meanwhile, significant amounts of US made advanced armaments, vehicles, ammunition, and diverse military equipment have fallen into ISIS jihadists’ hands .

ISIS is advancing boldly in the looming security vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi security forces and the West's refusal to recommit forces to stabilize Iraq. This has rendered the country vulnerable to further incursions by al Qaeda-linked jihadists as well as intervention by interested neighbors such as Iran. Overt Iranian intervention in Iraq would likely lead any Sunnis still loyal to the government to side with ISIS and its allies, and would ensure that Iraq would slide even closer to a full-blown civil war and de facto partition, and risk a wider war throughout the Middle East.

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The article Outside the Box: The Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse was originally published at Mauldin Economics

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You pushed oil higher on Friday....was it China Demand or Middle East Disruption?

September crude oil closed higher ending a five day correction off last Friday's high. Yet shares of some top oil companies were down at the close of trading on Friday. BP fell $.01 to $41.27, Chevron fell $.57 or .5 percent, to $122.50, ConocoPhillips fell $.26 or .4 percent, to $66.83, Exxon Mobil Corp. fell $.43 or .5 percent, to $90.72, Marathon Oil Corp. fell $.12 or .3 percent, to $34.55. The high range close in Sept. oil sets the stage for a steady to higher opening when Monday's night session begins. Stochastics and the RSI are neutral to bearish signaling that sideways to lower prices are possible near term.

Closes in oil below last Tuesday's low crossing at 102.67 would confirm that a short term top has been posted. Closes above July's high crossing at 108.93 would renew this summer's rally while opening the door for a possible test of weekly resistance crossing at 110.55 later this summer. First resistance is July's high crossing at 108.93. Second resistance is weekly resistance crossing at 110.55. First support is last Tuesday's low crossing at 102.67. Second support is the 38% retracement level of the April-July rally crossing at 100.27.

The September S&P 500 closed lower on Friday. The mid range close sets the stage for a steady to lower opening when Monday's night session begins trading. Stochastics and the RSI are bearish signaling that sideways to lower prices are possible near term. Closes below the 20 day moving average crossing at 1687.33 would confirm that a short term top has been posted. If September extends the rally off June's low, upside targets will now be hard to project with the index trading into uncharted territory. First resistance is last Friday's high crossing at 1705.00. Second resistance is unknown with September trading into uncharted territory. First support is the 20 day moving average crossing at 1687.33. Second support is the reaction low crossing at 1670.50.

October gold closed higher on Friday. The high range close sets the stage for a steady to higher opening when Monday's night session begins trading. Stochastics and the RSI are turning neutral to bullish signaling that sideways to higher prices are possible near term. Today's close above the 10 day moving average crossing at 1307.90 confirms that a short term low has been posted. If October renews the decline off July's high, July's low crossing at 1208.50 is the next downside target. First resistance is the reaction high crossing at 1339.40. Second resistance is July's high crossing at 1348.00. First support is Wednesday's low crossing at 1272.10. Second support is July's low crossing at 1208.50.

September Henry natural gas closed lower on Friday leaving Thursday's key reversal up unconfirmed. The low range close sets the stage for a steady to lower opening on Monday. Stochastics and the RSI are oversold but remain neutral to bearish signaling that sideways to lower prices are possible near term. If September extends this year's decline, psychological support crossing at 3.000 is the next downside target. Closes above the 20 day moving average crossing at 3.520 would confirm that a short term low has been posted. First resistance is the 10 day moving average crossing at 3.349. Second resistance is the 20 day moving average crossing at 3.520. First support is Thursday's low crossing at 3.129. Second support is psychological support crossing at 3.000.

Last but not least, our favorite trade for 2013.....September coffee closed higher on Friday and the high range close set the stage for a steady to higher opening on Friday. Stochastics and the RSI are bullish signaling that sideways to higher prices are possible near term. Today's close above the 20 day moving average crossing at 122.22 confirms that a short term low has been posted. If September extends this week's rally, the reaction high crossing at 126.50 is the next upside target.

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OPEC Becoming a "Non Player" as North America Brings Energy Profits Home

Things have changed quite a bit in the last couple of years. Gone are the days of being glued to the TV waiting for news coming out of OPEC and it's effect on U.S. oil and gas prices. Now our days are filled with thoughts of "how do we profit on the oil and natural gas plays in North America". And we don't have to look no further than shale plays, energy service companies and offshore oil drilling opportunities in the U.S. or so says Byron King of Agora Financial LLC.

In this interview with The Energy Report, King discusses how dwindling exports to the U.S. from Latin America, Africa and the Middle East are shifting the supply and demand equation across the world. King also names companies in the service space with solid prospects for investors.

The Energy Report: Byron, welcome. You recently attended the Platts Conference in London, which addressed shifting energy trade patterns in light of growing U.S. export prospects and dwindling exports from South America and Africa. Has OPEC's role diminished?

Byron King: The short answer is yes. OPEC is struggling right now. The Middle East, the West African producers and Venezuela are struggling. The West African players and Venezuela have seen exports to the U.S. decline dramatically. In countries like Algeria, oil exports to the U.S. are essentially zero, while Nigeria's exports to the U.S. are way down. The oil these countries export tends to be the lighter, sweeter crude, which happens to be the product that is increasing in production in the U.S. through fracking.

The east-to-west trade pattern for oil imports to the U.S. has essentially gone away. This does not mean that the oil goes away. It means these countries have to find new markets for their oil which they are doing, in India and the Far East. But that disrupts trade patterns as well. Imports from the Middle East to the U.S. are falling as well. These barrels tend to be the heavier, sourer crude that U.S. refineries are geared to process.

As the U.S. imports less oil, our balance of trade gets better. The recent strengthening of the dollar has a lot to do with importing less oil. Strengthening the dollar decreases gold and silver prices, so there is some monetary blowback from the good news out of the oil patch. Strengthening the dollar increases the broad stock market for the non resource, non commodity and non-energy plays. There's an astonishing dynamic at work.

TER: When it comes to countries like Venezuela, part of the reason for the decrease in exports is because it has not invested its profits in infrastructure.

BK: Good point. In Venezuela, the government has taken so much money out of the oil industry to use for social spending, military spending and government overhead that the sustaining capital is not there. Even with Hugo Chavez's death and new leadership in Venezuela, it will require years of sustained and increased investment to get Venezuela's output up. After 10 years of dramatically bad underinvestment, the infrastructure is worn out. It will take a lot of time, money and some seriously hard political decisions to redeploy capital inside a country like Venezuela.

TER: If OPEC can no longer control the price of oil through supply because it does not have as much control of supply, what is keeping it from flooding the market with oil to get more revenue?

BK: That would work both ways. If OPEC floods the market with more oil, it will drive the price of oil down. Then OPEC nations would get fewer dollars for each barrel. All of that extra output, if sold at a lower price, might still yield less money, which is not a good thing if you are an oil exporter and need the funds.

"The east-to-west trade pattern for oil imports to the U.S. has essentially gone away."

The big swing producer is still Saudi Arabia. Saudi has spare capacity, but I suspect not as much as it wants people to believe. It gets back to that idea of peak oil. We've discussed it before, and yes, I know fracking is changing the game to some extent. But you still need to keep all the books about peak oil on your shelf. Fracking is what happens on the back side of the peak oil curve, when you need barrels, are willing to pay high prices and throw lots of capital and labor at the problem.

A country like Saudi Arabia could increase its output, but not for long and not in a heavily sustainable way. It would damage its oil fields. Beyond that, the trick for OPEC is going to be getting several countries to agree to cut output to make up for the extra output from North America, in the hope of keeping prices where they are right now.

Brent crude which is what the posting is for much of the OPEC contracts is about $103/barrel ($103/bbl). If OPEC wants to keep that number or not let it fall too much further it has to cut output, not increase output. That is a very difficult and politically charged issue within OPEC. The Middle Eastern countries can afford a minor amount of financial turmoil right now. The other OPEC countries absolutely cannot afford financial problems stemming from low oil prices.

TER: Is there informal price control going on in the shale oil fields? As the price of natural gas has dropped, the oil rig count has dropped and once the price goes up, those oil rigs could start up again. Could there be an OPEC of North America?

BK: I do not see an organized North American OPEC because there are too many companies in the mix. Too many people have a bite at the apple for anybody to control things. It is more like a tangle of accidental circumstances driving production levels. We are seeing a slight drop in the oil rig count in the U.S. right now. Part of that has to do with the natural gas cutback, but part also has to do with the efficiency of the fracking model. Fracking can be energy inefficient, but also can be industrially efficient.

Five years ago and earlier, the idea of drilling wells was to look for oil fields. You were drilling into specific regions enriched with hydrocarbons that could flow into a well under reservoir energy or with just modest amounts of pumping or pressurization.

Today, with fracking, you are not really looking at oil fields. You are drilling into an entire formation. You are drilling into a large-scale resource and introducing energy into a formation to break up the rock and get the oil or natural gas out. To do that successfully is much more a manufacturing model than the traditional oil drilling model. This is why you see drilling pads that have room for 10 or 12 wells. You drill the wells directionally outward.

In western Pennsylvania I have seen some of the drilling maps for companies like Range Resources Corp. (RRC:NYSE). These companies have very efficient ways of corkscrewing pipe into the sweet spots of the formations with multistage fracks. They are draining the formations very efficiently. You see fewer rigs because each rig is being used in a manufacturing type of process, as opposed to the olden days when drilling was similar to craftwork.

Modern drilling and fracking, at least in North America, is much more of an assembly line process. Companies are using the same drill pits over and over again. They are using the same drilling mud and the same fracking water. Much of the same equipment gets used multiple times on several different wells. In the olden days, each well was its own special unique construction. Of course, every oil or gas well is different, and the results depend on how you drill it.

TER: Which companies are doing this the best and are they actually making money?

BK: Five years ago, people would talk about how this well made money or how that well does not make money anymore. That's harder to do today. The economics of the current fracking world are still up in the air.

The jury is out on many of these fracking plays. Companies are drilling a lot of wells and they are expensive. They are fracking the wells and that is very expensive. At a recent conference, a gentleman from Halliburton Co. (HAL:NYSE) said up to 50% of the different fracking stages on wells do not work. They either fail at the beginning or soon after they go into production due to many reasons geotechnical failure; equipment failure; blockages in the holes, in the pipe, in the perforations; things like that. Once a company has put the steel in the ground, done its fracking and inserted its equipment, it is very difficult to get down there and fix what is broken.

"North American shale oil plays have had an extensive ripple effect through the U.S. economy."

Right now natural gas prices are so low that if a company is drilling for dry gas, it is almost a given that it is not making any money. If the company is drilling for wet gas and is producing, the gas helps pay for the investment. When you get into some of the oil plays in the Bakken formation in North Dakota, or the Eagle Ford down in Texas, you are starting to get a mid continent price or even better for the gas plus associated oil or liquids. When I say mid-continent, I mean West Texas Intermediate; the WTI price as opposed to the Brent price.

Regarding the pricing structure within North America, the oil sands coming out of Alberta are selling at the low end of the market scale. If West Texas Intermediate is about $90/bbl, the Canadian sand oil might be $60/bbl. That is a one third differential. Is that because the quality is so different? Not necessarily. The oil sand product quality is slightly lower than the WTI, but it is not a one-third difference in terms of molecules or energy content or refinability. The difference is in stranded infrastructure. The cheaper oil is geographically stranded up in the frozen north of Canada, and you have to get it out through pipelines and railcars. You cannot get it over the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Coast. There are only a few places for that oil to go, so it comes south. In its first stop across the U.S. border, in North Dakota, it competes with the Bakken plays.

The great mover of mid-continent oil today is the North American rail system the tanker cars. Back in the days of John D. Rockefeller, he could control oil markets with access to rails, rail shipping and tankers cars. Now you have to look at the cost of moving oil from mid-continent to another destination. If you are in North Dakota, you can move oil west to Washington or California, where there are refineries. Or you could move it to Chicago or farther east, to the refineries there. Or you could move it south, where you compete with imported oil at the Houston refineries. It is a very complex arrangement. And you must deal with the usual suspects BNSF Railway Company and Union Pacific the two biggies of hauling oil.

"The jury is out on many of these fracking plays."

We're seeing some truly astonishing developments here. Look at Delta Air Lines Inc. (DAL:NYSE), which spent $300 million buying the old Trainer refinery in Philadelphia. Actually, less than that when you take in the subsidy from the state of Pennsylvania. So now, Delta is importing oil from the Bakken to Trainer on railroad cars. Delta feeds its East Coast operations with jet fuel coming out of the Trainer refinery, including planes flying out of John F. Kennedy International Airport, which gives it a price advantage in the North Atlantic market. The price differential of just a few pennies a gallon on jet fuel is the difference between making or losing money on the North Atlantic routes.

Then, Delta can go to other airports where it operates, and beat up on the fuel supplier by threatening to bring in its own fuel. So Delta is extracting price concessions from vendors. It's sort of an old-fashioned "gas war," like when service stations used to see who could sell fuel the cheapest.

Mid-continent oil, mid-continent economics and transport by rail have completely altered the economics of other industries, including the rail and airline industries. North American shale oil plays have had an extensive ripple effect through the U.S. economy.

TER: Could building more pipelines to export facilities in the U.S. shrink those differentials?

BK: More pipelines will shrink the differential, but pipelines take time. In the environmentalist political world we live in today, it takes years to do all the permitting, and pretty much nobody wants to have a pipeline running through the backyard. Existing pipelines are golden because they are already there. Maybe they can be expanded, the pumps improved; we can tweak them or put additives in the fluid to make the product move faster. There are all sorts of possibilities with existing pipelines.

For the pipelines that are not built yet, you have the whole NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) issue. The railroad lobby and the lobbies of companies that build railroad cars also do not want to see new pipelines because these companies are more than happy to ship oil on railcars, even though in terms of energy efficiency safety and spillage, rail is less efficient overall.

TER: Based on this reality, how are you investing in shale space or are you?

BK: Right now, I am investing in the shale space at the very fundamentals. It is a pick-and-shovel approach to investing. I focus on what I call the big three of the services companies Halliburton, Schlumberger Ltd. (SLB:NYSE) and Baker Hughes Inc. (BHI:NYSE)because these companies have people are out there in the fields with the trucks and equipment, doing the work and getting paid for it. Another company that I really like is Tenaris (TS:NYSE), one of the best makers of steel drill pipe. You could buy U.S. Steel Corp. (X:NYSE), for example, which is doing very well in tubular goods, but it is a big, integrated steel company with iron mines and coal mines. It owns railroads, and sells steel to the auto industry, the appliance industry and the construction industry. Tubular and oilfield goods are just a part of U.S. Steel. With a company like Tenaris, it is more of a pure play on the oilfield development.

TER: Are you are a fan of oil services companies at this point in time?

BK: Yes. In terms of a company that is actually out there doing the work, I have great admiration for Range Resources. Its share price seems bid up pretty high. In terms of the large caps, I am looking at global integrated players: BP Plc (BP:NYSE), Royal Dutch Shell Plc (RDS.A:NYSE), Statoil ASA (STO:NYSE) and Total S.A. (TOT:NYSE), the French company. They are big, global and pay nice dividends. Even BP, for all of its troubles, is still paying a respectable dividend.

TER: Those are companies that also have exposure to the offshore oil area. Is that a growth area?

BK: Offshore is booming. Some companies are very good at what they do, and when you look at the pick-and-shovel plays, that would be companies like Halliburton, Schlumberger and Baker Hughes, among others. Transocean Ltd. (RIG:NYSE), the big offshore drilling company, is making a nice comeback, as is Cameron International Corp. (CAM:NYSE), which is in wellhead machinery, blowout preventers and things like that. FMC Technologies (FTI:NYSE) is a fabulous subsea equipment builder, and Oceaneering International (OII:NYSE), which makes remote operating vehicles (ROVs), has done great the last couple of years and is still growing.

"Fracking is changing the game to some extent. But you still need to keep all of the books about peak oil on your shelf."

A couple of points about offshore. In the U.S. offshore space, in March and April 2010, right after the BP blowout, the U.S. government basically shut it down. The offshore space was utter road kill. By the second half of 2010, it was dead. It went from being a $20 billion ($20B)/year industry to about a $3B/year industry. Here we are, three years later, and the offshore industry in the U.S. is recovering. There is still growth.

If you look at the rest of the world's coastlines, you see an increasing amount of concessions, leasing and acreage whether it is in the Russian Arctic or the North Sea or off the coast of Africa. There are booming areas offshore of West Africa and East African plays, with companies like Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (APC:NYSE) and its huge natural gas discovery off of Mozambique. In the Far East, off of Australia, there is a whole liquefied natural gas (LNG) boom. Much of the Australia hydrocarbon story is in offshore LNG. These are huge plays involving great big companies, a lot of money, steel in the ground and lots of equipment that either floats on the water or sits on the seafloor. It is all good for the offshore space.

TER: Are there any particular projects that a BP or Shell is doing right now that you are excited about?

BK: Shell has a big play onshore in the U.S., part of the whole shale gale. Shell is a big global integrated explorer, but is backing away from the offshore East African plays because they are a little too expensive for the company's taste. Shell has made investments in West Africa, off of Gabon, and also in South Africa, in the Orange Basin. I think Shell envisions itself as a future key player in South Africa, which is good because South Africa is a big, industrially developed country with a large population and big markets. South Africa has ongoing social problems, but it needs energy. So if Shell is successful in offshore South Africa, there's a built-in market. Shell doesn't have to tanker oil in or pipe it in or somehow move it halfway across the world.

TER: In light of what happened with BP, are these offshore oil plays riskier, since one accident can shut everything down. Or are large companies like Shell diversified enough that it doesn't matter?

BK: I will never say that accidents do not matter. As we learned from the Gulf of Mexico, an offshore accident can be a company killer. BP literally went through a near-death experience. In the minds of some people, BP is still not out of the woods. The company has made settlement after settlement and it is still not done paying. It has divested itself of many attractive assets over the past couple of years to raise enough cash to pay settlements, fees and fines.

The good news about the aftermath of the accident is that, globally, there is a heightened sense of safety awareness in the oil industry. Companies have watched the BP issues very closely and learned every lesson they possibly can. All of the solid operators are hypersensitive and hypercautious toward offshore operations.

It all comes back to benefit some of the service players I mentioned earlier. The fact that many offshore drilling platforms had to upgrade blowout preventers to a much higher specification benefited the likes of Cameron and FMC Technologies. In the new environment, your subsea equipment must be built to a higher specification. So say thank you to FMC Technologies which will gladly build it to that higher spec and charge you a higher price.

The numbers of inspections that companies must do when they work at the surface of the ocean are enormous. If a company has to inspect every 48 hours, it needs more ROVs. Who makes ROVs? That would be Oceaneering. There are other opportunities in other spaces, such as dealing with existing offshore platforms, existing offshore pipelines and existing offshore rig populations. One company that has done very well in our portfolio in the last couple of years is Helix Energy Solutions Group Inc. (HLX:NYSE). It deals with offshore repairs and servicing issues, and offers decommissioning services.

Individuals who go into these kinds of investments want to become educated about them. We are in these investments with a long term, multiyear horizon because that is the investment cycle. From prospect to producing platform, these kinds of investments can take 1015 years to play out. It's like an oil company annuity for the well run oil service guys.

The good news is that there is long-term reward, because large volumes of oil come from offshore. When looking at the shale gale, on the best day of the year in the Eagle Ford or the Bakken onshore, a really good well can produce 1,000 barrels per day (1 Mbbl/d). Six months from now that well could produce 400 (400 bbl/d), and a year from now it might produce 200 bbl/d. The decline rates are really steep. On some of the offshore wells, we are talking 1520 Mbbl/d, which can be sustained for several years. The economics of a good well and a good play offshore are for the long term.

TER: It sounds like your advice is for people to do their homework and be in it for the long term.

BK: Yes. My newsletter, Outstanding Investments, talks about oil and oil investments all the time; subscribers receive my views over the long term. As an investor, you want to educate yourself about different companies in the space, what equipment is used in the space and what the processes are. You do not have to be a geologist or an engineer to invest, but you need to be willing to learn. There is an entire offshore vocabulary that you need to understand to appreciate the investment opportunities. You also need to be able to keep your sanity during times of tumult, when the rest of the market might be losing its grip. And you need to understand why you went into a certain investment in the first place and when it is time to get out.

TER: That is great advice. Thank you so much for taking the time to talk with me today.

BK: You are very welcome.

Byron King writes for Agora Financial's Daily Resource Hunter and also edits two newsletters: Energy Scarcity Investor and Outstanding Investments. He studied geology and graduated with honors from Harvard University, and holds advanced degrees from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and the U.S. Naval War College. He has advised the U.S. Department of Defense on national energy policy.

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